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As a result of the agency problem, earnings management may take place due to the high 
contracting costs, shareholders’ bounded rationalities, and information asymmetry. 
Therefore, three main groups of motives have been identified to explain earnings 
management behaviour at the contracting, capital market, and external levels.  While the 
previous studies have individually examined those motives, this thesis provides 
evidence that they interact in determining earnings management behaviour.  
The first empirical chapter of this thesis focuses on the contracting factors and 
examines the impact of earnings management on executive compensation conditioned 
on managerial ability. It finds that managers who utilize accrual earnings management 
receive higher compensation than those who undertake real earnings management. 
However, high quality managers are rewarded less for accrual earnings management 
and punished less for real earnings management.  
The second empirical chapter examines the non-linear effect of market 
concentration as an external motive of earnings management. It documents that accrual 
earnings management increases in concentrated markets as the quantity of information 
decreases. However, the sophisticated real earnings management starts to substitute for 
discretionary accruals at higher levels of market concentration when the quality of 
information declines.  
The third empirical chapter combines factors from the contracting and external 
motives. It examines the effect of market competition on the relationship between 
managerial ability and earnings management. The results show that in the face of 
increased competition, high quality managers manipulate earnings via accruals rather 
than more costly real earnings management.  
 Overall, the results of this thesis show that management compensation is a 
crucial factor in assessing the costs of earnings management at the firm level. An 
optimal level of market concentration exists and should be considered by the regulators. 
Finally, understanding how industry level factors influence managerial decisions at the 
firm level is essential to explaining earnings management behaviour. 
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As a result of separating ownership from control in public companies, an agency 
problem appears between the principals (shareholders) and the agents (managers) 
(Holmström and Milgrom, 1987). Under this conflict in interests, managers might not 
reveal the truth because of the high contracting costs between managers and firms, 
shareholders’ bounded rationalities that do not enable them to understand management 
actions, and the information asymmetry derived from the costly communication in the 
market (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Ronen and Yaari, 2008; Walker, 2013). In this 
sense, managers may exercise discretion over financial reporting that can take the shape 
of earnings management if performed under the umbrella of Generally Accepted 
Accounting principles (GAAP). Based on the previous theoretical perspectives, earnings 
management might be explained by three main theories that involve contracting theory, 
bounded rationality theory, and information asymmetry theory (Harris and Raviv, 1979; 
Fama, 1980; Strong and Walker, 1987; Walker, 2013). From these theories, modern 
research has introduced three different groups of motives to explain earnings 
management behaviour including contracting motives that arise from the deficiencies in 
the contract terms between the firm and its stakeholders, capital market motives that are 
related to the inefficiencies of stock markets, and third-party motives driven by external 
parties that influence the cost of communicating information in the market (Ronen and 
Yaari, 2008; Walker, 2013). 
The earnings management literature has separately studied the previous groups 
of motives and identified a number of factors under each group. Among the contracting 
motives, management compensation, CEO turnover, managerial ability, corporate 
governance, and loans were identified (Godfrey et al., 2003; Boone et al., 2004; DeFond 
and Francis, 2005; Yu, 2008; Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009; Laux and Laux, 2009; 
Demerjian et al., 2013b). To examine capital market motives, the literature has focused 
on the influence of the stock market, issuance of equity, new listing and cross-listing, 






mergers and acquisitions, insider trading, management buyouts, meeting or beating a 
benchmark, and the effect of analysts on earnings management (Kothari, 2001; Lang et 
al., 2006; Efendi et al., 2007; Fan, 2007). Finally, from the external motives the 
literature has studied the impact of industry, industrial diversification, regulations, 
political environment and country-specific policies, accounting standards, tax 
considerations, competitors, suppliers and customers (Bagnoli and Watts, 2000; 
Goldman and Slezak, 2006; Jiraporn et al., 2006; Barth et al., 2008). 
At the contracting level, management compensation is part of the contract 
structure between the firm and its managers that aims to link between firm performance 
and managerial payment to resolve the conflict of interests arising from the separation 
of ownership from control (Strong and Walker, 1987; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). 
Compensation has been frequently examined as an incentive of earnings management 
because managers might attempt to extract higher rewards by using earnings 
management to signal better performance (Healy, 1985; Cohen et al., 2008). However, 
compensation can be also viewed as an outcome of management behaviour as firms 
tend to reward or punish their managers based on the consequences of their activities 
(Adut et al., 2013; Dutta and Fan, 2014; Sun, 2014). The previous studies have 
emphasized the outcomes of earnings management activities to the firm but ignored the 
costs that managers might incur upon using accrual and real earnings management 
(Graham et al., 2005). While real earnings management is more costly to the firm 
because it contributes to losing cash flows and sacrificing future projects, it is also more 
likely to influence managers’ future compensation. Understanding the impact of 
earnings management on managers’ future benefits would assist in explaining their 
current behaviour e.g., the behaviour of high quality managers who select using more 
accrual and less real earnings management (Demerjian et al., 2013b).  
At the external level, market concentration is considered as another motive of 
earnings management behaviour as it influences the communication of information in 
the market and ultimately contributes to moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
(Walker, 2013). While the previous studies have focused on a linear effect of market 
concentration on earnings management (Dalia and Park, 2009; Markarian and Santalo, 
2010; Karuna et al., 2012; Datta et al., 2013), a non-linear effect is more plausible 
because of the concurrent opportunistic and disciplinary incentives in concentrated 






markets. By the time earnings management is likely to occur because of the lack of 
information needed for monitoring performance, the presence of fewer competitors 
creates less communication pressure to manipulate earnings (Strong and Walker, 1987; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). In this sense, the changes in the quantity and quality of 
information are likely to create a situation of uncertainty that explains the trade-off 
between earnings management activities (Hart, 1995; Arroyo, 2007). Analysing 
earnings management behaviour in concentrated markets would contribute to 
identifying an optimal level of market concentration that should mitigate the negative 
consequences of accrual and real earnings management.  
Finally, the external and contractual motives can be combined to further 
understand earnings management behaviour. Within the earnings management literature, 
neither competition nor managerial ability has been found to have consistent effects on 
the earnings management behaviour of firms. Demerjian et al. (2013b), for example, 
examine the impact of managerial ability on earnings management and find less able 
managers undertake more earnings management. Conversely, Francis et al. (2008) find 
higher earnings management where managers have higher abilities. This conflicting 
evidence also occurs in the presence of competition with some studies finding a 
negative relation between competition and earnings management (Dalia and Park, 2009; 
Markarian and Santalo, 2010), while others document a positive relationship (Karuna et 
al., 2012; Datta et al., 2013). However, the effects of competition and managerial ability 
are unlikely to be independent. Therefore, understanding whether managerial ability 
explains the earnings management behaviour in the presence of differing levels of 
competition would contribute to highlighting the importance of simultaneously 
considering the different groups of earnings management motives when studying 
earnings management behaviour. 
Overall, this thesis aims to examine the relations between the previously 
selected motives and earnings management, and subsequently studies whether the 
interaction between those contractual and external factors contributes to further 
understanding earnings management behaviour. At the contracting level, the thesis 
examines the influence of accrual and real earnings management on the future 
compensation of managers based on their different abilities. At the external level, the 
thesis studies the impact of market concentration on accrual and real earnings 






management taking into consideration the changes in information quantity and quality 
in concentrated markets. Finally, at an external-contractual level, the thesis examines 
how market competition influences the amounts of accrual and real earnings managed 
by high quality managers. Earnings management was the underlying reason for some of 
the financial scandals of large companies like Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and Tyco in 
the early 2000s and ultimately resulted in the failure of those companies. These 
incidences have raised more concern about the role of financial reporting in reflecting 
the performance of firms (Giroux, 2004). Therefore, understanding the relations 
suggested in this thesis is expected to have implications to the regulators, policy makers, 
shareholders, investors, academics, and some of the gatekeepers e.g., auditors and 
analysts. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 explains the 
effect of earnings management on management compensation taking into consideration 
the variation in managerial abilities. Section 1.3 discusses the relationship between 
market concentration and earnings management based on the changes in information in 
the market. Section 1.4 presents the joint effect of managerial ability, as one of the 
contracting motives, and market competition, as an external factor, on earnings 
management. Section 1.5 summarizes the research questions. Section 1.6 explains the 
significance and contributions of this research. Finally, section 1.7 outlines the structure 
of the thesis.  
 
1.2 Management Compensation  
The first empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 6) examines the impact of earnings 
management exercised by managers at different levels of abilities on their future 
compensation. While the previous literature documents that managerial ability has a 
positive effect on accrual earnings management and a negative one on real earnings 
management, it explains the previous findings based on the consequences of earnings 
management on the firm (Demerjian et al., 2013b). From the firm perspective, accrual 
earnings management is considered less costly than real earnings management because 
it only allows for discretion over accrual accounting and subsequently unwinds in the 
next accounting period. In contrast, real earnings management involves actions that 






have severe economic consequences to the firm’s operating and stock return 
performance because they result in losing cash flows and ultimately sacrificing future 
projects (Graham et al., 2005; Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007; Cohen et al., 2008). 
Although accrual and real earnings management are likely to influence managers’ 
welfare as well, the previous literature does not explain their costs from management 
perspective. Compensation is one of the major rents managers extract; hence creating a 
contractual motive that has been frequently examined as an incentive of earnings 
management behaviour (Healy, 1985; Gao and Shrieves, 2002; Cheng and Warfield, 
2005; Graham et al., 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Carter et al., 2009; Feng et al., 2011; Oberholzer-Gee and Wulf,  
2012). However, in this chapter, compensation is treated as an outcome of managerial 
activities because firms tend to evaluate their consequences to determine management 
rewards. 
According to the principal-agent theory, the separation of ownership and control 
leads to specialized risk bearing and specialized decision skills in the organization 
(Holmström and Milgrom, 1987; Strong and Walker, 1987). This conflict in interests 
raises a situation of uncertainty due to the information asymmetry and moral hazard 
between the two parties. Therefore, an optimal structure of contracts is required that 
links managerial compensation to firm earnings in an optimal pay-performance structure  
and hence motivates managers to exert effort to enhance earnings and ultimately 
resolves the previous conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Harris and Raviv, 1979; 
Strong and Walker, 1987; Hart, 1995; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Dutta and Fan, 
2014). 
Because of the previous situation of uncertainty, managers send signals in the 
reported earnings to improve their performance measures that are tied to their 
compensation plans (Strong and Walker, 1987; Carter et al., 2009). On the other side of 
the agency problem, shareholders deal with this situation of information asymmetry by 
screening the consequences of the information provided by managers before deciding 
on management compensation (Adut et al., 2013). As accrual earnings management is 
considered less costly from the firm perspective, it is also less likely to harm managers’ 
future payments compared to real earnings management that is screened as a costly 
activity and thus might negatively influence managers’ future compensation.  






High quality managers are also motivated to use earnings management to signal 
their performance because shareholders might not be able to distinguish the quality of 
the reported earnings due to their bounded rationalities. Meanwhile, shareholders are 
less likely to detect or understand those signals because of the high contracting costs 
and the big knowledge gap between the more able managers and the less informed 
shareholders (Oberholzer-Gee and Wulf, 2012; Demerjian et al., 2013b; Walker, 2013). 
Consequently, while firms are more likely to pay higher incentives to managers with 
better abilities to compensate them for their superior efforts, a lesser impact of earnings 
management is expected on managers’ future compensation (Hart, 1995; Stathopoulos 
et al., 2007; Baranchuk et al., 2011). 
The previous studies that focus on management compensation as an outcome of 
earnings management behaviour are quite few. Empirically, Adut et al. (2013) 
document a negative relation between poor earnings quality and management 
compensation; hence showing that firms tend to punish managers for providing less 
informative earnings. The analytical modelling of Sun (2014) shows that when 
managers have more opportunities to manage earnings and shareholders are less likely 
to detect earnings management, the pay-performance sensitivity increases in order to 
eliminate managers’ desire to manipulate earnings. Therefore, the positive association 
between earnings management and executive compensation reflects optimal contracting 
in this setting. In a similar way, the study of Dutta and Fan (2014) documents that when 
the cost of earnings management increases, e.g., under strong governance mechanisms, 
managers are motivated to exert more efforts which requires the firms to pay higher 
compensation. Thus, the study documents a positive relation between the cost of 
earnings management and managerial compensation.  
This chapter contributes to the literature by examining the effects of both accrual 
and real earnings management on management compensation and explaining how these 
effects change when taking the different abilities of managers into consideration. To my 
knowledge, both questions have not been answered in the earnings management 
literature so far and would help in evaluating the costs of accrual and real earnings 
management at the management level along with the documented costs at the firm level.  
The answers to these questions would assist in drawing the regulators’ attention to 
mitigating the costly activities of earnings management and emphasizing the role of 






compensation and managerial ability as governance mechanisms that enhance firm 
performance.  
 
1.3 Market Concentration 
The second empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 7) examines a non-linear effect of 
market concentration on earnings management based on two different perspectives of 
the revelation principle. On the one hand, the information asymmetry in concentrated 
markets results in the absence of common knowledge and thus allows earnings 
management as it becomes more difficult for the shareholders to understand or monitor 
management activities. On the other hand, the presence of fewer competitors decreases 
the chances of comparisons between firms; hence makes communication less costly and 
ultimately offsets the previous positive effect of market concentration on earnings 
management (Strong and Walker, 1987; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Walker, 2013). 
The studies in the literature tend to favour only one of the previous points of view at a 
time and, therefore, they present a linear relationship between market concentration and 
earnings management and document a positive effect in some cases and a negative one 
in the others (Dalia and Park, 2009; Markarian and Santalo, 2010; Karuna et al., 2012; 
Datta et al., 2013). However, the previous arguments suggest a contrasting effect of 
market concentration ranging between the opportunistic incentive and the disciplinary 
function and, therefore, this chapter introduces a non-linear relationship between market 
concentration and earnings management.  
 As earnings management behaviour in concentrated markets depends on 
information asymmetry, it may take the form of a moral hazard as shareholders face 
difficulties in monitoring performance or an adverse selection as managers solely have 
access to private information (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Boujelbene and Besbes, 
2012). While the quantity of information is expected to decrease with market 
concentration, the information quality fluctuates due to the discretion exercised by 
managers over financial reporting (Gunny, 2010; Walker, 2013). Therefore, the changes 
in information raise a situation of uncertainty that is expected to explain earnings 
management behaviour in concentrated markets (Hart, 1995; Arroyo, 2007). 






 Few studies in the literature have viewed market concentration or information 
asymmetry in non-linear relations. Guo et al. (2015) introduce a non-linear quadratic 
effect of market concentration on earnings quality. They document that while earnings 
quality decreases at lower levels of market concentration as the firm faces the threat of 
losing its competitive advantage, the marginal benefit of earnings quality increases at 
higher levels of market concentration. In the same line, Bhattacharya et al. (2013) 
present a non-linear quadratic relationship between earnings quality and information 
asymmetry; hence considering information asymmetry as an alternative measure for the 
quality of disclosure (Bhattacharya et al., 2013). However, no study has examined the 
non-linear relation between market concentration and the different earnings 
management activities so far.  
This chapter contributes to the literature by explaining the effect of market 
concentration on earnings management through a non-linear relationship based on the 
changes in information quantity and quality in concentrated markets. This shape of 
analysis has not been considered yet in the literature and would help in identifying the 
levels of market concentration where both accrual and real earnings management 
decline. As a result, it would assist regulators and policy makers in emphasizing the 
optimal range of market concentration by evaluating its consequences at different levels.  
 
1.4 Managerial Ability and Market Competition 
The last empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 8) studies how the interaction between 
motives at the external and contractual levels may influence earnings management 
behaviour. While high quality managers possess superior skills that allow them to 
extract better rents from their firms, they may avoid earnings management as they are 
able to evaluate its bad consequences on their future benefits (Francis et al., 2008; 
Demerjian et al., 2013b). At the same time, superior managers may operate firms in 
different business environments and thus different levels of competition may influence 
their motivations to manage earnings (Dalia and Park, 2009; Markarian and Santalo, 
2010; Karuna et al., 2012; Datta et al., 2013). Therefore, this chapter examines whether 
market competition has an impact on the relation between managerial ability and 
earnings management.  






 Managerial ability is one of the contractual motives that might be viewed from 
different perspectives regarding its influence on firm performance and moral hazard 
between managers and shareholders (Francis et al., 2008; Demerjian et al., 2013b). 
According to the rent extraction hypothesis, the high contracting costs with more able 
managers, e.g., the need to write, negotiate, and renegotiate the contracts, result in 
establishing simplified general contracts that are more difficult to be monitored and thus 
give managers the opportunity to achieve more personal benefits (Hart, 1983; Walker, 
2013). In contrast, the efficient contracting hypothesis implies that superior managers 
appreciate the value of maximizing firm wealth on their future benefits and, therefore, 
they provide a better quality of performance that contributes to aligning their interests 
with those of the shareholders (Hart, 1983; Walker, 2013). Therefore, the impact of 
managerial ability on earnings management is still debateable.  
At the macro-level, market competition is one of the motives that is also 
expected to influence earnings management behaviour in two different directions (Dalia 
and Park, 2009; Markarian and Santalo, 2010; Karuna et al., 2012; Datta et al., 2013). 
Competition may play a disciplinary function in mitigating earnings management as it 
contributes to improving the information symmetry in the market and allowing better 
monitoring of management performance (Dalia and Park, 2009). In contrast, 
communicating more information allows the stakeholders to exert pressure on managers 
to imitate the aggressive behaviour of others in the same industry; hence aggravating 
adverse selection and motivating earnings management (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006; 
Walker, 2013). Accordingly, the influence of market competition on earnings 
management is also controversial. 
The literature that studies managerial ability and market competition supports 
the previous points of view and documents contrasting results.  While more able 
managers avoid real earnings management activities that are associated with high costs 
to their firms in the future, they prefer achieving personal benefits by managing accruals 
and providing lower earnings’ quality (Francis et al., 2008; Demerjian et al., 2013b). 
Similarly, market competition drives more accrual and real earnings management 
because it encourages aggressive herding behaviour (Karuna et al., 2012; Datta et al., 
2013). However, it may serve as an alternative governance mechanism as 
communicating more information in the market contributes to mitigating the conflict of 






interests between management and shareholders; hence making it costlier to manipulate 
earnings in the same business environment (Holmstrom, 1982; Hart, 1983; Dalia and 
Park, 2009; Markarian and Santalo, 2010; Chhaochharia et al., 2012). 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by examining the effect of 
market competition on earnings managed by high quality managers. While the previous 
question has not been answered in the earnings management literature so far, it allows 
an understanding of the determinants of earnings management behaviour at two 
different levels by analysing the impact of industry factors on management decisions. 
The answer to this question would assist in drawing the regulators’ attention to the 
simultaneous role of managerial ability and market competition as governance 
mechanisms that enhance firm performance and mitigate the agency problem.   
 
1.5 Research Questions 
Based on the previous arguments, the major objectives of this thesis can be summarized 
in the following research questions: 
1. Do firms reward/punish their managers for using accrual and real earnings 
management through an increase/decrease in their future compensation? 
2. Do firms reward/punish their high quality managers for using accrual and real 
earnings management in the same way they do other managers? 
3. Do the levels of accrual and real earnings management activities change at different 
levels of market concentration? 
4. Do the changes in information quantity and quality in the market explain the 
fluctuations in accrual and real earnings management at different levels of market 
concentration? 
5. Does market competition influence the levels of accrual and real earnings managed 
by high quality managers? 
 
1.6 Significance and Contributions 
This thesis studies earnings management behaviour at two different levels - contracting 
and external - and subsequently examines whether factors at both levels interact in 






determining earnings management behaviour. While the previous studies in the earnings 
management literature have individually focused on the contracting, capital market, or 
external motives of earnings management at a time, they have ignored the interrelations 
between the motives of these different groups (Bagnoli and Watts, 2000; Kothari, 2001; 
Godfrey et al., 2003; Boone et al., 2004; DeFond and Francis, 2005; Goldman and 
Slezak, 2006; Jiraporn et al., 2006; Lang et al., 2006; Efendi et al., 2007; Fan, 2007; 
Barth et al., 2008; Yu, 2008; Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009; Laux and Laux, 2009; 
Demerjian et al., 2013b). Examining the motives at different levels simultaneously 
allows for understanding their influence at the firm level while taking into consideration 
the strategic objectives and competitive advantages at the market level; hence extending 
the research benefits beyond the firm borders.  
Starting at the contracting level, this thesis is the first to study the impact of 
earnings management on managers’ welfare by examining the effect of accrual and real 
earnings management on management compensation in the future. While the previous 
studies focus on management compensation, and particularly performance-based 
payments, as an incentive of earnings management (Healy, 1985; Gao and Shrieves, 
2002; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Graham et al., 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; 
Burns and Kedia, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Carter et al., 2009; Feng et al., 2011; 
Oberholzer-Gee and Wulf,  2012), few studies look at compensation as an outcome of 
management behaviour  (Adut et al., 2013; Dutta and Fan, 2014; Sun, 2014). Therefore, 
this thesis provides new empirical evidence of firms punishing their managers for real 
earnings management but not for accrual earnings management. This evidence provides 
a better understanding of the costs of accrual and real earnings management from 
managers’ perspectives and assists in implementing regulations that mitigate costly real 
earnings management activities.    
The thesis also provides the first empirical evidence on the firm’s response to 
earnings managed by managers with different levels of abilities. While the previous 
studies find that more able managers prefer using accrual than real earnings 
management (Demerjian et al., 2013b), the thesis finds that their compensation is 
negatively influenced by accrual earnings management and positively influenced by real 
earnings management. Nevertheless, real earnings management remains more costly to 
this type of managers as the firms generally punish this activity regardless of their 






managers’ abilities. In this sense, the thesis provides an explanation of earnings 
management behaviour of managers with high abilities and shows that their skills can 
contribute to enhancing firm performance in the future as far as they are appropriately 
rewarded.  
Moving to the external level, the thesis examines the effect of market 
concentration on earnings management taking into consideration the opportunistic and 
disciplinary incentives in concentrated markets simultaneously. While the majority of 
the previous studies have focused on a linear positive or negative influence of market 
concentration (Dalia and Park, 2009; Markarian and Santalo, 2010; Karuna et al., 2012; 
Datta et al., 2013), very few ones have viewed its effect as non-linear (Guo et al., 2015). 
Therefore, this thesis provides the first empirical evidence of a non-linear impact of 
market concentration on earnings management where accrual earnings management 
increases at lower levels of market concentration while real earnings management 
dominates at higher levels. The findings contribute to identifying an optimal level of 
market concentration that needs to be emphasized by the regulators and policy makers 
to mitigate the negative consequences of accrual and real earnings management.  
Furthermore, the thesis examines a non-linear effect of market concentration on 
information asymmetry measures taking into consideration the quantity and quality of 
information in the market. While the previous studies have linearly examined the effect 
of market concentration on information asymmetry (Ali et al., 2014; Dalia and Park, 
2009; Markarian and Santalo, 2010), this thesis provides the first non-linear empirical 
evidence and documents that the fluctuation in the quality of information in 
concentrated markets is associated with the switching between accrual and real earnings 
management. The results assist in explaining the previous effect of market concentration 
on earnings management and emphasizing the importance of information quality in 
enlarging the optimal level of market concentration.  
Finally, the thesis is the first study that examines the impact of managerial 
ability and market competition on earnings management and thus it contributes to the 
earnings management literature by introducing the combined influence of contractual 
and external motives. The previous studies have focused on the individual effects of 
managerial ability and market competition on earnings management and documented 
contradictory results (Holmstrom, 1982; Hart, 1983; Francis et al., 2008; Dalia and Park, 






2009; Markarian and Santalo, 2010; Chhaochharia et al., 2012; Karuna et al., 2012; 
Datta et al., 2013; Demerjian et al., 2013b). However, this thesis provides new empirical 
evidence on the simultaneous influence of both factors on earnings management and 
shows that the behaviour of high quality managers changes under the pressure of market 
competition through using more accrual and less real earnings management. This 
evidence highlights the importance of understanding the consequences of the interaction 
between the different earnings management motives on firm performance.  
 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction about this 
thesis and summarizes the motivation and main questions for each empirical chapter.  In 
addition, it explains the significance of this thesis and the expected contributions of its 
empirical results. Finally, the chapter presents the structure that will be followed for the 
remaining parts of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 explains the definitions of earnings management and its specific 
characteristics compared to fraud, earnings quality, impression management, and 
expectation management. It presents the different activities of earnings management and 
how they might be traded off in addition to the models of measuring accrual and real 
earnings management. Finally, the chapter discusses some special issues in measuring 
earnings management including the combined models, the specific measures in the 
financial sector, and the qualitative measures.  
Chapter 3 provides a brief description of the firm and agency theories. It 
discusses the revelation principle and the relevant theories to explain its conditions 
including contracting theory, bounded rationality theory, and information asymmetry 
theory. Finally, it presents the three main theoretical approaches of earnings 
management that include the costly contracting approach, the decision-making approach, 
and the legal-political approach.  
Chapter 4 provides a comparison between earnings management and truth 
telling. It explains the contracting motives of earnings management that include 
management compensation, CEO turnover, managerial ability, corporate governance, 
and loans. It also presents the capital market motives of earnings management that 






consist of the effect of the stock market, issuance of equity, new listing and cross-listing, 
mergers and acquisitions, insider trading, management buyouts, meeting or beating a 
benchmark, and the role of analysts. Finally, the chapter discusses the third-party 
motives of earnings management including industry and industrial diversification, 
regulations, political environment and country-specific policies, accounting standards, 
tax considerations, competitors, suppliers and customers. 
Chapter 5 discusses the data and methodology of this thesis. It explains the 
overall sample construction of the three empirical chapters and the sources used to 
collect data. It also presents the different models that will be used in the following 
empirical chapters to measure accrual and real earnings management. Finally, the 
chapter discusses the general basis for selecting the methodology of the thesis.  
Chapter 6 represents the first empirical chapter of this thesis and examines the 
effects of accrual and real earnings management on management compensation in the 
future. It also studies whether managerial ability influences the previous effects of 
earnings management on compensation and thus explains the documented behaviour of 
high quality managers using accrual rather than real earnings management. Data, 
variable definitions, methodology and statistical analysis are discussed in detail in the 
chapter. 
Chapter 7 is the second empirical chapter of this thesis and introduces a non-
linear effect of market concentration on earnings management based on two contrasting 
points of view in the theory. As the previous effect is likely to be determined by the 
asymmetry of information in the market, the chapter examines the changes in the 
quantity and quality of information in concentrated markets to explain that effect. Data, 
variable definitions, methodology and statistical analysis are discussed in detail in the 
chapter. 
Chapter 8 is devoted to the last empirical chapter of this thesis and examines 
accrual and real earnings managed by high quality managers at different levels of 
market competition. In this sense, this chapter studies the mutual influence of 
contractual and external motives of earnings management compared to the majority of 
the studies in this area that emphasize the individual effects of earnings management 
motives at a time. Data, variable definitions, methodology and statistical analysis are 
discussed in detail in the chapter. 






Finally, chapter 9 concludes this thesis by providing a summary of the objectives 
and results of the three empirical chapters. It explains the implications of the thesis to 
the regulators, policy makers, shareholders, investors, gatekeepers, and academics. 
Furthermore, the chapter presents the limitations of this research and suggests some 
recommendations for future studies to take into consideration based on the results of 
this thesis.  
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This chapter starts by providing a summary of the definitions of earnings management 
in the literature and accordingly it suggests a four-stage process for a comprehensive 
definition of earnings management that includes its characteristics, conditions, activit ies, 
and targets. Following this approach, the chapter attempts to distinguish between 
earnings management and other concepts like fraud, earnings quality, impression 
management, and expectation management. 
The chapter also explains the different methods of earnings management and 
how managers trade them off based on their different needs. It also discusses in detail 
the models to calculate the different activities of earnings management - particularly 
focuses on the measurement of accrual and real earnings management and evaluates 
each of the models introduced in this area. Finally, the chapter throws some light on 
special issues in measuring earnings management including the models that combine 
between more than one manipulation activity and the measurement of earnings 
management in the financial sector and qualitative research.  
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains the 
definitions of earnings management and its specific characteristics compared to fraud, 
earnings quality, impression management, and expectation management. Section 2.3 
presents the different activities of earnings management and how they might be traded 
off. Section 2.4 explains the models of measuring accrual earnings management. 
Section 2.5 explains the models for measuring real earnings management. Section 2.6 
discusses some special issues in measuring earnings management including the 
combined models, the specific measures in the financial sector, and the qualitative 
measures. Finally, section 2.7 provides a conclusion to the chapter. 
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In this section I discuss some of the most common definitions of earnings management 
in the literature. Afterwards, I introduce my own definition of earnings management 
taking into consideration some of the deficiencies in the previous definitions of the 
literature. Because earnings management has been frequently confused with other 
concepts like fraud, earnings quality, impression management, and expectation 
management, I also discuss each of these definitions separately and distinguish them 
from earnings management.  
 
2.2.1 Earnings Management Definition 
No single definition exists for earnings management in the literature. Researchers have 
provided different explanations that mainly define earnings management as the 
manipulation of financial reporting to achieve specific targets. I present here some of 
the most common definitions of earnings management in a chronological order. 
Schipper (1989, P.92) focuses in her definition on the manipulation of external 
reporting to achieve private benefits like improving managers’ compensation whereby,  
“Earnings management means disclosure management in the sense of a 
purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the 
intent of obtaining some private gain as opposed to, say, merely facilitating 
the neutral operation of the process”. 
Healy and Wahlen (1999, P.368) also focus on changing financial reporting to 
mislead the stakeholders and achieve contractual benefits where, 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of 
the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers”. 
Mulford and Comiskey (2002, P.3) emphasize management discretion to meet 
earnings targets which may be set by internal or external parties. In this sense, their 
definition of earnings management is as follows: 
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“The active manipulation of earnings toward a predetermined target, which 
may be set by management, a forecast made by analysts, or an amount that 
is consistent with a smoother, more sustainable earnings stream”. 
Phillips et al. (2003, P.493) provide a brief definition of earnings management 
that emphasizes the manipulation of accounting choices and operating cash flows as 
follows: 
“Managerial discretion over accounting choices and operating cash flows”. 
Giroux (2003, P.280) also focuses on management discretion to achieve specific 
income targets. Therefore, he defines earnings management as: 
“The operating and discretionary accounting methods to adjust earnings to 
a desired outcome”. 
In his second definition, Giroux (2004, P.2) emphasizes the incentives of 
management to manipulate earnings under different conditions and thus defines 
earnings management as follows: 
“The planning and control of the accounting and reporting system to meet 
the personal objectives of management”. 
Ronen and Yaari (2008, P.5) provide a general definition for earnings 
management that focuses on the target of management to influence the interpretation of 
its reported earnings, whereby earnings management involves: 
“Deliberate actions to influence reported earnings and their interpretation”. 
However, Ronen and Yaari (2008, P.27) later provide a comprehensive definition 
for earnings management that distinguishes between the two main activities to 
manipulate earnings – real vs. accrual - and shows that such activities are not 
necessarily bad all the times whereby, 
“Earnings management is a collection of managerial decisions that result in 
not reporting the true short-term, value-maximizing earnings as known to 
management. Earnings management can be beneficial: it signals long-term 
value; pernicious: it conceals short- or long-term value; neutral: it reveals 
the short-term true performance. The managed earnings result from taking 
production/investment actions before earnings are realized or making 
accounting choices that affect the earnings numbers and their interpretation 
after the true earnings are realized”. 
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Finally, Walker (2013, P.446) also emphasizes both the accrual and real earnings 
management in the following definition:  
“The use of managerial discretion over (within GAAP) accounting choices, 
earnings reporting choices, and real economic decisions to influence how 
underlying economic events are reflected in one or more measures of 
earnings”. 
While some of the previous definitions are brief, others might better explain the 
meaning of earnings management. Overall, they emphasize how managers manipulate 
their earnings. Among the different methods of manipulation, the literature emphasizes 
the treatment of accruals by using different accounting principles (Baber et al., 2011; 
Walker, 2013), real economic decisions that influence cash flows (Graham et al., 2005; 
Roychowdhury, 2006), smoothing earnings to decrease their volatility over time (Coffee, 
2003; Graham et al., 2005; Walker, 2013), shifting the classification of some items in 
the financial statements (McVay, 2006; Athanasakou et al., 2009; Barua et al., 2010; 
Walker, 2013), and other advanced methods like using derivatives and special purpose 
entities (Giroux, 2004; Petrovits, 2006; Feng et al., 2009). I will discuss these activities 
in detail in the next section of this chapter. 
The previous definitions have also emphasized the motives that drive managers to 
manage earnings. There are different incentives of earnings management at the 
contracting level like compensation (Healy, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Dechow 
and Huson, 1994; Laux and Laux, 2009), capital market level like improving the stock 
prices (Lev, 1989; Ramakrishnan and Thomas, 1998; Kothari, 2001; Gelb and  Zarowin, 
2002), and the external level like the influence of regulators and competitors (Jones, 
1991; Cahan, 1992; Cahan et al., 1997; Kallunki and Martikainen, 1999; Bagnoli and 
Watts, 2000; Goldman and Slezak, 2006). Most of the empirical literature has 
emphasized examining the impact of these motives on earnings management as I will 
discuss in detail in chapter 4.  
However, the previous definitions have ignored the conditions that allow 
management to manipulate earnings like managers’ incomplete contracts that give them 
more flexibility in their decisions, stakeholders’ limited capabilities to understand 
management sophisticated decisions, and the selective communication of information 
by management to stakeholders (Walker, 2013). Therefore, I define earnings 
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management as the within GAAP management discretion over external financial 
reporting by abusing some contracting deficiencies, stakeholders’ bounded rationalities, 
and information asymmetry in the market, through some economic decisions, a change 
in the accounting treatment, or other sophisticated methods. The purpose of 
management is to present earnings in a way different (up or down) from what is known 
to them to achieve private benefits while misleading the stakeholders; although such 
discretion may not always be harmful to them. Figure 2.1 illustrates the previous 
definition in four stages. 
In spite of the previous efforts to explain the definition of earnings management, it 
has been always confused with other concepts like fraud (Dechow and Skinner, 2000), 
earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010), impression management (Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2007), and expectation management (Das et al., 2011). Although my previous 
definition distinguishes earnings management from the previous activities in the ‘What?’ 
part of Figure 2.1, I explain all these concepts in detail in the following sections and 
show how they differ from the concept of earnings management. 
 
2.2.2 The Difference between Earnings Management and Fraud 
Based on the previous definition, earnings management may take place through the 
aggressive or conservative accounting within the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) that happens usually at the end of the fiscal year, e.g., decreasing or 
increasing the estimation of some provisions. It may also happen through some 
aggressive or conservative economic decisions that managers may take anytime during 
the fiscal year to influence cash flows, e.g., accelerating or delaying sales. Earnings 
management may result in increasing or decreasing the reported earnings. It can be 
considered pernicious if it contributes to minimizing firm value but beneficial if it 
allows signaling more information about the firm in the future. Nevertheless, earnings 
management does not involve any violation of the accounting principles (Dechow and 
Skinner, 2000; Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
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 Accounting treatment 
 Economic decisions 




 Contracting deficiencies 
 Bounded rationalities 




 Management private benefits  
 Misleading the stakeholders  
 Stakeholders’ benefits 
 
Figure 2.1 Earnings management definition 
What? 
 
 Within GAAP 
 Management discretion 
 External financial reporting 
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In contrast, fraud involves a violation of GAAP, e.g., ignoring some required 
provisions or recording fictitious or unrealized sales. Managers may commit fraud 
within or after the fiscal year to increase or decrease the reported earnings. Fraud 
generally follows aggressive earnings management behaviour; hence it is considered 
extremely aggressive compared to earnings management (Dechow and Skinner, 2000; 
Ronen and Yaari, 2008; Walker, 2013). In this sense, fraud is always harmful to the 
firm and its stakeholders.  
 
2.2.3 The Difference between Earnings Management and Earnings Quality 
According to the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No.1 (SFAC 1), earnings 
quality is related to providing information about firm performance that is relevant for 
decision making (Dechow et al., 2010). Therefore, earnings quality is different from 
earnings management because it measures the overall relevance of earnings for 
stakeholders to make decisions, whether that quality was related to management 
discretion or not. In contrast, earnings management focuses only on the discretionary 
aspect of financial reporting and does not consider factors outside management control, 
e.g., errors.  
While there are specific models that measure earnings management which will 
be discussed in detail later in this chapter, there are three groups of proxies that measure 
earnings quality. The first group includes some external measures like the earnings 
restatements reported by the SEC. The second group represents the measures of 
earnings properties like earnings persistence, errors in the bad debt provision, and the 
mapping of accruals into cash flows according to the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
measure that will be explained in detail later in section 2.4.9. Finally, the third group 
includes the measures of investors’ responses to earnings like the earnings response 
coefficient (ERC) (Dechow et al., 2010; Demerjian et al., 2013a). High earnings quality 
is associated with low earnings restatements, high earnings persistence, lower 
probability of errors in the bad debt provision, better mapping of accruals into cash 
flows, and high investors’ response to earnings announcements (Adut et al., 2013). 
However, there is no single appropriate measure for earnings quality as each proxy 
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measures a specific aspect of the variable and supports different type of decision 
(Dechow et al., 2010). 
 
2.2.4 The Difference between Earnings Management and Impression 
Management 
Impression management is a group of strategies used by firms to opportunistically 
manage discretionary narrative disclosures and thus influence stakeholders’ perceptions 
and decisions based on the asymmetry of information between the two parties (Merkl-
Davies and Brennan, 2007). In line with this explanation, Clatworthy and Jones (2001, 
P.311) define impression management as a method “To control and manipulate the 
impression conveyed to users of accounting information”. Similarly, Hooghiemstra 
(2000, P.60) defines impression management as “A field of study within social 
psychology studying how individuals present themselves to others to be perceived 
favourabley”. In this sense, while earnings management emphasizes management 
discretion over the numerical part of the earnings component of the financial statements, 
impression management focuses on manipulating the narrative part in the financial 
reports.  
 There are seven strategies of impression management. The first strategy is 
manipulating the ease of reading in order to make the narratives more difficult to read 
and ultimately not easily understood by the stakeholders. Second, management may use 
rhetorical manipulation to make the language of the narratives more convincing to the 
readers. The first two strategies are mainly used by management to hide bad news. 
Third, thematic manipulation can be used to emphasize the good information in the 
narratives. The fourth strategy involves the use of visual and structural effects by 
manipulating the presentation like the order of the presented information. The fifth 
strategy is the use of performance comparisons where management benchmarks its 
performance to cases that relatively emphasize its better current achievements. Sixth, 
the choice of earnings numbers might allow management to selectively emphasize 
specific numbers in the financial reports that reflect its better performance. Finally, 
firms may use the attribution of organizational outcomes strategy to emphasize that all 
successes have resulted from the superior current management performance. The last 
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five strategies aim basically to signal good news about management performance to the 
stakeholders (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007).  
Like earnings management, impression management involves managers’ 
judgment in financial reporting to hide or signal information about the underlying 
economic performance of the firm that may ultimately mislead the readers of the 
financial reports and, therefore, result in short-term capital misallocation.  Both 
activities are based on the assumption that a weak form of market efficiency exists 
resulting from the bounded rationalities of the different stakeholders. However, while 
earnings management activities involve the manipulation of accruals or real economic 
transactions that may influence the future cash flows, impression management relies 
only on the presentation of the narrative disclosures of the financial reports. In this 
sense, impression management can be considered as a more indirect way to influence 
stakeholders’ decision making than earnings management. Nevertheless, it may involve 
high risk especially with the increase in the amount of narrative disclosures that occupy 
more than half of firms’ annual reports and that are difficult to be monitored and 
regulated (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). 
 
2.2.5 The Difference between Earnings Management and Expectation 
Management 
Expectation management is often used to guide the perceptions of the different 
stakeholders whether explicitly through firm announcements to influence analysts’ 
forecasts or implicitly by staying silent without advising the stakeholders about the truth 
of the underlying transactions. One common way of guiding expectations is the use of 
unaudited pro-forma earnings, particularly in the US where pro-forma statements are 
commonly announced. In this sense, firms may exclude or include specific items from 
these statements that may influence the forecasts of analysts about their overall earnings 
numbers (Walker, 2013).  
According to the previous explanation, both earnings management and 
expectation management are used to meet earnings targets and avoid losses. However, 
while earnings management involves the manipulation of the reported earnings, 
expectation management emphasizes communicating specific information that 
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indirectly influences stakeholders’ decisions. Das et al. (2011) find that the relationship 
between expectation management and earnings management is complementary. 
Managers even make more use of expectation management when earnings management 
activities involve higher costs; e.g., in the fourth quarter of the financial year when 
auditors’ scrutiny increases. In addition, the market tends to discount the meet or beat 
premium when using both methods but the overall stock price generally benefits when a 
firm meets its earnings benchmarks (Das et al., 2011). 
In summary, earnings management is the within GAAP manipulation of 
earnings for managers to achieve specific targets. However, it is essential to distinguish 
earnings management from other concepts like fraud, earnings quality, impression 
management, and expectation management. The main differences between these 
activities can be evidenced in their level of aggressiveness, violating the accounting 
principles, management control, and the numerical vs. narrative focus in the financial 
statements. Figure 2.2 summarizes the main differences between the five activities. As 
far as this thesis is concerned with the within GAAP discretion over financial reporting, 
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 Figure 2.2 The differences between earnings management, fraud, earnings quality, 
impression management and expectation management 
 
2.3 Earnings Management Activities 
Earnings management mainly takes place by selecting a specific accounting treatment 
of certain transactions or by taking some economic decisions that may influence the 
cash flows, investments, or production of the firm. Both actions aim to improve 
earnings presented in the financial statements and, ultimately, stakeholders’ 
interpretations of the accounting numbers. Other strategies for the within GAAP 
earnings management may involve earnings smoothing, classification shifting, and 
some advanced methods. However, while earnings management may take several forms, 
revenue recognition seems to be the most common area of manipulation (Ronen and 
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2.3.1 Accrual and Real Earnings Management  
Until recently, the main focus of the literature was on accrual earnings management 
which involves the within-GAAP manipulation of accruals through the discretionary 
choices of accrual accounting, e.g., depreciation rates, inventory valuation methods, and 
bad debt calculation. Therefore, accrual earnings management does not influence the 
firm’s underlying economics but involves the change in the accounting presentation of 
these economics. As accruals play a role in determining earnings, they ultimately 
influence the distribution of wealth between the stakeholders. In addition, management 
discretion over accruals allows conveying information about firms’ future cash flows 
and, therefore, may result in decreasing the information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders. While accrual earnings management may influence the 
claims to cash flows, it does not influence firms’ value which is basically determined by 
these cash flows (Walker, 2013). However, the reversal of accruals in the next 
accounting period creates a limitation on the subsequent use of accrual earnings 
management. The high magnitude of the previously managed accruals and the fast 
accruals’ reversal impose more restrictions on the use of accrual earnings management 
in the same direction in the next accounting period (Baber et al., 2011). 
In contrast, real earnings management has started to receive more attention since 
2005, after the studies of Graham et al. (2005) and Roychowdhury (2006) which 
highlighted the importance of understanding such activity in evaluating management 
behaviour. Roychowdhury (2006, p. 336) defines real earnings management as, 
“Management actions that deviate from normal business practices, 
undertaken with the primary objective of meeting certain earnings 
thresholds”. 
Real earnings management involves economic decisions like accelerating sales 
through more lenient credit terms and higher discounts to the clients (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010), timing the sale of long-term assets and investments in periods of low 
earnings (Bartov, 1993), overproduction to decrease the fixed cost per unit and 
ultimately the unit cost and the cost of sales (Chi et al., 2011), and manipulating 
discretionary expenses like research and development, advertising, selling and 
administrative expenses (Cheng, 2004; Osma, 2008). In this sense, real earnings 
management ultimately changes the free cash flows of the firm as it involves sacrificing 
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some value maximizing activities and thus negatively influences its operating 
performance and stock returns in the future (Graham et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008; 
Kothari et al., 2016). However, Gunny (2010) documents a positive effect of real 
earnings management on future performance when it is used by a firm to meet some 
benchmarks that ultimately improves its reputation in the market. Because of the strong 
relation between accruals and free cash flows that are concurrently determined, both 
have to be considered in modelling earnings management to avoid endogeneity 
problems (Zang, 2012; Walker, 2013).  
If the earnings management strategy attempts to increase earnings above the true 
level, it is referred to as a maximization strategy. On the other hand, if it attempts to 
reduce earnings below the true earnings, it is called a minimization strategy. Overall, 
because a firm’s resources are limited, earnings maximization and minimization are 
likely to take a loop form. In other words, the current maximization will drive future 
minimization and vice versa. As companies tend mostly to maximize, rather than 
minimize, their earnings to improve their images to the stakeholders, maximization 
strategies have received more attention in the literature. Maximizing current earnings 
arises from consuming old earnings reserves or reducing those expected in the future. 
Overall, managers attempt to maximize their earnings to improve the market valuation 
of their firms’ stocks, achieve better rewards, be able to renegotiate their contracts, and 
get a better shape compared to competitors (Healy, 1985; Demski and Frimor, 1999; 
Fischer and Verrecchia, 2004). In contrast, earnings minimization implies conservative 
reporting and hence it has not received lots of attention in the earnings management 
literature. Minimization results in shifting current earnings to future periods. One of 
these strategies is the “cookie jar reserves” when a firm decreases its current earnings to 
report higher numbers in the future when performance deteriorates (Giroux, 2004). The 
strategy of “taking a bath” is an extreme form of earnings minimization to report 
extremely low earnings which mostly happens when management does not expect any 
bonuses in the current period or attempt to meet high earnings’ targets in the future 
(Scott, 1997; Levitt, 1998; Ronen and Yaari, 2008).  
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2.3.2 Earnings Smoothing 
In addition to the previously mentioned two major strategies that management can use 
to manipulate earnings, other activities can be implemented to signal or hide 
information.  Earnings smoothing is another way of management discretion which gives 
a chance for managers to decrease the volatility of their earnings and, therefore, 
influences the stakeholders’ risk perceptions (Coffee, 2003; Walker, 2013). According 
to Graham et al. (2005), earnings smoothing is likely to be appealing to managers 
because it basically allows presenting the business in a more stable shape and hence it is 
perceived to be less risky by stakeholders.  
 According to the nature of the strategy, earnings smoothing can be classified 
into real and artificial types (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Real earnings smoothing involves 
economic decisions related to firm’s operating or investing activities that aim to 
decrease the volatility of earnings. Such activities are more complex and difficult to be 
detected; and thus may severely influence firm value in the future (Ewert and 
Wagenhofer, 2005). On the other hand, artificial earnings smoothing involves the 
accounting discretion to over- or understate firm’s earnings; and hence may build on the 
economic decisions of the real smoothing strategies.  
 According to the consequences of the strategy, earnings smoothing can be 
classified into beneficial, neutral, and pernicious (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Earnings 
smoothing might be beneficial when it improves the informativeness of earnings and 
allows the prediction of future earnings. This occurs when managers exert their best 
efforts and try to reduce the current high earnings numbers if they expect a decrease in 
future earnings, and vice versa. In this sense, earnings smoothing makes future earnings 
more predictable to shareholders especially under uncontrollable conditions, e.g., 
changes in accounting standards. In contrast, pernicious smoothing occurs when 
management opportunistically reports different earnings from those that are already 
known to them in order to hide bad current news. Such activity results in worse earnings 
in the future when firm performance does not improve; and thus takes the shape of 
current earnings maximization and subsequent earnings minimization (Dalia and Park, 
2009). In this case, the opportunistic behaviour results in lower information quality and 
ultimately more volatility in stock returns and share prices (Markarian and Gill-de-
Albornoz, 2012). Finally, neutral smoothing occurs when it does not influence the firms’ 
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cash flows, and the market is well informed and rational to perceive it (Goel and Thakor, 
2003). 
As earnings volatility has a negative effect on stock price, firms tend to smooth 
earnings to avoid a decrease in their prices. However, although beneficial smoothing 
changes the valuation of the firms, it results in mitigating some of the 
misrepresentations in their share prices (Sankar and Subramanyam, 2001).  Neutral 
smoothing, on the other hand, has no influence on share prices because the market 
already knows about it and incorporates it when discounting the firms’ values (Goel and 
Thakor, 2003). Pernicious smoothing may positively influence the stock prices if the 
market is irrational and less informed. It may also succeed in rational markets under 
specific conditions, e.g., if it is accompanied with some other good news (Yaari, 2005). 
  The compensation contracts between shareholders and managers also influence 
earnings smoothing behaviour. Managers play the “timing game” in order to smooth 
their abilities to consume over time by shifting earnings from the periods when they 
receive high pay-offs to the periods when they expect lower ones, so that they guarantee 
receiving better compensation in bad times (Demski, 1998; Oyer, 1998). The duration 
of the contract may also motivate such behaviour as earnings smoothing is likely to 
occur in long-term employment contracts because they allow inter-temporal risk 
allocation (Allen, 1985). Managers may also “pull in” earnings to the current year if the 
firm performance is poor in order to guarantee the renewal of their contracts and avoid 
being terminated (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). 
 Finally, external parties may influence earnings smoothing behaviour. Firms 
may smooth earnings under the pressure of suppliers, customers, or competitors as the 
demand of one firm influences the earnings of the others (Graham et al., 2005). 
Regulators may interfere to mitigate earnings smoothing. However, for their role to 
succeed, they have to essentially focus on curbing pernicious earnings smoothing rather 
than eliminating the beneficial one, and hence contribute to improving shareholders’ 
value.  
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2.3.3 Income Shifting 
Firms may sometimes use classification shifting instead of accrual or real earnings 
management when managers are more concerned about net income rather than earnings’ 
numbers. As a result, they transfer items from the operating activities to other activities 
and vice versa in order to improve the performance of the core business which is 
considered more important for the stakeholders, e.g., transferring small operating losses 
into the exceptional items (McVay, 2006; Athanasakou et al., 2009; Barua et al., 2010; 
Walker, 2013). Opposite to accrual earnings management, classification shifting neither 
changes the net earnings number nor reverses over time, and therefore it is a less costly 
activity than accrual earnings management (McVay, 2006). However, Athanasakou et al. 
(2009) document that the market rewards firms that achieve their targets by 
classification shifting less than those that genuinely perform the job.  
 In another form, income shifting may take place in multinational corporations 
(MNCs) by shifting income between the parent and its subsidiaries to avoid high taxes. 
In this setting, companies shift more income to their subsidiaries in low-tax countries 
and more debts to those in countries with higher statutory taxes to get better deductions 
on their interest depending on the tax enforcement level in each country (Beuselinck et 
al., 2015). Multidivisional firms may also manipulate the transfer prices between the 
divisions to avoid taxes and ultimately maximize net income (Martini, 2015).  
 
2.3.4 Advanced Techniques 
Recently, managers have started to use new complicated methods to manage earnings 
that are difficult for an average shareholder to understand. One of these means is the 
repurchase of firm stocks from the market which helps in improving the firm stock price 
as it indicates higher demand. At the same time, it results in an improved earnings per 
share (EPS) ratio because the profits of the year will be distributed over a lower number 
of outstanding shares, and hence it assists the firm in meeting analysts’ forecasts (Hribar 
et al., 2006). In the same line, firms may also issue convertible bonds, rather than new 
shares, because they are excluded when calculating the diluted EPS and thus enable 
them to achieve higher EPS and reflect a better performance (O’Brien, 2005). 
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Another method is the use of financial derivatives like options, interest rate 
swaps, forwards and future contracts. Such instruments are structured on other 
transactions and therefore they are associated with sophisticated valuation and high risk. 
Derivatives can be used for speculation or for hedging to counterbalance the 
accompanying risk of other transactions. The gains and losses on some of these 
instruments are reflected in the income statement e.g., interest rate swaps for fair value 
hedge, while others are not e.g., the effective portion of interest rate swaps for cash flow 
hedge. Therefore, earnings management may take place when managers shift the related 
gains and losses between the two previous categories (Giroux, 2004).  
A more complicated technique to manage earnings is the special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs) like the ones which were used by Enron before the 2001 scandal. Firms 
may establish an SPV as a separate legal entity to execute specific transactions like sales, 
loans, receivables’ factoring, and transfer of assets. Therefore, an SPV allows firms to 
manage earnings especially that it stays off the balance sheet according to the US 
regulations as far as a third party owns 10% of its equity. However, strong corporate 
governance may mitigate the misuse of SPVs (Giroux, 2004; Feng et al., 2009). 
Similarly, firms may use corporate-sponsored foundations for their charitable 
contributions which allow for discretion over the amount of contribution from their 
earnings and flexibility in reporting them as an off-balance sheet reserve (Petrovits, 
2006). 
 
2.3.5 The Trade-off between Earnings Management Activities  
Companies trade off accrual and real earnings management activities according to their 
relative costs, and hence accrual earnings management and real earnings management 
are commonly perceived as substitutes (Cohen et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009; 
Baber et al., 2011; Zang, 2012). Cohen et al. (2008) document that firms switched from 
discretionary accruals to real earnings management after the release of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) in 2002. In this sense, the costs of accrual earnings management are different 
from those of real earnings management and thus managers tend to implement more real 
strategies when the costs of accrual activities are higher and vice versa. The costs of 
accrual earnings management include stakeholder scrutiny, audit quality, and 
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accounting flexibility (Zang, 2012). Analysts also influence accrual earnings 
management behaviour and encourage switching to real activities once their 
expectations fall (Bartov and Cohen, 2009). On the other hand, the costs of real earnings 
manipulation contain the competitive status in the industry, financial health, 
institutional ownership, and the tax consequences of manipulation (Zang, 2012). The 
detailed measurement of the two activities is explained in detail in the next section. 
Among the aforementioned costs, stakeholder scrutiny has been emphasized in 
the various corporate governance codes that influence earnings management behaviour. 
The release of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 is considered among the most 
significant in the United States (US) and in many other countries. Generally, firms tend 
to replace accrual earnings management by real activities in periods following huge 
corporate failures as they become subject to detection by regulators and auditors due to 
the strict governance codes that aim to prevent the recurrence of such events and regain 
the public confidence in the market (Cohen et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009; 
Nordberg and McNulty, 2013). While real earnings management activities remain less 
detectable because they need specialized knowledge that is not available for most of the 
stakeholders, they are considered more costly as they lead to sacrificing the long term 
objectives of the firm and hence negatively influence its future performance (Graham et 
al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008; Kothari et al., 2016). Therefore, the increased scrutiny by 
regulators drives managers to utilize different forms of earnings management activities 
rather than entirely eliminating such behaviour (Badertscher, 2011).   
The trade-off between accrual and real earnings management can be viewed as a 
sequential relationship. Managers focus on real earnings management activities 
throughout the accounting period because they have the flexibility of using the real 
earnings management activities that are based on their own decisions (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010). However, they tend to use more accrual earnings management after the 
period ends and before issuing the financial statements to achieve their targets as they 
miss the chance to manipulate the real activities to any further extent (Zang, 2012). 
Firms also utilize more accrual activities in periods when their stocks are overvalued in 
order to maintain the price for longer, but they may also switch to real earnings 
management based on the intensity and length of the overvaluation period (Badertscher, 
2011). The trade-off is also noted in periods of seasonal equity offerings when the 
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utilization of one activity is positively correlated with the costs of the other (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010). 
Managers may also trade-off accrual and real earnings management activities 
with other practices depending on their costs (Das et al., 2011; Haw et al., 2011). They 
can utilize expectation management by minimizing analysts’ perceptions about firm 
performance to convince them that their expectations have been met (Bartov and Cohen, 
2009). The nature of the relation between earnings management and expectation 
management depends on the constraints of using each activity (Das et al., 2011). 
Similarly, earnings management can be substituted with classification shifting in the 
financial statements. This technique is basically used to improve earnings from the 
major operations but does not tend to change the bottom line of the firm’s earnings. 
Therefore, classification shifting is considered to be less costly than the other forms of 
earnings management activities, and can be used as a substitute when managers face 
strict constraints on managing their earnings (Haw et al., 2011). 
Overall, there are different methods for firms to manage earnings that vary in 
their nature, timing, aims, costs, and consequences. Managers do not adhere to a 
specific technique and usually switch to the one which is more difficult to be detected, 
relatively less costly, and attains the short term goals of the firm. Although all these 
methods have to be taken into consideration to understand earnings management 
behaviour, the literature has mostly emphasized accrual and real earnings management. 
Therefore, I discuss the measurement of these two activities in detail in the next sections.  
 
2.4 Accrual Earnings Management Models 
The models of aggregate discretionary accruals have dominated the earnings 
management literature rather than those that measure a single component of accrual 
accounting choices, e.g., depreciation and inventory valuation, because aggregate 
models are more comprehensive in measuring accruals’ manipulation. Although the 
Jones Model and the Modified Jones Model have been the most prominent in this area, 
other models were also introduced to solve for the numerous modelling problems. In 
this section, I discuss the different models that were introduced in the literature and 
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explain their main advantages and disadvantages then provide an overall evaluation of 
all the attempts of measuring accrual earnings management. 
 
2.4.1 The Ronen and Sadan Model 
Ronen and Sadan (1981) only incorporate sales in their regression to calculate 
discretionary accruals compared to the Jones model that uses both sales and PP&E. 
Their model also takes classification shifting into consideration as another earnings 
management strategy. They measure how a company may use real, accrual, or 
classification smoothing to reduce the fluctuations in its reported earnings. To achieve 
this, they run their regressions at different levels of the income statement to calculate 
abnormal sales, abnormal extraordinary expenses, and abnormal ordinary income. 
Ronen and Sadan run the following regressions: 
 Lt=a0L+a1Lt+ut  (2.1) 
 
 OPt=a0P+a1Pt+a2Put+st  (2.2) 
 
 X2t=f0+f1tt+f2tut+qt  (2.3) 
Where 𝐿 is the sales number from the income statement, 𝑂𝑃 is the operating income 
from the income statement, 𝑋2 is the extraordinary expenses from the income statement, 
𝑡  is the time impact (i.e. year), 𝑢  is the abnormal sales, 𝑠  is the abnormal ordinary 
income, and 𝑞 is the abnormal extraordinary expenses. By including the abnormal sales 
in the other two regressions, the model ensures controlling for any exceptional 
performance (e.g., a non-linear relation between performance and normal accruals). 
However, the model ignores the relations between working capital items and its 
regressands.  
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2.4.2 The Healy Model 
Similar to the Jones model, Healy (1985) considers discretionary accruals as the 
difference between total accruals and normal (nondiscretionary) accruals. However, the 
model uses the average of total accruals over the last five years as a measure of normal 
accruals to reflect the long-term average. Therefore, Healy’s model considers earnings 
management as a systematic event that repeats over time. Then, the model compares 
between the group of observations where earnings management is expected to be 
managed upwards and that where it is expected to be managed downwards based on the 
accounting flexibility available to management. The main contribution of Healy is 










  (2.4) 
Where 𝑁𝐷𝐴 is the non-discretionary accruals, 𝑇𝐴 is the total accruals, 𝐴𝑖−1 represents 
the lagged assets, 𝑛  is the number of years over which the long-term accruals are 
averaged which has been set as 5 years by Healy (1985). Based on the previous equation, 
discretionary accruals are calculated as: 
 DA = TA - NDA (2.5) 
Where 𝐷𝐴 is the discretionary accruals and 𝑇𝐴 is the total accruals calculated as the 
difference between reported earnings and operating cash flows. However, as accruals 
reverse over time, the average normal accruals might be zero, and in this case 
discretionary accruals will be equal to total accruals. Therefore, some of the normal 
accruals might be mistakenly classified as discretionary in some years (Dechow et al., 
1995). 
 
2.4.3 The DeAngelo Model 
 DeAngelo (1986, 1988) studies consider last year’s total accruals as a measure of 
normal accruals and hence any change in accruals this year compared to the previous 
year is considered discretionary. The model calculates non-discretionary accruals using 
the following equation: 
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  (2.6) 
Where 𝑁𝐷𝐴  represents the non-discretionary accruals, 𝑇𝐴𝑡−1  is the lagged total 
accruals, 𝐴𝑖−1  represents the lagged assets. Similar to Healy model, DeAngelo 
calculates discretionary accruals according to the following equation: 
 DA = TA - NDA (2.7) 
Where 𝐷𝐴 is the discretionary accruals and 𝑇𝐴 is the total accruals calculated as the 
difference between reported earnings and operating cash flows. 
Although there is high association between the DeAngelo model and the Healy 
model, the DeAngelo model reduces the serial correlation that might exist in Healy’s 
model because it only takes the last year’s total accruals rather than the last five years’ 
total accruals into consideration when calculating normal accruals. Nevertheless, 
DeAngelo’s assumption is still not valid all the time (Dechow et al., 1995). 
  
2.4.4 The Industry-Based Model 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) introduce an industry-based model to measure normal 
accruals because firms within the same industry face the same motives for discretionary 
behaviour. Therefore, the model uses the median of total accruals for all firms in a 
specific industry sector and in a specific year as a measure of non-discretionary accruals 
according to the following equation: 
 NDAt=γ1+γ2median(TAt)  (2.8) 
Where 𝑁𝐷𝐴 represents the non-discretionary accruals and 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝑇𝐴𝑡) is the median 
value of total accruals scaled by lagged assets for all firms in the same industry and in a 
specific year.  
 In this sense, earnings management will be the difference between a firm’s 
accruals and those of other firms in the same industry. However, the assumption that all 
firms in the same industry operate under exactly the same conditions is weak (Dechow 
et al., 1995). Furthermore, if the other firms which do not have the motive to manage 
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earnings in the industry manage earnings, then earnings management measure will be 
biased upwards, and vice versa (Ronen and Yaari, 2008).   
 
2.4.5 The Jones Model 
The Jones model (1991) represents one of the most famous models in calculating 
accrual earnings management. It starts by measuring the following regression for the 















+εit  (2.9) 
The coefficients from the previous regression are used to determine the normal (non-
discretionary) accruals in the following regression in the event period for each firm 












+εit  (2.10) 
The residual ( 𝜀𝑖𝑡) from the second regression is the measure of normal accruals. 
Discretionary accruals are calculated as the difference between a firm’s total accruals 




 - NAit  (2.11) 
Where 𝑇𝐴 represents total accruals measured following the balance-sheet-approach or 
the cash-flow-statement-approach; 1  𝐴  represents total assets; 𝑅  represents revenues; 
𝑃𝑃𝐸 represents the gross value of property, plant, and equipment; 𝑁𝐴 represents normal 
accruals; and 𝐷𝐴  represents discretionary accruals. An intercept is included and all 
variables are scaled by average total assets (𝐴𝑎𝑣𝑔) of the beginning and ending asset 
balances to avoid heteroskedasticity problems. A cross sectional model is used in the 
calculations for each year and each industry classified by its four-digit SIC code so that 
                                            
1 The balance sheet approach calculates total accruals as the change in current assets (except cash 
items) minus the change in current liabilities (except the current portion of long term debt) minus 
depreciation. On the other hand, the cash-flow-statement-approach measures total accruals as the 
difference between earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations and the 
operating cash flows. Hribar and Collins (2002) document that the cash flow statement approach is 
more reliable, and thus I follow this approach for calculating accrual earnings management in this 
thesis.  
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while taking the time influence into consideration the model controls for the economic 
variations between industries.  
 The model focuses on the changes in revenues as the main source of change in 
working capital accruals including accounts receivable, inventory, and accounts payable. 
Hence 𝛽1 is expected to be positive as sales increase, but if sales are mostly in cash and 
purchases are in credit, a negative working capital appears that makes the coefficient 
negative. On the other hand, the gross property, plant, and equipment reflects the 
accruals related to total depreciation expense. Therefore, 𝛽2 is expected to be negative 
as huge PP&E result in bigger depreciation expense. The impact of depreciation on 
regression (2.9) is usually more than that of current working capital accruals and hence 
it is excluded by some studies when applying the Jones model (Barth et al., 2001).   
However, the Jones model does not take other expenses into consideration as 
explanatory variables although they influence total accruals. In this sense, the model 
suffers from the problem of omitted variables. Yaari et al. (2007) show that the 
omission of variables results in a model that does not explain discretionary accruals well 
and thus generates lower R2 and F statistics. The omitted variables will be captured in 
the error term that might correlate with the existing explanatory variables and result in 
biased estimation of earnings management and subsequently biased results in any study 
that examines accrual earnings management as a dependent variable (Dechow et al., 
1995; Young, 1999).  
Meanwhile, measurement errors may influence the results obtained using the 
Jones model.  When examining the effect of a specific factor on discretionary accruals, 
the correlation between the independent variable and the measurement error captured in 
the error term may result in biased inferences (McNichols, 2002). Similarly, some bias 
may rise because of the flexibility in calculations like using the balance-sheet-approach 
or the cash-flow-statement-approach in calculating total accruals. (Hribar and Collins, 
2002). The Jones model also suffers from a simultaneity problem as account receivable 
influences the explanatory variables (∆𝑅) and the dependent variable (𝑇𝐴) at the same 
time.  
The Jones model originally followed a time-series approach in the calculation of 
the coefficients in equation (2.9); and thus raised concerns about the stationarity of 
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accruals over the estimation period. Therefore, a cross-sectional model has been mostly 
followed by the subsequent studies that mainly uses firms within the same industry and 
in the same time period (Yaari et al., 2007), or a group of matched firms (Kothari et al., 
2005) or the performance of the industry in the previous years (Xie et al., 2003) to 
determine the level of normal accruals. However, the sample used to estimate normal 
accruals may itself include some firms that have managed accruals as well; which 
makes benchmarking inappropriate (Shivakumar, 2000). It is also not reasonable to 
assume the homogeneity of all firms in the same industry. In addition, small samples are 
ignored in cross-sectional analysis as they result in violating the assumption of Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) regression regarding the normality of the error term (Bernard and 
Skinner, 1996).  
 The Jones model might detect discretionary accruals in some firms not because 
of earnings management but due to specific business conditions that drive a change in 
accruals like acquisitions, capital expenditure, discontinued operations, and sale of long-
lived assets (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). A similar problem appears in firms with extreme 
performance because they do not show a linear relationship between performance and 
normal accruals; thus the Jones model may end up categorizing high normal accruals as 
discretionary accruals. The same may occur in large random samples when firms 
manage earnings in different directions that will finally offset each other and result in an 
average normal accruals of zero which results in inappropriate benchmarking when 
determining the discretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 1995). In the three previous cases, 
there is a higher probability of type I error where the null hypothesis that earnings 
management did not occur might be rejected. To mitigate this problem, some studies 
add new explanatory variables to the model like acquisitions, capital expenditure, 
discontinued operations, and sale of long-lived assets (Hansen, 1999). Other studies 
exclude certain firms in the calculations like high-growth ones as they generally show 
high accruals which are not necessarily due to earnings management (Ye, 2006). Some 
studies even control for performance in the model by incorporating the return on assets 
or cash flows (Jeter and Shivakumar, 1999; McNichols, 2000).  
 More seriously, the Jones model may not allow detecting earnings management 
especially in small samples that generate high standard errors and thus increase the 
probability of type II error and ultimately accepting the null hypothesis that earnings 
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management did not occur. However, as top journals tend to reject such papers, type II 
error seems more limited than type I error explained earlier (McNichols, 2000).  To 
overcome this problem, large samples are recommended in a cross-sectional approach 
when using the model. However, large samples can hide the individual firm 
characteristics that might differ from the group and thus the homogeneity assumption is 
not valid (DeAngelo, 1986; Bernard and Skinner, 1996). Therefore, some studies add 
firm-specific characteristics to the model to overcome this homogeneity problem (Ye, 
2006). 
  
2.4.6 The Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
To mitigate some of the previous shortcomings of the Jones model, a number of studies 
have tried to modify it by adding the omitted variables, controlling for performance, 
taking the dynamic nature of accruals and cash flows into consideration, eliminating 
extreme observations, or applying different estimators to solve the model. Dechow et al. 
(1995) developed a new model from the Jones model (1991); which has been referred to 
as the modified Jones model (1995). It again starts by measuring the following 















+εit  (2.12) 
The coefficients from the previous regression are used to determine the normal (non-












+εit   (2.13) 
The equation, however, adjusts the change in revenues for the change in accounts 
receivable here to avoid any discretion in credit sales while calculating normal accruals; 
compared to the first equation where total accruals were measured (Cohen et al., 2008).  
Discretionary accruals are calculated as the difference between a firm’s total accruals 




 - NAit  (2.14) 
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Where 𝑇𝐴 represents total accruals measured following the balance-sheet-approach or 
the cash-flow-statement-approach as mentioned above; 𝐴  represents total assets; 𝑅 
represents revenues; 𝐴𝑅 represents accounts receivable; 𝑃𝑃𝐸 represents the gross value 
of property, plant, and equipment; 𝑁𝐴 represents normal accruals; and 𝐷𝐴 represents 
discretionary accruals. All variables are scaled by average total assets (𝐴𝑎𝑣𝑔) of the 
beginning and ending asset balances to avoid heteroskedasticity problems. A cross 
sectional model is used in the calculations for each year and each industry classified by 
its four-digit SIC code so that while taking the time influence into consideration the 
model controls for the economic variations between industries.  
Although the modified Jones model takes into account the possibility of 
manipulating accounts receivable in the event period, it ignores this fact in the 
estimation period; which leads to inconsistency in the calculations. This implies that the 
use of cash sales in both periods, rather than the event period only, is a better approach 
and can mitigate the simultaneity problem of having accounts receivable on both sides 
of the equation (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Consequently, some studies in the earnings 
management literature have started to adopt the cross-sectional version of the modified 
Jones model that considers the adjustment for both the estimation and event periods 
rather than the time-series version of the modified Jones model that makes the 
adjustment in the event period only; e.g., Dechow et al. (2003) and Kothari et al. (2005). 
Compared to the Jones model, the modified Jones model overestimates discretionary 
accruals and therefore it is less likely to fall in type II error (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
However, the influence of measurement errors also applies on the modified Jones model. 
  
2.4.7 The Forward-Looking Model 
The forward-looking model developed by Dechow et al. (2003) also tries to solve some 
of the problems associated with the Jones model. In addition to excluding the change in 
accounts receivable from the change in revenues like the modified Jones model, it also 
excludes the discretionary part of credit sales by adding back the non-discretionary 
component calculated as the change in sales multiplied by the sensitivity of the change 
in accounts receivable to sales. The model also controls for lagged accruals that are 
expected to influence current discretionary accruals when they reverse. Finally, the 
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model is forward-looking as it controls for the growth in sales that is expected to result 
in a growth in accruals as well and thus it avoids misclassifying such growth as earnings 
management. The forward-looking model is estimated per industry-year as follows: 
 
TACCit=∝+β1 ((1+k)∆Sales-∆AR) +β2PPE  





Where 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶 is total accruals; 𝑘 is the slope coefficient obtained from regressing the 
change in accounts receivable on the change in sales; ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 is the change in sales from 
the previous accounting period; ∆𝐴𝑅  is the change in account receivables from the 
previous accounting period; 𝑃𝑃𝐸 is property, plant, and equipment; and 𝐺𝑅_𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 is the 
change in sales compared to the previous year. Discretionary accruals are again 
calculated as the difference between total accruals and normal accruals similar to the 
Modified Jones model. However, the model still suffers from the problems of 
simultaneity and measurement errors.  
  
2.4.8 The Competing-Component Model (The K S Model) 
As performance influences accruals, some models have attempted to control for specific 
performance characteristics that may result in classifying normal accruals as 
discretionary. Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) introduce the competing-component 
model that incorporates more regressors to match the transactions and assets, e.g., 
revenues, expenses, and PP&E with their related working capital accruals, e.g., accounts 
receivable, accounts payable, inventory accruals, and depreciation. Identifying each of 
the previous items separately reduces errors that may arise because of the variation in 
the credit policies related to revenues and expenses. The model also considers the time 
impact on accruals by taking the lags of revenues and expenses in determining current 
accruals because previous year’s credit policies will influence the current year’s 
accruals. In addition, the model solves for the problems of endogeneity that arise from 
the simultaneity, omitted variables, and measurement error with a generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimator that uses some instrumental variables rather than a 
pooled OLS estimator.  Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) document that the new 
estimator results in reducing type I and II errors. The competing-component model is as 
follows: 
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GPPEi,t] +εi,t  
(2.16) 
Where 𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡  represents the unmanaged accruals; 𝐴𝑅  is accounts receivable accruals; 
𝑅𝐸𝑉 is revenues; 𝐴𝑃𝐵 is the aggregate of inventory accruals, other non-cash current 
asset accruals, and current liability accruals;  𝐸𝑋𝑃 is the expenses related to the 𝐴𝑃𝐵 
like cost of sales and selling and administrative expenses; 𝐷𝐸𝑃 is depreciation expense; 
and 𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸 is gross property plant and equipment. However, the model does not control 
for major performance measures like the return on assets or sales growth; which may 
give some space for misclassifying normal accruals as discretionary.  
 
2.4.9 The Cash-Flows Model 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) introduce the cash-flows model that controls for firm 
performance by incorporating its cash flows to measure how accruals map into these 
cash flows. As accruals are linked to the timing of cash recognition, cash flows of the 
past, current, and future periods are included in the explanatory variables to represent 
the probable returns of previous sales, current sales, and expected bad debt in the future, 
respectively. The model does not use accruals as the dependent variable as its 
calculation is based on cash flows and thus results in a simultaneity problem when cash 
flows variable is introduced as a control. Instead, the model uses the working capital as 
the regressand. The cash-flows models is as follows: 
 ∆WCt=b0+b1CFt-1+b2CFt+b3CFt+1+εt  (2.17) 
Where ∆𝑊𝐶 is the change in working capital; 𝐶𝐹 is operating cash flows; and 𝜀 is the 
residual from the regression which is considered as the measure of accrual earnings 
management. However, the residual is likely to capture some non-discretionary aspects 
that might be related to firm characteristics like the volatility of the transactions and 
thus better represents the overall quality of earnings as discussed earlier in section 2.2.3 
(Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
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2.4.10 The Cash-Flows Jones Model 
McNichols (2002) develops the previous model further by combining it with the 
original Jones model. She finds that the explanatory power of the model increases and 
thus confirms the importance of controlling for performance when measuring accrual 
earnings management. The McNichols model is as follows: 
 ∆WCt=b0+b1CFt-1+b2CFt+b3CFt+1+b4∆Slaes+b5PPE+εt  (2.18) 
Where ∆𝑊𝐶 is the change in working capital; 𝐶𝐹 is operating cash flows; 𝑃𝑃𝐸 is the 
gross property, plant and equipment, and 𝜀 is the residual from the regression which is 
considered as the measure of accrual earnings management. Although the residual is 
less likely to capture non-discretionary accruals in this case, the model suffers from 
simultaneity and measurement error problems.  
 
2.4.11 The Performance-Matching Model 
Kothari et al. (2005) introduce the performance-matching model that further develops 
the Jones model and the modified Jones model by controlling for firm operating 
performance. They match the discretionary accruals of firms in the sample with those of 
firms in a control group within the same industry. This way, they control for the effect 
of any extreme performance that results in a non-linear relation between performance 
and accruals and thus type I error, e.g., growth firms. In its simple form, the model 
considers accrual earnings management as the difference between a firm’s accruals and 
its peer’s accruals from the control group without running any regression. In a more 
sophisticated format, the model calculates accrual earnings management for each firm 
using the Jones model while incorporating the lagged return on assets ratio (ROA) as a 
control and then makes the comparison. As a result, discretionary accruals can be 







   (2.19) 
Where 𝐷𝐴  represents discretionary accruals; 𝐴  represents total assets; and 𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 
represents a firm from the control group close to firm 𝑖 in its return on assets (ROA) 
within the same year and industry sector. The performance-matching model shows 
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better explanatory power than the Jones model (Ye, 2006). However, a problem appears 
in identifying the matched group of firms as it is not always possible to obtain a 
homogenous relation between performance and accruals for two different groups. In this 
sense, selecting the inappropriate matched group will cause biased results. For example, 
selecting a matched firm that manages earnings may result in a type II error (Kothari et 
al., 2005). 
 
2.4.12 The Business Model 
Ye (2006) developed the business model which solves for more than one deficiency in 
the Jones model at once. The model controls for performance, takes the dynamic nature 
of abnormal accruals into consideration, adds the intensity of working capital to control 
for sales growth related to the short-term accruals, and finally incorporates depreciation 
to control for the impact of long-term accruals. This way, the model controls for firm-
specific characteristics that were ignored in cross-sectional models. The business model 
looks as follows:  
 







           +(β
5
NCWCi,t-1-β6NCWC
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
i,t)  
           +β
7
NCWCi,t-1X∆REVi,t+β8depi,t-1+β9depi,t-1PPEi,t+εt  (2.20) 
Where, 𝑇𝐴 is the total accruals; 
𝛽0+𝛽1∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 is the Jones model where ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉 is 
the change in revenues, 𝑃𝑃𝐸 is property, plant, and equipment, and 𝐴 is total assets; 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 is the return on assets to control for firm performance; 𝑁𝐶𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑁𝐶𝑊𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?,𝑡 
represents the abnormal lagged accruals where 𝑁𝐶𝑊𝐶 is the non-cash working capital 
and 𝑁𝐶𝑊𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the normal non-cash working capital calculated as the average non-cash 
working capital over the last three years; 𝑑𝑒𝑝  is the depreciation rate; and 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the historical depreciation used to anticipate the depreciation expense 
for the current period. However, the model still suffers from an unsolved endogeneity 
problem due to the simultaneity between the dependent and explanatory variables.  
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2.4.13 The Stubben Model 
Stubben’s Model (2010) focuses on discretionary revenues which are the largest 
component of earnings in most firms (Stubben, 2010). Using revenues as an estimate of 
discretion reduces measurement error and makes the model less biased and more 
specified than other accrual models due to three reasons. First, Discretionary revenues 
reflect receivables’ accruals, rather than aggregate accruals. Receivable accruals, in turn, 
are more directly related to revenues than other working capital accruals. Second, the 
model focuses on reported revenues rather than on cash revenues. While this results in 
understating discretionary revenues estimate, it is unlikely to overestimate discretion for 
firms that are less expected to collect their credit revenues by the year end like growth 
firms. Finally, the model examines receivable accruals for the fourth quarter separately 
because they are less likely to be collected before the year end. As a result, it prevents 
overstating discretion when the revenues of the fourth quarter are relatively high or 
understating discretion when the revenues of the fourth quarter are relatively low 
















+εit  (2.21) 
Where 𝐴𝑅  represents accounts receivable; 𝐴  represents total assets; 𝑅1_3  represents 
revenues in the first three quarters; and 𝑅4 represents revenues in the fourth quarter. All 
variables are scaled by average total assets (𝐴𝑎𝑣𝑔) to avoid heteroskedasticity problems. 
A cross sectional model is used in the calculations for each year and each industry 
classified by its four-digit SIC code. The residual ( 𝜀𝑖𝑡) from the regression is the 
measure of discretionary revenues ( 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑅𝑒𝑣 ) that represents accrual earnings 
management (𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑀). However, the model ignores other working capital 
accruals that might be material in some firms depending on the nature of their 
transactions. In addition, by using a pooled OLS estimator, the model still suffers from a 
problem of endogeneity. Finally, it does not control for any measures of firm 
performance. 
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2.4.14 The Single-Item Models 
Although the models of aggregate discretionary accruals have dominated earnings 
management literature as mentioned earlier, single-item models have been introduced in 
certain occasions. Based on materiality criterion, these models select one item of the 
income statement that can be manipulated within GAAP, like estimating the bad debt 
expense, reserves, or even aggregate accounts like total tax expense which includes 
deferred tax as well (McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Dhaliwal et al., 2004). This 
methodology allows better identification of discretionary accruals in a specific account. 
However, the discretionary part might be covered by the non-discretionary part if the 
latter is higher than the earlier. Furthermore, although I can accept the fact that total 
earnings management exists if discretionary accruals were detected in a specific account, 
the opposite may not apply and thus the results cannot be generalized to total accruals.  
 
2.4.15 The Distributional Approach 
A final methodology of measuring earnings management is by studying the distribution 
of earnings or earnings per share (EPS). This kind of methodology is referred to as the 
distributional approach. The approach assumes that unmanaged earnings follow a 
normal distribution and thus earnings management is measured by how each 
observation deviates from that normal distribution (Thomas, 1989; Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997). However, determining the boundaries of the normal distribution remains 
a subjective matter. In addition, having high or low earnings may reflect firm 
performance and does not necessarily imply the existence of earnings management.  
 
2.4.16 Evaluation of Accrual Earnings Management Models 
Overall, the majority of accrual earnings management models consider total accruals as 
the dependent variable, measured by using the balance sheet approach (working capital 
items) or the cash flow approach (the difference between earnings and operating cash 
flows). However, some models use a single item of the total accruals, e.g., Stubben’s 
Model, because they want to emphasize the relative importance of this particular 
account among other accruals. While using total accruals allows for a more 
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comprehensive measure of accrual earnings management, it is difficult to specify the 
degree of influence for each of the explanatory factors on each item within total accruals 
(McNichols and Wilson, 1988). The opposite applies on using a single accrual item as a 
dependent variable.  
Different factors have been included within the explanatory variables of accrual 
behaviour. The most commonly used ones were revenues, PP&E, and expenses. 
Meanwhile, some models take the time effect on accruals’ manipulation into 
consideration, e.g., the Ronen and Sadan Model, or incorporate the role of time in the 
form of the lagged accruals value, e.g., the Forward-Looking Model, the Business 
Model, and the Competing-Component Model. Furthermore, some models control for 
performance using sales growth (Forward-Looking Model), cash flows (Cash-Flows 
Models), return on assets (Performance-Matching Model and Business Model), 
abnormal sales (Ronen and Sadan Model), matching performance to a benchmark 
(Performance-Matching Model), or working capital items (Competing-Component 
Model and Business Model) to avoid misclassifying normal accruals as discretionary. 
However, some models still ignore this type of control, e.g., the Jones Model, Modified 
Jones Model, and Stubben’s Model; and thus are more likely to fall in type I error.  
For measuring accrual earnings management, some of the models do not even 
run any kind of regression, e.g., the Healy Model, DeAngelo Model, the Industry-Based 
Model, and the Distributional Approach. Instead, they consider accrual earnings 
management as the deviation of current accruals from the past or current accruals’ 
values. Therefore, these models are less powerful in detecting earnings management 
because they do not consider the influence of the different firm operations and 
characteristics on the manipulation. On the other hand, almost all the models that run 
regressions use a pooled OLS estimator to solve for accrual earnings management. The 
Competing-Component Model is the only one that uses a system generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimator which allows for resolving the endogeneity that arises 
because of the problems of simultaneity, omitted variables, and measurement errors.   
Although the previous models have tried hard to provide reliable measures of 
accrual earnings management, they still suffer from different problems like the omitted 
variables, simultaneity between the dependent and explanatory variables, type I error 
due to ignoring performance effect, weak assumptions that result in biased measurement, 
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and unsuitability for extremely small or large samples. Although some studies have 
documented high correlation between the different aggregate models of accrual earnings 
management (Guay et al., 1996), others have found that some models are better in 
measuring accrual earnings management than others (Dechow et al., 1995; Thomas and 
Zhang, 2000). As each model measures a different aspect of accrual earnings 
management, choosing the best measure is still a subjective matter that depends on the 
different needs of each researcher. Using more than one model is always a good 
approach in avoiding biased results, but developing more precise models remains one of 
the challenges for future research. For the measurement purpose of this thesis, I will 
select the Modified Jones Model which shows strong power in explaining total accruals 
and Stubben’s Model which specifically emphasizes the receivable accruals related to 
discretionary revenues (Dechow et al., 1995).  
 
2.5 Real Earnings Management Models 
Before the introduction of the Roychowdhury Model in 2006, studies used to focus only 
on individual economic choices for measuring real earnings management activities and 
emphasized the manipulation in a specific industry sector, e.g., Baber et al. (1991) 
examine the manipulation of R&D expense in the manufacturing sector in the US. 
Afterwards, studies have started to implement more than one aspect of real earnings 
management in more than one industry sector. The most commonly used models that 
measure the overall real earnings management across industries and over time include 
the Roychowdhury Model and the Gunny Model.  
 
2.5.1 The Roychowdhury Model 
Based on the study of Dechow et al. (1995), Roychowdhury (2006) developed a model 
that represents one of the most commonly used measures of real earnings management 
in the non-financial sectors and consists of three components (Cohen et al., 2008; 
Walker, 2013). The first component represents the decrease in operating cash flows as a 
result of sales discounts and flexible credit terms in order to increase the sales volume 
and improve earnings in a specific period. Therefore, the model starts by establishing 
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the normal level of operating cash flows based on sales level and changes in sales 















+εit  (2.22) 
In the previous equation, 𝐶𝐹𝑂 represents operating cash flows; 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  represents the 
sales for the current period; ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 represents the change in sales during the current 
period. I scale all variables by average total assets (𝐴𝑎𝑣𝑔) of the beginning and ending 
asset balances to avoid any heteroschedasticity. I use a cross sectional model in the 
calculations for each year and each industry classified by its four-digit SIC code. The 
abnormal operating cash flows are calculated as the difference between the normal 
operating cash flows and the actual operating cash flows. For the resulting measure to 
reflect the upward earnings management, it is multiplied by -1.  
The second component of real earnings management according to 
Roychowdhury model (2006) is the decrease in discretionary expenses in order to 
improve earnings and current cash flows. Discretionary expenses include research and 
development (R&D), advertising, and selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) 
expenses. The model starts by establishing the normal level of discretionary expenses 












+εit  (2.23) 
In the previous equation, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐸𝑥𝑝  represents discretionary expenses that include 
research and development (R&D), advertising, and selling, general, and administrative 
(SG&A) expenses; 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 represents the sales of the previous period which is used 
rather than the current period sales ( 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 ) to avoid the mechanical decrease in 
discretionary expenses in case of managing sales upwards during the current period. I 
scale all variables by average total assets (𝐴𝑎𝑣𝑔 ) of the beginning and ending asset 
balances to avoid any heteroschedasticity. I use a cross sectional model in the 
calculations for each year and each industry classified by its four-digit SIC code. The 
abnormal discretionary expenses are calculated as the difference between the normal 
discretionary expenses and the actual discretionary expenses. For the resulting measure 
to reflect the upward earnings management, it is multiplied by -1.  
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The third component of real earnings management according to Roychowdhury 
model (2006) is the increase in operating costs like the increased inventory production 
in order to decrease the cost of goods sold and ultimately improve earnings.  As the 
fixed costs are split over a bigger number of units, the unit cost will decrease. The 
production costs, however, will still be high relative to sales and result in an overall 
decrease in operating cash flows.  The model again starts by establishing the normal 
level of production costs based on sales level and changes in sales according to the 




















+εit  (2.24) 
In the previous equation, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 represents the production costs which includes the costs 
of goods sold (𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆) in addition to the change in inventory (∆𝐼𝑛𝑣) during the period; 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 represents the sales for the current period; ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 represents the change in sales 
during the current period; ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1  represents the change in sales during to the 
previous period. I scale all variables by average total assets (𝐴𝑎𝑣𝑔) of the beginning and 
ending asset balances to avoid any heteroschedasticity. I use a cross sectional model in 
the calculations for each year and each industry classified by its four-digit SIC code. 
The abnormal production costs are calculated as the difference between the normal 
production costs and the actual production costs.  
 However, the model still suffers from the problem of omitted variables. 
Furthermore, the assumption that the sample used to measure normal real earnings 
management is by itself normal cannot be valid all the time as it may include some 
firms that manipulate earnings, and thus benchmarking to this group is not appropriate 
and the results might be biased. The model is also not suitable for extremely small 
samples due to violating the OLS assumption regarding the normality of the error term. 
The same applies to extremely large samples where the individual characteristics of the 
firms are hidden.  
 
2.5.2 The Gunny Model 
Gunny’s Model (2010) for real earnings management measures four types of real 
earnings management activities. These include decreasing discretionary research and 
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development expense (𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑅𝐷) as in equation (2.25), decreasing discretionary selling, 
general, and administrative expense (𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑆𝐺𝐴) as in equation (2.26), timing of fixed 
asset sales to report gain (𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒) as in equation (2.27), and overproduction (𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑) 






















































































Production  (2.28) 
The previous equations are initially used to calculate normal real earnings management, 
where 𝑅𝐷 represents R&D expense; 𝑆𝐺𝐴 represents selling, general and administrative 
expense; 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴  represents income from asset sales; 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷  represents COGS plus 
change in inventory;  𝐴 represents total assets; MV represents the natural logarithm of 
market value calculated as the number of common shares outstanding multiplied by the 
share price; Q  represents Tobin’s Q calculated as the sum of the market value of 
common shares, the book value of preferred shares, long term debt and current debt 
divided by total  equity and liability; INT represents internal funds calculated as the sum 
of income before extraordinary items, research and development expense, and 
depreciation and amortization expenses; DD  represents an indicator variable that 
reflects the sticky cost behaviour for the intentional reduction in SG&A when the 
demand drops, which equals 1 when total sales decrease between t-1 and t, and zero 
otherwise; 𝐴𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 represents the sales of long-lived assets; and 𝐼𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 represents the 
sale of long-lived investment. To keep the relation between 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴, 𝐴𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠, and 𝐼𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 
monotonic in equation (2.27), I make all their signs negative when 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴 is negative. I 
scale all variables by average total assets (𝐴𝑎𝑣𝑔 ) of the beginning and ending asset 
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balances to avoid any heteroschedasticity. I use a cross sectional model in the 





𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) from the regressions represent the 
measures for the R&D, SG&A, fixed assets’ sale, and production components of real 
earnings management (𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑅𝐷, 𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑆𝐺𝐴, 𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒, 𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑) respectively. Imultiply the 
first and second residuals by negative one so that cutting the discretionary expense 
reflects an increase in real earnings management.  
For the purpose of obtaining an overall estimate for real earnings management in 
this thesis, and similar to what I have done earlier when applying the Roychowdhury 
model, a principal component analysis with varimax rotation is performed (Demerjian 
et al., 2013b). This step prevents the inclusion of highly correlated variables in the 
measure. Although the model incorporates more variables to explain each measure of 
real earnings management, it suffers from the problem of endogeneity due to the 
simultaneity between the dependent and explanatory variables. Meanwhile, it is 
vulnerable to error in the measurement of any of the included variables. Similar to 
Roychowdhury Model, measuring normal real earnings management does not provide a 
valid benchmark as it may include some firms that already use real earnings 
management. Furthermore, the model would not be suitable for extremely small or large 
samples.  
 
2.5.3 Evaluation of Real Earnings Management Models 
Very few models have been developed to measure real earnings management compared 
to those that measure accrual earnings management. The models of Roychowdhury 
(2006) and Gunny (2010) seem to be the only ones in this area. Both models emphasize 
management decisions to manipulate discretionary expenses and production to improve 
earnings. However, while the Roychowdhury Model takes into consideration some of 
the managerial decisions related to manipulating sales transactions, the Gunny Model 
emphasizes those that allow for manipulating the sale of assets and investments.  
Although the Gunny Model incorporates more variables to explain its dependent 
variables than the Roychowdhury model, both models still suffer from endogeneity due 
to the problems of simultaneity, omitted variables, and measurement error. Therefore, 
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applying an OLS regression is not the optimal way to solve the previous models and it 
is essential to use alternative estimators, e.g., a generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimator. In addition, both models suffer from some inappropriate assumptions and 
may generate problems when applied on small or large samples. 
 Similar to the case of accrual earnings management, selecting a model to 
measure real earnings management remains a subjective matter depending on research 
needs. However, using more than one model is recommended and therefore I apply both 
of the previous models in this thesis because they measure different aspects of real 
earnings management. Meanwhile, future research has to take into consideration 
introducing new models that assist in solving some of the problems encountered by the 
previous models.  
 
2.6 Special Measures of Earnings Management 
To complete the previous discussion, I also cover some special issues encountered in 
the literature regarding the measurement of earnings management. Some of the models 
in the earnings management literature have tried to solve for the mutual effect between 
accrual and real earnings management. In addition, specific models have been 
introduced to measure earnings management in the financial sector because of its 
characteristics that require special attention in measurement. Finally, some attempts to 
measure earnings management have been evidenced in the qualitative research. All 
these topics are covered in some detail in this section. 
   
2.6.1 Combined Models 
Zang (2012) introduces a model that tackles the endogeneity problem between accrual 
and real earnings management. The model considers the sequential nature of the two 
activities - while real earnings management takes place within the financial year, 
accruals’ manipulation is generally performed after the year end. Therefore, the level of 
accrual earnings management depends on the previously manipulated real activities, but 
not the other way round. In this sense, real earnings management is introduced as an 
exogenous variable when solving for accrual earnings management equation but accrual 
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earnings management is excluded when solving for real earnings management equation. 
The model emphasizes the trade-off between accrual and real earnings management 
activities based on their costs and benefits that vary across firms according to the 
following two equations:  
 
    RMt= β0+ ∑ β1,kCost of RMk,tk   
              + ∑ β
2,l




    AMt= γ0+ ∑ γ1,kCost of AMk,tk   
              + ∑ γ
2,l
Cost of RMl,t+ γ3Unexpected RMt + ∑ γ4,mControlm,tml +vt  
(2.30) 
Where RMt represents real earnings management measured using the Roychowdhury 
model (2006); AMt represents accrual earnings management measured using the Jones 
model (1991); Cost of RM is the cost of real earnings management which include the 
competitive status in the industry, financial health, institutional ownership, and the tax 
consequences of the manipulation; Cost of AM  is the cost of accrual earnings 
management which include audit quality, public scrutiny, and accounting flexibility; 
Controlm,t  include predetermined firm characteristics; and Unexpected RMt  is the 
estimated residual from the first equation (ut). 
Although Zang (2012) has introduced the first model that considers the 
simultaneous measurement of accrual and real earnings management, it strictly relies on 
the assumption that both activities are sequential (Walker, 2013). However, firms are 
not prohibited from manipulating accruals within the accounting period.  Furthermore, 
the model ignores the trade-off with other activities like earnings smoothing and 
classification shifting. The model also ignores the dynamic nature of earnings 
management by only examining the impact of the unexpected portion of real activities 
on the levels of discretionary accruals in the same year. However, it does not consider 
the missed chances to manipulate earnings in prior years on the current levels of 
earnings management. Incorporating the cumulative impact of both activities in the 
previous periods may assist in explaining the trade-off behaviour over time. Finally, 
some elements which may also influence earnings management behaviour are missing 
in Zang’s model; e.g., managerial ability which influences the costs of both accrual and 
real activities.  
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2.6.2 Earnings Management Measures in the Financial Sector 
The financial sector has its unique accounting and financial practices and is subject to 
distinct regulations. Therefore, managers in this sector have different motivations to 
manipulate earnings than those of managers in other industry sectors. Accordingly, 
different proxies are used to measure earnings management in the financial sector 
compared to other industries. One of the most commonly used ones is income 
smoothing through loan loss provision which represents the difference between the 
amount of the loan loss estimated and the amount actually required to set the provision. 
Earnings management in the financial sector can be also measured by earnings 
smoothing calculated as the correlation between the change in cash flows from 
operations and the change in total accruals or the volatility of earnings relative to the 
volatility of cash flows. Finally, benchmark beating can be used to measure earnings 
management in the financial sector, e.g., meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts or 
reporting small profits or losses compared to the previous year (Imperatore and 
Trombetta, 2015; Martinez et al., 2015; Vlad, 2015). 
 
2.6.3 Earnings Management in Qualitative Research 
Although earnings management involves lots of behavioural perspectives, very few 
studies in the literature have examined it qualitatively. The most famous study in this 
area is the study of Graham et al. (2005) which performed a survey of 400 executives in 
addition to 20 interviews from the US firms. The study mainly finds that most 
executives in the sample are likely to use real earnings management than accruals’ 
manipulation in order to achieve their earnings benchmarks. Executives are also more 
inclined to use earnings smoothing because it involves lower risk and tend to use 
aggressive smoothing strategies under the pressure of meeting earnings targets. The 
study also documents that earnings are more important numbers to the outsiders than 
revenues or cash flows; and prior earnings and analysts’ forecasts are important 
benchmarks for management to meet in order to avoid negative market reactions. 
Similar findings were observed in a smaller scale survey and interviews in the UK 
performed by Choi et al. (2006) where analysts reported that UK executives are more 
likely to use real rather than accrual earnings management.  
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 Another survey was performed by De Jong et al. (2014) and covered 306 
analysts in addition to interviews of 21 analysts from the biggest investment banks in 
the world to examine the influence of earnings management on investors’ reactions. 
Their results show that analysts believe in the influence of earnings management on 
firms’ stock prices; and therefore firms manage earnings to meet earnings benchmarks 
and boost firm value. To achieve the previous target, managers prefer to increase 
earnings by reducing discretionary costs although it may contribute to destroying the 
value of the firm in the future. However, analysts believe that stock repurchase is a 
better choice for management to influence investors’ perceptions. 
 Finally, Nelson et al. (2002) perform a qualitative study to examine the relation 
between earnings management and audit quality. To achieve this target, they use a 
questionnaire to collect data from 253 auditors in one of the big 5 audit firms in the US. 
Their results show that auditors do not request their clients to adjust for their 
misstatements that are structured to conform to precise standards e.g., manipulating 
leases and consolidations, or unstructured under imprecise standards e.g. manipulating 
reserves. Accordingly, auditors are likely to request an adjustment when there is a 
material unstructured misstatement under a precise standard. 
Given all the limitations of qualitative research such as the respondents’ bias and 
the low response rate; the previous findings have shifted the attention of modern 
research in earnings management to some of the manipulative activities that have 
underlying economic consequences. For future research, using such qualitative 
methodology is recommended besides the widely used quantitative methods to obtain 
new insights in the earnings management literature.  
 
2.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to provide a comprehensive definition of earnings 
management taking into consideration its characteristics, conditions, methods, and 
targets. Identifying the characteristics of earnings management allows for distinguishing 
it from fraud which involves a violation of GAAP, earnings quality that might be 
influenced by factors unrelated to management discretion, impression management that 
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involves the narrative part of the annual reports, and expectation management that 
focuses on firm announcements.   
 The within GAAP managerial discretionary methods over financial reporting 
include accrual earnings management, real earnings management, earnings smoothing, 
income shifting, and other advanced techniques. Each of the previous methods has its 
unique features and hence managers tend to trade-off between them according to how 
their features fit into their needs. Although the earnings management literature has 
mostly focused on one method per study, it is more meaningful to analyse more than 
one of these methods at a time when examining earnings management behaviour.  
Lots of models have been introduced for measuring accrual earnings 
management compared to very few ones for measuring real earnings management 
which is a relatively new topic in the literature. Almost all the models in both areas 
suffer from a problem of endogeneity due to the simultaneity between the dependent 
and explanatory variables, the omission of some of the independent variables, or errors 
in measuring any of the variables. In addition, the models sometimes make weak 
assumptions that lead to biased results and they are not always suitable to be applied in 
any context. Using more than one model may help in mitigating some of the previous 
problems, but researchers still have lots of flexibility in choosing between the different 
models; which may sometimes result in ‘research management of earnings 
management’.  
The previous models for measuring earnings management discussed in sections 
2.4 and 2.5 cannot be applied to the financial sector due to its unique accounting 
characteristics. Therefore, specific measures have been developed in the literature for 
this task. The only model that takes the mutual impact of accrual and real earnings 
management is that of Zang (2012). However, it suffers from some problems that create 
a need for developing new models to solve for the trade-off between more than one 
earnings management activity at a time. Finally, the earnings management literature has 
been dominated by quantitative research although the qualitative methodology has 
already made significant contribution to the literature. Therefore, qualitative studies are 
worth considering by the current researchers in the field.    
In this chapter, the conditions that allow earnings management to occur have 
been briefly described. However, each of the identified conditions has a theoretical basis 
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in contracting theory, bounded rationality theory, or information theory. Therefore, the 
following chapter discusses in detail how earnings management theories have evolved 

































This chapter establishes the theoretical framework of earnings management by focusing 
on the agency aspect of firm theory that best explains management opportunistic 
behaviour due to the separation of ownership from control in public companies. It also 
discusses the model developed by Walker (2013) to explain earnings management 
through the violation of the revelation principle and identifies the main conditions that 
allow for this behaviour. Then, the chapter discusses in detail the theory behind each of 
those conditions based on contracting theory, bounded rationality theory, and 
information asymmetry theory.  
 The chapter also discusses the three major theoretical approaches to explain 
earnings management based on Ronen and Yaari (2008). These include the costly 
contracting approach that is based on contracting theory, the decision-making approach 
that is based on information asymmetry theory, and the legal-political approach that 
takes into consideration the theories of contracting, bounded rationality and information 
asymmetry altogether. The chapter finally explains how all these theories contribute to 
explaining earnings management behaviour.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a 
brief description of firm theory. Section 3.3 explains the agency aspect of firm theory. 
Section 3.4 discusses the revelation principle and the relevant theories to explain its 
conditions that include contracting theory, bounded rationality theory, and information 
asymmetry theory. Section 3.5 presents the three main theoretical approaches of 
earnings management that include the costly contracting approach, the decision-making 
approach, and the legal-political approach. Finally, section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
 






3.2 Firm Theory 
A firm is considered as a black box that contains participants with conflicting objectives 
who aim to maximize their utilities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, a firm 
needs to organize the control and power between the different parties in the 
relationships within and outside its boundaries. As a result, the theory of the firm has 
been developed to provide a comprehensive view of the firm taking into consideration 
different factors at the agency, contracting, and property rights levels. To explain the 
internal and external relations, the modern perspective of firm theory emphasizes some 
behavioural aspects; e.g., it explains managerial performance through the motivation of 
managers to control the firms without owning them (Fama, 1980). For the purpose of 
this thesis, I emphasize the agency perspective of the firm because it assists in 
explaining earnings management behaviour as discussed in the following section.  
 
3.3 Agency Theory 
The agency theory, also referred to as the principal-agent theory, was established by 
Holmström and Milgrom (1987) based on the previous work of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). It assumes that there are two parties involved in the employment contract: the 
agent (manager) and the principal (shareholder). The main problem between the 
principal and the agent is a problem of information. As the manager is more informed 
than the shareholders, a situation of information asymmetry arises which gives a chance 
for adverse selection by management. The different motivations and attitude towards 
risk by the different decision makers leads to an incentive problem that also contributes 
to the agency problem and referred to as moral hazard (Harris and Raviv, 1979). 
Adverse selection and moral hazard give rise to the problem of coordination in making 
decisions regarding what information is reported, how it is communicated, and who 
makes the decision. Thus, shareholders delegate the task of decision making to the 
managers while trying to maintain some control over their performance.  
The different preferences and objectives of the principals and agents also 
contribute to the agency problem. The separation between ownership and control leads 
to specialized risk bearing and specialized decision skills in the organization. In this 
sense, principals generally prefer high payoff and are indifferent to the agent’s effort. 






On the other hand, agents possess the decision making skills regardless of their personal 
wealth and thus prefer gaining high payoffs and expending less effort. Each party aims 
to maximize its utility function and ultimately the overall agency payoff depends on the 
agent’s effort (Strong and Walker, 1987). The difference in the intensity of the agency 
problem results in different behaviours of management ranging from obedience to self-
interest and further to opportunism that involves earnings manipulation (Giroux, 2004).  
Furthermore, shareholders and managers differ in their interests to emphasize 
firm horizons when making their decisions. Shareholders may focus on the short- or 
long-term horizons because they are heterogeneous in their rationalities and ways of 
thinking. Therefore, some of them can get more benefits by maximizing firm’s short-
term value like speculators, while others’ interests are linked to maximizing firm’s long-
term value like long-term investors. Similarly, managers may focus on the long-term 
horizons of their firms as they are concerned about their careers in the long-run and, 
thus, they care about their reputations which will enable them to enter into more 
rewarding contracts in the future. In this sense, managers are motivated to maximize 
firms’ long-term values which emphasize shareholders’ value. On the other hand, 
managers may focus on the short-term horizons, so that they can extract better 
compensation by maximizing firms’ short-term value and, therefore, they invest in 
short-term projects to signal a high-quality performance while ignoring shareholders’ 
value. A post-horizon problem arises sometimes when managers aim to reflect better 
current performance that would open more chances for their future employment after 
retirement or after they leave their current firms.  Consequently, when shareholders and 
managers focus on different aspects of the firm’s horizons, a conflict of interests 
appears that contributes to the agency problem (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
As a result of the agency problem, agency costs arise like the monitoring costs 
incurred by the principal, bonding costs incurred by the agent, and the residual loss 
represented by the decrease in principals’ welfare as a result of their conflicting interests 
with the agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  However, the agency costs can be 
controlled by mechanisms like the hierarchical control systems in the organization, 
managerial labour market penalties, outsider experts in the boards of directors, the 
relative performance evaluation of the manager compared to other agents within the 






same industry, and incentives like the performance-based rewards (Strong and Walker, 
1987).  
Managerial incentives have received most of the attention among the control 
mechanisms of the agency problem, especially that they are dependent on different 
factors. On the one hand, there is an inverse relation between pay performance 
sensitivity (PPS) and firm risk and, hence, an efficient contract has to combine between 
incentives and risk sharing. The previous relation was emphasized in the studies of 
Lambert and Larcker (1987), Garen (1994) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). On the 
other hand, the study of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) documents a positive relation 
between the pay performance sensitivity and firm risk. They find that firm risk increases 
under higher levels of uncertainty leading to more discretion in managerial decisions 
which makes them more difficult for shareholders to understand. As a result, 
shareholders offer more incentives to the managers to deal with this information gap.  
The previous relation was also emphasized in the studies of Core and Guay (1999, 2001, 
2002) and Prendergast (2000, 2002). In this sense, the use of managerial incentives to 
mitigate the agency problem depends on how the shareholders view the relation 
between firm risk and the incentives.  
Determining the type of managerial incentive is also dependent upon the risk 
attitude of management. Managers who are risk averse are associated with less 
information uncertainty about their decisions. Therefore, they require less monitoring as 
shareholders possess enough information to evaluate their performance. As a result, 
their incentives would be based more on their current salaries. On the other hand, 
managers who are risk takers are associated with more information uncertainty in their 
decisions, which increases the information problem. Therefore, their incentives would 
rely more on their delayed compensation as the firm obtains more information in the 
future (Eaton and Rosen, 1983).   
Furthermore, determining management incentives depends on the costs of 
contracting like the monitoring cost. If the shareholders can observe the performance of 
the managers, then fixed wage contracts are optimal for the contracting between the two 
parties. However, if the agent’s performance is difficult to be observed, then it would be 
better for the two parties to engage in an incentive scheme that allows for the trade-off 
between optimal incentives and optimal risk sharing.  






Overall, although viewing earnings management as a beneficial activity may 
imply a resolved agency problem because it is used to convey firm private information 
according to the stewardship theory (Barney, 1990; Donaldson, 1990; Davis et al., 1997; 
Jiraporn et al., 2007; Gunny, 2010), earnings management is mainly perceived as a 
conflict of interest between management and shareholders. The problem originates from 
the information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, the difference in risk 
attitudes of the two parties or their focus on different aspects of the firm horizons. 
Managerial incentives have been the most commonly introduced mechanism to mitigate 
the agency problem. However, inappropriate incentives may lead to a productivity crisis 
because managers who are unsatisfied with their incentives may continue using the 
same old production tools to avoid any new investments.  While the resulting high 
profits allow them to extract more compensation and get better reputations to further 
develop their careers, they can have a negative impact on firms’ future productivity.  
 
3.4 Revelation Principle 
The revelation principle represents the ideal situation where no agency problem exists. 
In such a situation, the outcome of the game when all information is revealed can be 
generalized to situations with restrictions on information. Therefore, in the presence of 
information asymmetry, the revelation principle assumes that privately informed 
managers achieve more benefits from revealing the truth as they avoid any subsequent 
penalties on misreporting bad results (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). At the same time, 
shareholders would maximize their expected utilities as managers are motivated to act 
for improving firm performance (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). In this sense, the 
revelation principle helps in solving the conflict between principals and agents and 
emphasizes truth telling equilibrium where the truthful revelation of private information 
by managers leads to maximizing the utility functions of all players in the game.  
For the truth telling equilibrium to take place, the revelation principle assumes 
the following sequence of events.  First, principals design the truth inducing contracts 
then agents do their efforts to meet these contracts, which are not observable by the 
principals. When the economic profits of these efforts are achieved, the agent produces 
a report about the economic results he/she obtains. Finally, the audit report is issued, the 






agent gets his/her payment based on the contract terms with the firm, and the principals 
receive the residual share (Ronen and Yaari, 2008).  
However, the revelation principle does not apply when any of the following four 
conditions is violated (Walker, 2013). The first condition is violated when contracting 
costs are high, especially with the need for regular renegotiation to co-ordinate between 
management and the large number of shareholders. This renders contracts imperfect and 
difficult to enforce; and ultimately results in the use of simplified contracts with general 
terms and conditions (e.g., the use of GAAP to prepare the financial statements) that 
give more chances for earnings’ manipulation (e.g., the within GAAP discretion by 
management). Second, the revelation principle is violated because of shareholders’ 
imperfect rationalities especially under conditions of market uncertainty, which makes 
them unable to take wealth maximizing decisions all the time. The third condition of the 
revelation principle is violated when there is no common knowledge, in the form of a 
management information system, which is well known to shareholders and enables 
them to understand management actions. Finally, the revelation principle is violated 
when managers find that communicating with shareholders is costly due to the presence 
of third parties like regulators, competitors, and tax authorities. Any of the previous 
violations of the revelation principle results in aggravating the agency problem and is 
sufficient to give managers the chance to manage earnings (Walker, 2013).  
Although the revelation principle provides a solid explanation for the motives of 
earnings management, it does not take into consideration the cost variation of earnings 
management activities. Therefore, the revelation principle cannot explain the different 
motivations of management to use more than one activity to manage earnings at a time 
or to trade off these activities based on their consequences. To improve the quality of 
research, the cost of each activity has to be considered simultaneously based on the four 
previous conditions to explain earnings management behaviour.   
The previous four conditions of the revelation principle are based on three major 
aspects of the economic theory that include contracting, bounded rationalities and 
information asymmetry. Each of these theories is going to be discussed in detail in this 
section. Then, I show how earnings management theories have been developed from 
these three theories in the following section. The overall flow of the theory discussion in 
this thesis is displayed in Figure 3.1. 

























3.4.1 Contracting Theory 
 Contracting theory views the firm as a nexus of contracts that identify the rights and 
obligations of the different parties involved in relations with the firm (Fama, 1980). The 
need for contracts rises because of the uncertainty in situations of information 
asymmetry or complete absence of information, which lead to variation in the costs and 
benefits of information to decision makers. Furthermore, the different attitudes towards 
risk by the different decision makers lead to an incentive problem, which is referred to 
as a moral hazard. The situation of uncertainty together with the incentive problem can 
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be mitigated by an optimal structure of contracts between the firm and the other parties 
that allows for the optimal sharing of risk (Harris and Raviv, 1979).  
The written contracts attempt to solve the conflict of interests that mainly 
appears in the relations between the firm and its executives on the one hand and the firm 
and its creditors on the other hand. In this sense, two main types of contracts are 
identified: reward contracts between the firm and its executives that separate between 
the control role of management and the risk bearing role of the owners, and financial 
contracts between the firm and its creditors that specify their subsequent rights and 
obligations upon borrowing and lending (Walker, 2013). Each party is assumed to 
possess sufficient rationality and thus uses logic and experience in collecting 
information and evaluating its costs and benefits when signing a contract (Salop, 2015). 
In line with the previous discussion about the role of managerial incentives in 
section 3.3, the reward contracts represent one of the most common ways to mitigate the 
agency problem by motivating managers to improve shareholders’ wealth through their 
compensation (Garen, 1994). Reward contracts assume a situation of uncertainty due to 
the imperfect information about the agents’ performance, which makes it difficult for 
the principal to observe the agent. Therefore, high managerial incentives may improve 
the communications between managers and shareholders leading to less false 
information (Strong and Walker, 1987). An optimal reward contract involves a fixed 
payoff to the principal and a residual payoff to the agent. In this sense, the utility 
functions of both parties can be improved by sharing risk; hence solving moral hazard 
problem.  
Managerial incentives in the reward contracts depend on managers’ performance, 
which is likely to be determined by their abilities to make better decisions and take 
more risk (Baranchuk et al., 2011). Managers’ performance is evaluated using different 
kinds of measures which mainly include the security market performance measures (e.g., 
security market returns) and accounting measures (e.g., return on equity). The 
informational properties of these measures play an important role in determining 
managers’ compensation in their contracts with the firms. The less the noise and the 
higher the sensitivity of the measures to managerial actions, the more reliable they are 
in establishing the compensation contracts.  






The informational properties of the performance measures change over time and 
thus time plays a role in determining the reward contracts. According to Harris and 
Holmstom (1982), firms prefer to be engaged in full insurance contracts (e.g., fixed 
wages) with their managers in the short run because of information uncertainty about 
their abilities. The uncertainty arises in a single period agency model because the nature 
of managers’ actions would lead to ambiguity in evaluating their efforts and thus ending 
with imperfect information about their performance (Lambert and Larcker, 1987). 
However, in the long run, firms can assess the labour marginal product of their mangers 
because the performance measures of prior periods, referred to as memory, provide 
more information about management performance in a multi period agency model 
(Lambert and Larcker, 1987). The better information raises the need for partial 
insurance contracts (e.g., variable wages) that help companies in avoiding inter-firm 
mobility of their managers, especially the high quality ones who might be targeted by 
competitors (Hayes and Schaefer, 1999). 
In addition to taking the firm’s own performance into account, reward contracts 
also rely on the relative performance evaluation of a manager compared to others in the 
industry. The strategic interaction with the competing firms, however, contributes to 
decreasing the relative performance-based incentives. In this sense, the relative 
performance evaluation contract helps in softening the competition among firms by 
decreasing managers’ exposure to risk while increasing the probability of overall lower 
industry returns. In contrast, the strategic interaction between firms in highly 
competitive markets becomes more difficult and thus compensation is less based on the 
relative performance evaluation. Therefore, competition leads to more managerial 
efforts to improve firm efficiency thus mitigating the principal-agent problem 
(Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999). 
The nature of the contracts, in turn, influences management performance. 
Contracts which involve fixed rewards drive less managerial efforts because mangers 
have low incentives to improve performance. Thus the principal will carry all the risk; 
which may result in low payoff to the principal. On the other hand, forcing contracts 
lead to more managerial efforts as they involve high monitoring to the agent’s 
performance. They ultimately lead to high payoff to the principal but cannot be 
considered a practical solution for the agency problem as they assume the availability of 






perfect information that always allows the principals to observe the agent (Strong and 
Walker, 1987).  
However, contracts are incomplete as they cannot cover all the rights and 
obligations for all parties involved in the current and all possible future conditions. 
Therefore, contracting always involves some costs like the contract structuring, contract 
monitoring and contract bonding, in addition to the residual loss of output as the cost of 
contract’s enforcement may exceed its benefit (Strong and Walker, 1987). Contracts 
also involve the costs of thinking, negotiating, writing, and renegotiating contingencies 
that are expected to happen in the long run based on the changes in economic conditions 
(Hart, 1995). 
Due to the previous contracting costs, the hold-up problem arises when the firm 
gets engaged in long-term agreements with other parties who may not fulfil their duties 
in the future regarding price or quality and thus use their power to bargain. The hold-up 
problem is also influenced by the bounded rationalities of the parties in a contract that 
render them unable to carefully evaluate the utility consequences of their actions, and 
ultimately create the need for renegotiating the contract. Similarly, the changes in 
information asymmetry may affect the hold-up problem. Consequently, the hold-up 
problem may result in changing firms’ decisions when signing contracts. 
A number of ideas have been suggested to solve the hold-up problem. 
Competition can mitigate such problem because any party can switch to another 
supplier/client when it realizes that it is bounded with inappropriate terms (Hart, 1995). 
The allocation of the rights to control, according to the property rights theory, may also 
solve the hold-up problem as it specifies some of the rights that are usually ignored in 
the contracts based on a clear definition of the firm boundaries. In this sense, defining 
the firm as a legal fiction with a group of contracting relations makes it difficult to 
distinguish between the relations inside and outside of the firm and thus may mix the 
behaviour of the firm with the behaviour of the market (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Furthermore, developing contingent contracts that specify all possible future conditions 
or the use of cost/revenue sharing contracts among the parties of the contract sound 
impractical solutions to the hold-up problem.  
Overall, contacts have been developed to solve the conflict of interests related to 
the information asymmetry and moral hazard. Among the number of contracts that a 






firm might sign, optimal reward contracts have been emphasized to encourage managers 
to improve productivity by sharing risk. The relation between the reward contracts and 
management performance is mutual – while management performance is an important 
determinant of the reward contracts’ structure, the nature of the contract shapes 
management performance as well. Because contracts are incomplete, contracting costs 
arise between the firm and its management and, therefore, encourage the use of 
simplified general contracts that give management the chance to hide information from 
the stakeholders (Walker, 2013).  
 
3.4.2 Bounded Rationality 
According to the agency theory, individuals exhibit rational behaviour and, therefore, 
utilize an expected utility approach in decision making by ranking the alternative 
actions according to their expected outcomes and ultimately selecting the best 
alternative that maximizes their objective utility functions. The expected utility 
approach assumes that rational individuals have a minimum level of consistency in their 
choices and will ignore any situation with equal consequences when selecting the 
optimum action. It also assumes that tastes are independent of beliefs and vice versa 
(Strong and Walker, 1987). 
The concept of rationality is strongly related to the ideas of individualism and 
equilibrium. Individualism underlies the selective behaviour of the individuals to 
maximize their objective functions subject to their own constraints. Meanwhile, 
rationality is complementary with the equilibrium situation within the group, so that all 
the individuals’ choices are consistent and implementable under the availability of 
different information to each individual in the group (Strong and Walker, 1987).  
Based on the previous argument, all stakeholders take into consideration the 
possibility of management opportunistic behaviour and factor its costs opposite to its 
expected benefits. In this sense, the rational abilities of the shareholders can offset the 
high costs of contracting like thinking, negotiating, renegotiating, and writing; hence 
drive efficient contracting and mitigate opportunistic behaviour (Walker, 2013). 
However, individuals suffer from cognitive limitations and partial mental 
capabilities to evaluate the different events in the exogenous environment (Strong and 






Walker, 1987). Furthermore, decision makers may not obtain all information they 
require about the available alternatives. Therefore, under the need to make the decision 
of selecting only one of the alternatives, they are likely to face a situation of uncertainty. 
In this sense, individuals’ complete rationality is questionable and they are more likely 
to possess bounded rationality instead. 
The bounded rationalities of the shareholders and their inabilities to completely 
understand management actions create a weak form of market efficiency where some of 
these actions are not reflected in the share prices (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). 
The bounded rationalities also contribute to developing incomplete contracts because 
the shareholders cannot foresee all the contingencies, determine the course of action for 
each contingency, or abide by the contract terms as they may need to renegotiate them 
in the future. Under such conditions, managers may behave opportunistically through 
imperfect commitment, hold-up problem, and signalling private information to achieve 
personal benefits (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Consequently, they may use their 
judgement to alter the financial statements and manipulate the reported earnings (Ronen 
and Yaari, 2008). 
To summarize this part of the theory, an ideal case might be assumed if the 
individuals act rationally in order to maximize their utility functions based on their 
individual needs while maintaining equilibrium with the other players in the market.  
However, in reality individuals suffer from bounded rationalities due to the limitations 
in their cognitive and mental capabilities. Consequently, the bounded rationalities of the 
different stakeholders contribute to a weak form of market efficiency and creating 
incomplete contracts that may give management the chance to avoid revealing all 
information to the stakeholders.  
 
3.4.3 Information Asymmetry 
Information plays an essential role in the capital market functioning as it contributes to 
minimizing the levels of uncertainty by assisting to detect or forecast the different 
possible situations in the market. Accordingly, information allows the decision maker to 
take an action strategy in the form of a combination of different choices that increase 
his/her expected utility function. Meanwhile, the effect of information on the utility 






function is based on the individual’s ability to utilize that information and revise his/her 
action according to information available. In this sense, information contributes to the 
welfare of the society by improving the decisions of the different parties in the market. 
Information efficiency (IE) exists in ideal markets that are characterized by 
perfect competition where no individual has power over information and thus all 
individuals receive the same input. In such an environment, market prices fully reflect 
and react instantaneously to the information available in the efficient market and, 
therefore, a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium (FRREE) is achieved 
(Strong and Walker, 1987).  
However, markets cannot be considered completely efficient as management 
prepares the financial statements that shareholders have to rely on for part of their 
information. The resulting information asymmetry can take one of the two forms: moral 
hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard happens because shareholders do not 
possess the information to monitor management and assess whether it works for 
maximizing their firms’ values; resulting in different attitudes and motivations for each 
party. On the other hand, adverse selection happens because managers have access to 
private information that allows them to make decisions for their own benefits and ignore 
shareholders’ value (Walker, 2013). Therefore, a condition of imperfect information in 
the market can be assumed where information is neither absent nor complete. 
Under such uncertainty, shareholders who are at different levels of 
sophistication will not be able to make their decisions based on rationality. Meanwhile, 
the uncertainty gives managers the chance to obfuscate their failures or send the 
messages they wish to deliver to the outsiders.  Accordingly, signaling and screening 
take place when there is informational asymmetry between the insiders (e.g., 
management) and the outsiders (e.g., investors). While the insiders possess superior 
information, the outsiders are imperfectly informed about product quality and firm 
performance. Accordingly, the outsiders pay the prices that reflect the quality they 
perceive about the firm and its products; which drives the insiders to offer different 
qualities to the different outsiders (Walker, 2013).  
Signaling occurs when the market does not distinguish between the performance 
of a good firm and that of a bad one. Investors would consider reporting bad financial 
results as a consequence of the auditors’ efforts and thus would take their value with 






high confidence. On the other hand, they might consider reporting good financial results 
as a consequence of audit failure and thus discount the auditee’s price. In this sense, the 
price of a good performer will be understated and that of a bad performer will be 
overstated. This will stimulate good firms to signal messages to the market based on a 
self-selection principle (e.g., paying dividends) to inform the outsiders about the quality 
of their products and thus improve their prices. The above informational asymmetry can 
result in high quality firms to withdraw from the market as the outsiders do not 
distinguish the quality provided and thus do not pay the expected prices. The overall 
result is lower quality and prices in the market as the poorest quality products remain, 
ending up in a market break down. However, if good firms are more, the higher prices 
in the market would drive bad firms to manage earnings in order to signal better 
performance (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
Signals can be non-dissipative when the outsiders have the ability to observe the 
insiders’ quality subsequent to a contingent contract. Here, both parties share the risk, 
thus signalling cost is inversely proportional with quality. On the other hand, signals can 
be dissipative if the outsiders cannot observe the insiders’ quality and thus only the 
outsiders carry the risk.  
The most common example of signalling is firm’s capital structure that reflects 
management choice of debt and equity and thus can be used for signalling firm value. In 
this sense, management choses capital structure that maximizes its expected utility and 
thus takes into consideration both the increase in firm value and the risk of bankruptcy 
when deciding on the signalling equilibrium. Another example of signalling is firm’s 
dividends policy that reflects firm profitability and the investment and financing plans 
for the future. Once more, management choses dividends policy that maximizes its 
expected utility and takes into consideration both the increase in firm value and the 
subsequent adjustment penalty when deciding on the signalling equilibrium.  
On the other hand, screening is another consequence of the information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. The less information available to the 
outsiders creates an incentive for them to sort firms of different quality products. A 
common example is the credit rationing by banks where they sort firms by using loan 
agreements according to their credit risk. With higher firm risk, banks charge higher 
interest and request more securities to maximize their returns and offset any risk in case 






a firm’s projects fail to achieve the required returns. However, under informational 
asymmetry, banks attempt to charge optimal interest rates in order to balance between 
risk and return, thus they avoid the extremely risky or safe clients (Strong and Walker, 
1987).  
Information asymmetry and the resulting signalling and screening may influence 
the contracting between the firms and the managers. In situations where information is 
available, individual managerial reward schemes are optimal as managers’ efforts can 
be easily evaluated. However, with imperfect information, relative managerial 
performance reward schemes are expected as they provide more chances for adjustment 
according to the uncertainty in the environment. In this case, the optimal reward 
structure includes an incentive level (e.g., basic salary), a risk component (e.g., bonus), 
and some flexibility based on the level of uncertainty in the environment (Nalebuff and 
Stiglitz, 1983). 
Overall, information theory assumes an ideal case of information efficiency 
where all players in the market are equally informed and, thus, prices fully reflect 
market information. However, incomplete efficiency exists in reality because of the 
information asymmetry between the firms and the stakeholders. The resulting 
uncertainty drives the good performers to signal information that emphasizes their 
quality and bad performers to signal information that enables them to stay comparable 
to others. On the other hand, the uncertainty drives the stakeholders to screen 
information in order to make their decisions. The interaction between information 
signalling and screening determines the market utility equilibrium.  
   
3.5 Earnings Management Theories 
The theories of contracting, bounded rationality, and information asymmetry discussed 
above have contributed to developing three main approaches to explain earnings 
management behaviour according to Figure 3.1. In all of these approaches, I focus on 
the conflict of interests between shareholders and management while excluding other 
stakeholders, e.g., lenders, employees, etc. This is because managers generally attempt 
to meet the expectations of other stakeholders as far as they are in line with shareholders’ 
interests. The three approaches are explained in the following sections. 







3.5.1 The Costly Contracting Approach 
The costly contracting approach supports the contractual view of the firm emphasized in 
the positive accounting theory. It implies that contracting is the major motive for 
earnings management behaviour because of its high costs. Contracts between 
shareholders and managers attempt to solve the conflict of interests between the two 
parties who behave rationally to achieve their own benefits. However, individuals 
cannot expect all contingencies in the future because of their bounded rationalities. As a 
result, contracts are imperfectly adjustable because they are incomplete; and individuals 
may exhibit opportunistic behaviour to fulfil the conditions of the contract when an 
unforeseen contingency occurs.  
The costs of contracting and renegotiating contracts, however, can be avoided by 
using some accounting measures. Earnings are usually used as performance measures 
by shareholders to monitor management behaviour; thus mitigate the conflict of 
interests. Nevertheless, the costly contracting approach assumes that shareholders have 
full knowledge of the underlying economic conditions of the market and, therefore, 
there is no informational asymmetry between shareholders and managers. In this sense, 
contracts are expected to adjust optimally to economic changes; hence accounting is 
considered irrelevant and earnings do not have an intrinsic value. Therefore, 
opportunistic behaviour applies only to contracts that are un-adjustable to economic 
conditions or that are costly to renegotiate; which creates a limitation to the costly 
contracting approach.  
Accordingly, earnings management in the costly contracting approach can be 
defined as an opportunistic behaviour in choosing an accounting treatment to achieve 
specific target numbers in firms’ contracts; which results in the deterioration of firm’s 
value.  If this behaviour, however, leads to the maximization of firm’s value, it is 
considered economically efficient rather than opportunistic (Ronen and Yaari, 2008).  
 






3.5.2 The Decision-Making Approach 
The decision-making approach focuses on the decision makers who design the contracts 
in order to achieve their interests, and emphasizes the value of earnings in decision 
making. Thus, the approach assumes that a firm is an interaction of decision makers. 
According to the game theory, decision makers are rational and set their preferences as 
ranked alternatives in the form of utility functions, while each decision maker aims to 
maximize his/her own expected utility (EU).  
The maximization of the individual’s expected utility depends on the decision 
taken by other decision makers to establish an equilibrium situation. Achieving the 
equilibrium relies on information to make decisions that require estimating future 
earnings or require assessing future risk. Information comes in the form of earnings and 
accounting numbers; which create a common knowledge structure for decision makers. 
The decision-making approach, however, assumes that decision makers are not fully 
informed about the underlying economic events and thus emphasizes the demand for 
information. In this sense, the different decision makers cannot perfectly predict 
management opportunistic behaviour.  
Therefore, even if the financial statements provide useful information to 
shareholders, they would not make a difference unless they are relevant in decision 
making and have economic consequences. As shareholders are considered rational, the 
opportunistic behaviour takes place with an explicit or implicit consent from the 
shareholders. Earnings management would be good if it has no effect on decision 
making. The opposite applies if earnings management is bad and, therefore, the harmed 
parties will take actions to prevent earnings management as far as the benefits of these 
actions are greater than their costs (Ronen and Yaari, 2008).  
 
3.5.3 The Legal-Political Approach 
The legal-political approach emphasizes the current legal systems in the US and the UK. 
It considers the weaknesses in shareholders’ rights as the main source of earnings 
management. Compared to the previous approach, it assumes that the shareholders are 
neither powerful nor knowledgeable to make decisions and, therefore, they cannot 
design complete contracts to maximize their utilities. 






Although shareholders possess the rights to firm assets and cash flows, they do 
not have high power over management performance or the major decisions of the firm, 
e.g., dividend payments or the power over directors’ performance. In contrast, 
management possesses the right to make decisions for managing assets and, therefore, 
earnings management arises when shareholders cannot effectively direct management 
especially with the presence of poor governance systems. In this sense, the legal-
political approach emphasizes the importance of improving the legal systems at the 
levels of investor protection, ownership structure, and legal enforcement in order to 
prevent earnings management. One of the most prominent regulations in the modern 
accounting scene is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 which had a noticeable 
influence on improving the governance systems. Although such a regulation comes at a 
cost in the form of investment in governance systems, it provides benefits in the form of 
a decline in earnings management behaviour which, in turn, contributes to improving 
the quality of financial reporting and restoring public confidence in the market (Ronen 
and Yaari, 2008).   
In addition, the legal political approach assumes that shareholders are not 
knowledgeable of the economic conditions and, therefore, a situation of information 
asymmetry exists. Accordingly, they cannot direct management with the limited amount 
of information provided to them; hence management opportunistic behaviour becomes 
more likely. In this sense, shareholders are considered ignorant rather than rational; and 
accounting information would be more valuable.  
According to the legal-political approach, earnings management can have good 
and bad implications. In the good sense, earnings management is a way to please the 
shareholders by providing summary information about the firm which, in turn, enhances 
firm value. In the bad sense, earnings management results from moral hazard, poor 
governance, and the shareholders’ ignorance, thus devastating the value of the firm 
(Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
In summary, each of the previous approaches has explained earnings 
management behaviour by emphasizing a major cause of earnings management while 
ignoring the others. The costly contracting approach emphasizes the contracting costs, 
the decision-making approach focuses on the availability of information for decision 
making, and the legal-political approache pays more attention to the lack of the legal 






power for shareholders to monitor management performance. However, the previous 
approaches are based on some invalid assumptions e.g., the symmetry of information in 
the costly contracting approach and the rationality of shareholders in the decision-
making approach. The legal-political approach seems to be closer to reality as it takes 
shareholders’ lack of knowledge and power into consideration. Consequently, to obtain 
a comprehensive theory of earnings management, it has to be viewed as an interaction 




This chapter has established the theoretical framework for this thesis. Earnings 
management reflects the conflict of interests between the principal (shareholders) and 
the agent (managers), and thus the main theory that explains this phenomenon is the 
agency theory. Earnings management is the opposite of truth telling; hence there has to 
be a violation of the revelation principle for earnings management to occur. The 
violation may happen because of the costly contracting between the management and 
the shareholders based on contracting theory, the limitations in the abilities of the 
shareholders to understand management actions based on bounded rationality theory, or 
problems in communicating information to the shareholders based on information 
asymmetry theory. 
There are no distinct boundaries between the previous theories as they might 
interact to determine earnings management behaviour. While complete contracting 
allows the shareholders to overcome some of their cognitive limitations in making 
decisions, the shareholders’ bounded rationalities contribute to establishing incomplete 
contracts.  Similarly, information enables shareholders to improve their decisions but 
selecting the appropriate alternative depends on the abilities of the shareholders to 
understand and use information. Finally, while the degree of contract completeness 
influences the level of information asymmetry, the available information contributes to 
determining the structure of the contracts. The previous relations are depicted in Figure 
3.2 below.  
 



















All these theories have contributed to establishing the three earnings management 
approaches that include the costly contracting approach, the decision-making approach 
and the legal-political approach. However, while the first two approaches focus on a 
specific aspect of the theory, the third approach is more comprehensive in considering 
the different parts of the relevant theory when explaining earnings management 
behaviour. Furthermore, from the previous three theories, researchers have derived three 
main groups of motives that include the contracting motives, the capital market motives, 














Figure 3.2 The interaction between earnings management theories 
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Based on the discussion in the previous chapter, the three main theories that explain 
earnings management suggest three main groups of motives for this phenomenon as 
shown in Figure 4.1. According to contracting theory, contractual motives exist based 
on the contract terms between the firm and its stakeholders that are linked to firm 
performance. Bounded rationality theory implies the inefficiency of the market and thus 
suggests the existence of capital market motives that influence firms’ stock values. 
Finally, external (third-party) motives arise from parties that have current or future 
interests in the firm and thus interfere in the way it communicates information to the 
stakeholders (Ronen and Yaari, 2008; Walker, 2013). Under each of the previous three 
groups, different motives have been identified in the literature. They are summarized in 
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Figure 4.1 The relation between the theoretical framework and earnings 
management motives 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 compares between 
earnings management and truth telling. Section 4.3 explains the contracting motives of 
earnings management. Section 4.4 presents the capital market motives of earnings 
management. Section 4.5 discusses the third-party motives of earnings management. 
Finally, section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2 Earnings Management vs. Truth Telling 
Earnings management is the opposite of truth telling and, therefore, it sounds helpful to 
learn about telling the truth first in order to understand the motives of earnings 
management later. Managers may have incentives to avoid earnings management when 
they expect more benefits and less costs subsequent to their true earnings’ disclosures 
(Verrecchia, 1983; Hellman, 1999). Meanwhile, the stakeholders have to be able to 
Figure 4.2 Earnings management motives 
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verify management disclosures and make decisions that protect their interests (Dye, 
1985). 
Firms also tend to report the truth and communicate their private information in 
situations of separating equilibrium. This happens when the good firms in the market 
are less than the bad ones so that the market will not be able to distinguish the 
difference in performance especially under the imperfect audit. In this case, a good-
performing firm tends to separate itself from bad-performing firms by incurring some 
costs e.g., paying dividends. In this sense, the stock price of the good firm after 
incurring such cost will be higher than its price when the market does not distinguish its 
performance. On the other hand, the stock price of a bad firm that does not incur any 
cost is already higher than its expected price even if it does not manipulate its earnings. 
Under such equilibrium, both types of firms are motivated to report the truth (Ronen 
and Yaari, 2008). 
Furthermore, truth revelation happens in case of signal jamming equilibrium 
when the market knows and understands the signal properly (Stein, 1989). In this case, 
if the firm starts by manipulating earnings, the market follows by discounting the firm 
price with the same amount of the inflated earnings (Elitzur, 1995). Although the 
situation involves earnings management, firms are motivated to reveal the truth and thus 
they do not mislead the stakeholders. In this sense, equilibrium may occur when firms 
use mixed strategies between truth reporting and misrepresentation depending on the 
cost and benefit of each strategy (Ronen et al., 2006). 
According to the revelation principle, a manager is motivated to tell the truth 
when the compensation benefit from revealing the bad news is the same or higher than 
his/her expected outcome when misrepresenting earnings to communicate better news 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Even if they are expecting to extract rents from earnings 
management, managers tend to avoid the subsequent penalty of misrepresenting the 
financial reports. This equilibrium is likely to happen under the presence of auditors 
who may reveal earnings management as far as the shareholders themselves cannot 
monitor management actions (Ronen and Yaari, 2008).  
In addition, firms prefer to tell the truth to avoid losing credibility in the market 
when the misrepresentation is detected subsequently.  Even when not detected, such 
misrepresentation may drive third parties to react to the communicated information in 
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an unfavourable manner, e.g., the aggressive response of a competitor (Ronen and Yaari, 
2008). Furthermore, the cooperation with third parties is not always possible to enable a 
firm to manage its earnings, e.g., for a supplier to manage earnings, it needs the 
cooperation of the buying firms by purchasing goods in specific quantities or at specific 
prices. In other instances, management might get motivated to tell the truth because of 
the conflicting interests between the external parties it has to deal with, e.g., a firm 
might choose to manage earnings upwards to discourage new firms from entering the 
market while it may need to manage earnings downwards in face of the labour unions’ 
demands.  Finally, mandatory regulations may enhance truth telling, e.g., the audit-
related rules imposed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) and the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). In response to such regulations, management 
may tell the truth when it expects higher pay-off from its good performance compared 
to the penalties it might face from violating the regulation through managing earnings 
(Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
Overall, truth telling is dependent on management perception of its benefits and 
costs. In this sense, management is likely to avoid earnings management when it 
expects more benefits from telling the truth, e.g., better compensation, higher stock 
prices, superior credibility in the market, milder third party reactions, or less regulatory 
penalties. In contrast, earnings management occurs when management does not expect 
high benefits from telling the truth under the three groups of motives identified earlier 
and which are going to be discussed in the next three sections of this chapter.  
 
4.3 Contracting Motives of Earnings Management 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the principal-agent relationship involves a conflict 
of interests between management and shareholders. As shareholders cannot monitor 
management performance, they elect a board of directors to act as an agent to the 
shareholders and a principal to the management. However, managers are averse to work 
and risk and thus incentive contracts are designed to mitigate this conflict. Similarly, 
conflicts in interests may appear in the contracts between the firm and the other 
stakeholders. As a result, factors incorporated in the internal or external contracting of 
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the firm are expected to influence the motivation to manage earnings (Ronen and Yaari, 
2008).  
 
4.3.1 Management Compensation  
If management objectives were aligned with shareholders’ objectives, there would not 
be any incentive for earnings management. However, the objectives of management and 
shareholders in reality are different because they may want to emphasize different 
horizons when making their decisions. Shareholders and managers also carry different 
risks – while the shareholders bear the risk of their equity in the firm, managers are 
generally risk averse because the risk involved with their human capital is not 
diversifiable. As a result, managers enjoy benefits without bearing any risk; which 
creates an agency cost against shareholders’ desire. 
To avoid the previous cost, shareholders design compensation schemes that 
align their interests with those of the management (Laux and Laux, 2009). Therefore, 
they link management compensation to shareholders’ equity using equity-based 
compensation, e.g., stocks and options that change the risk-taking behaviour of 
managers. Even though, compensation may still drive managers to manage earnings 
because their incentives depend on these earnings. In addition, managers enjoy limited 
liability and can influence the decision of compensation which is made by the board of 
directors and not directly by the shareholders. Finally, mangers tend to sell their stocks 
and options immediately compared to shareholders who aim to keep them for the long-
run (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Under such circumstances, management opportunistic 
behaviour is still probable even if they are compensated with valuable rewards.  
Management compensation is determined by some measures that provide signals 
to the shareholders about management performance (Healy, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 
1990; Dechow and Huson, 1994). Earnings is one of the commonly used measures that 
reflect the effort made by management during the current accounting period. However, 
they may not reflect some managerial decisions that influence future cash flows (Basu, 
1997; Barclay et al., 2005). 
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Conventionally, management compensation includes a fixed payment in the 
form of salaries. Performance-based payments in the form of bonuses, stock grants, and 
stock options has been gradually incorporated in management compensation packages 
recently (Perry and Zenner, 2001; Balsam et al., 2003; Jensen et al., 2004). Opposite to 
the performance-based payments, salaries are generally not perceived as incentives of 
earnings management (Gao and Shrieves, 2002). 
As bonuses create an incentive to manage earnings, managers try to keep the 
earnings between the minimum and maximum limits set by the board of directors to get 
eligible to receive bonuses (Healy, 1985). Evidence of discretionary accruals is, 
however, obtained when earnings fall below the minimum limit (Gaver et al., 1995; 
Holthausen et al., 1995). Gao and Shrieves (2002) also confirm the positive effect of 
bonuses on discretionary accruals. However, long-term bonus plans seem to mitigate 
earnings management (Richardson and Waegelein, 2002). 
Equity-based compensation comes in the form of stocks and options. Stock 
compensation can take the shape of stock grants, restricted stock grants2 , phantom 
stocks and stock appreciation rights3, and performance units4 (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
Options are instruments granted to the managers to exercise after paying certain fees. 
Managers only exercise their options when the share price becomes more than the 
exercise price. In this sense, options are granted to the managers to motivate them to 
improve firm value by making benefit from the increment between the stock price and 
the exercise price (Coles et al., 2006; Ronen and Yaari, 2008).  
Equity-based compensation aims to increase a manager’s utility with the 
increase in the firm’s equity value. Nevertheless, the role of equity-based incentives in 
aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, and hence their effect on earnings 
management, are controversial. In the short run, equity-based compensation is expected 
to stimulate earnings management, so that managers can cultivate the benefits of an 
                                            
2 Restricted stock grants are stocks granted to a manager with restriction on their sale. The manager 
can only sell this type of stocks when a specific condition is met, e.g., after a specific period of time 
passes or a specific goal is achieved.  
3 Phantom stocks and stock appreciation rights link between management compensation and stock 
prices by rewarding managers in cash, and to a lesser extent by distributing stocks. The two types of 
incentives mainly differ in terms of settlement dates and dividends payments. 
4 Performance units give a reward promise to a manager in the form of stocks if the firm achieves a 
specific level of performance. 
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increase in stock prices. Meanwhile, the high stock values of the current year increase 
shareholders’ expectations in the long run and thus may drive managers to avoid 
earnings management; a phenomenon referred to as the ratchet effect (O’Connell, 2004). 
In support to the first point of view, Gao and Shrieves (2002), Cheng and 
Warfield (2005), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), and Feng et al. (2011) find a 
positive effect of equity-based incentives on discretionary accruals, so that managers 
can show better performance to the outsiders and meet analysts’ expectations.  Burns 
and Kedia (2006) document that options are the only component of management 
compensation which is positively related to accounting restatements because the 
expected increase in management’s wealth from exercising options overcomes any 
punishments that may occur when earnings management is detected. Options also give a 
manager a chance to pool with other managers in order to minimize the market reaction 
to bad information. Cohen et al. (2008) also find a positive effect of management’s 
unexercised options on accruals’ manipulation, especially in the period preceding the 
release of the Sarbanes-Oxley act. 
In line with the second point of view, Bauman et al. (2005) document that 
management compensation in the form of stock options drive managers to implement 
guidance to analysts in order to meet their forecasts. In this sense, managers seem to 
guide analysts by reducing their expectations rather than manipulating accruals. Coles et 
al. (2006) document that before the issue of options, managers tend to avoid 
discretionary accruals in order to keep stock prices as low as possible and, therefore, 
decrease the exercise price which is determined at the grant date. Managers may even 
make use of income-decreasing discretionary accruals to achieve the previous target 
(Baker et al., 2003; Balsam et al., 2003). 
 
4.3.2 CEO Turnover  
As the turnover process involves the predecessor CEO and the successor CEO, it is 
essential to understand the differences in the incentives of each of them to manage 
earnings. The predecessor CEO can get more benefits from inflating earnings, so that 
he/she hides any bad performance, extracts more earnings-based benefits in his/her last 
year onboard, and creates better chances for moving to another job (Hazarika et al., 
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2012). On the other hand, the successor CEO gets more benefits from deflating earnings, 
usually by taking a big bath, so that he/she decreases shareholders’ expectations that 
allow reflecting better future performance (Geiger and North, 2006; Ronen and Yaari, 
2008). In this sense, the successor CEO establishes low benchmarks for his/her 
performance in the future based on the current year’s bad results attributed to the poor 
performance of the predecessor CEO, especially if the later is not moving to serve on 
the board of directors (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Pourciau, 1993; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Godfrey et al., 2003; Florou and Conyon, 2004). 
 The non-routine CEO departure is generally associated with poor performance 
compared to the routine (peaceful) departure. In such case, shareholders tend to punish 
management for making bad decisions by replacement and thus the CEO is suddenly 
forced to leave the firm because of the negative implications of performance on the 
stock price (Warner et al., 1988; Brickley, 2003; Lehn and Zhao, 2006). The frequency 
of senior management turnover is higher in distressed firms that suffer from default on 
debt, bankruptcy, or debt covenant violations (Gilson, 1989; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
1994). As a result, poorly performing managers may manipulate earnings upwards to 
postpone the announcement of bad performance and, thus, avoid being ousted as long as 
possible (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). In this sense, poor performance is perceived as a 
motive of management discretionary behaviour and, therefore, drives higher 
management turnover (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Desai et al., 2006). In contrast, 
Pourciau (1993) document that departing managers manage earnings downwards in 
their last years of service because of the high monitoring of the poorly performing firms.  
Even in the case of peaceful termination, a retiring manager manages accruals 
upwards in the year of departure to improve the short-term performance of the firm, so 
that he/she can get higher bonus or a chance of employment in the board of directors 
(Reitenga and Tearney, 2003). Real earnings management is also evidenced as CEOs 
might decrease research and development (R&D) and capital expenditures during their 
last years of service (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Florou and Conyon, 2004). 
When the nature of the departure (routine vs. non-routine) is ignored, evidence 
of downward earnings management is observed in the year of CEO change (Godfrey et 
al., 2003). Ahmed et al. (2006) provide more specific results and document that the new 
managers tend to manage accruals upwards in the current year when future performance 
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is expected to be bad, while they manage accruals downwards in the current year if the 
firm performance is expected to be good, so that they create some reserves to enable 
them to secure their jobs (Ahmed et al., 2006).  
Overall, the CEO turnover is positively related to earnings management. 
Earnings management is more evidenced when managers are at the beginning of their 
tenure as they are more expected to leave their firms. Earnings management is also 
expected in firms with old managers as they are not highly concerned about their future 
in the market (Ronen and Yaari, 2008).  
 
4.3.3 Managerial Ability 
Different managers have dissimilar styles in running their firms as they vary in their 
accounting preferences, disclosure choices, tax positions, and selecting and 
implementing corporate policies and earnings management strategies (Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2003; Bamber et al., 2010; Dyreng et al., 2010; Ge et al., 2011; Graham et al., 
2012). Those differences arise from managers’ personal characteristics such as age, 
education, inborn capabilities, personalities, the tendency to take risk, individual beliefs, 
military service, early life experience, career background, communication, interpersonal, 
and execution skills (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Bamber et al., 2010; Malmendier et al., 
2011; Graham et al., 2012; Kaplan et al., 2012). The overall result is different 
managerial abilities that contribute to the variation in performance among firms at the 
operating, investing, financial, and organizational levels (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; 
Jian and lee, 2011; Malmendier et al., 2011). 
Several measures have been introduced to quantify managerial ability such as 
firm size, past abnormal performance, compensation, tenure, media mentions, and 
manager fixed effects5 (Demerjian et al., 2012). However, they were always criticized 
for the high noise arising from the influence of other firm characteristics. In contrast, the 
measure of Demerjian et al. (2012) has been the most credible so far because it reflects 
                                            
5 According to Bamber et al. (2010), the manager fixed effect is estimated as the residual from 
regressing management forecast characteristics (e.g., forecast frequency, precision, and bias) on the 
specific determinants of voluntary disclosure (e.g., change in EPS, R&D expenditure, market to 
book ratio, the quality of governance, market value of equity, number of analysts, litigation risk, 
etc.), after excluding the firm fixed effect and time influence. 
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the role of the management in enhancing firm efficiency after excluding the impact of 
other factors that may also interfere with firm performance (Demerjian et al., 2012). The 
new measure calculates the ability of a manager relative to others within the same 
industry and focuses on managerial operating and investing skills. It correlates well with 
the old measures of managerial ability mentioned earlier (Demerjian et al., 2012).  
The measure of Demerjian et al. (2012) represents how efficiently managers 
generate revenues from the available firm resources. They divide the process of 
quantifying managerial ability into two steps. In the first step, they consider each firm 
as a decision-making unit (DMU) that converts inputs into outputs. Inputs include net 
property, plant, and equipment (PPE), net operating leases (OpsLease), net research and 
development expenditure ( R&D ), purchased goodwill ( Goodwill ), other intangible 
assets (OtherIntan), cost of inventory (CoGS), and selling, general, and administrative 
expenses (SG&A). Firm revenues (Sales ) are the only output in the calculation of 
managerial ability. Subsequently, Demerjian et al. (2012) perform Data Envelopment 









In equation (4.1), s represents the outputs; m  represents the inputs; u  represents the 
output weight; v  represents the input weight; y  represents the output quantity; x 
represents the input quantity; and k represents a number from 1 to n. To obtain the 
weights of inputs and outputs (u, v), Demerjian et al. (2012) use the optimization model 
that appears in equation (4.2). They then divide the firm efficiency scores they get from 
equation (4.1) by the highest number obtained in each industry, so that they get an 
efficiency measure ranging from zero to one. 
 
maxθ=(u1Sales).(v1CoGS+v2SG&A+v3PPE+v4OpsLease 
                            +v5R&D+v6Goodwill+v7OtherIntan)
-1
  (4.2) 
In the second step, Demerjian et al. (2012) exclude some firm specific characteristics 
from the firm efficiency score obtained from the previous step. They believe that such 
firm attributes enhance or impede the performance of managers. Therefore, they 
eliminate those characteristics in order to reach a score that purely represents 
managerial ability. For this purpose, they execute a Tobit regression model in equation 
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(4.3), so that the remaining residual (εi) is the ultimate measure of managerial ability. 
Finally, they take the decile ranks of these measures by industry-year to obtain better 





ln(Total Assets)i+ β2Market Sharei 
                              +β
3
Free Cash Flow Indicatori+β4ln(Age)i 









+Yeari+εi  (4.3)  
Nevertheless, the Tobit model of Demerjian et al. (2012) does not eliminate all firm 
specific characteristics that influence firm efficiency. Some of the variables that are 
expected to interfere with the measure include corporate governance, firm auditor, 
ownership, and employee turnover. Finally, the measurre mainly focuses on core 
business activities by incorporating the operating and investing aspects of the firm. 
However, it ignores other firm activities like the financing, social, and environmental 
aspects. 
As discussed above, managerial ability influences firm performance and thus it 
is expected to have an impact on earnings management. Two plausible approaches are 
suggested in this regard. On the one hand, more able managers tend to avoid earnings 
manipulation in order to safeguard their precious reputations in the market (Demerjian 
et al., 2013b). Instead, they invest their high competencies in improving firm operations 
and mitigating financial distress (Demerjian et al., 2013a). In this sense, better 
managerial ability is associated with high earnings quality to allow the managers to 
maintain their reputation-based compensation premium; which is in line with the 
efficient contracting hypothesis (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Jian and Lee, 2011; 
Graham et al., 2012). On the other hand, superior managers may invest their high skills 
in using more earnings management with the purpose of maintaining their personal 
welfare. Managers’ private benefits include increasing the value of their stock 
compensation and drawing the attention to their performance in the labour market; 
which is in line with the rent extraction hypothesis (Jian and Lee, 2011; Demerjian et al., 
2013b).  
Following the first explanation above, several positive consequences of 
managerial ability can be identified. Superior managers are expected to show fewer 
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subsequent financial restatements, less errors in accruals, better earnings persistence and 
enhanced mapping of accruals into operating cash flows (Demerjian et al., 2013a).  
Their role may even become more evident in the future as they are generally associated 
with enhanced subsequent business performance, better stock market responses to their 
decisions, and lower exposure to litigation (Jian and Lee, 2011; Kaplan et al., 2012; 
Demerjian et al., 2013a). Managerial ability also moderates the negative relationship 
between equity financing and future abnormal returns (Demerjian et al., 2012). Even if 
superior managers engage in earnings manipulation, they seem more likely to use the 
accrual activities rather than the costly real practices. Such consequences are attributed 
to the high knowledge of superior managers in their business conditions, more 
experience with market competitors, and higher capability to understand and implement 
accounting standards. Accordingly, better managers use their abilities to accomplish 
both their own benefits and maintain stakeholders’ welfare at the same time (Graham et 
al., 2005; Demerjian et al., 2013b). In contrast, managerial ability may have some 
negative consequences in the future - although not frequently documented. According to 
Francis et al. (2008), more reputable managers do not necessarily produce better 
disclosures (Francis et al., 2008). On the contrary, earnings quality may decrease with 
the increase in managerial ability (Demerjian et al., 2013a).  The contrasting 
consequences of managerial ability raise some dispute around how superior managers 
invest their talents and the purpose of their different decision. 
 
4.3.4 Corporate Governance System 
The studies that have examined the effect of the corporate governance on earnings 
management have mainly documented that the quality of corporate governance 
influences the quality of earnings. In this sense, strong governance mechanisms can 
generally decrease earnings management behaviour. However, some studies find that 
corporate governance can stimulate earnings management because managers are under 
more pressure to improve firm value (Siregar and Utama, 2008). In the following 
subsections, the major components of the governance system are discussed which 
include the ownership structure of the firm, board of directors, and the audit committee.  
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The shareholders of a firm can be institutional owners or individual retail owners (Koh, 
2003, 2007; Zang, 2012). Both types of owners use earnings information to make their 
decisions. However, the institutional owners are more sophisticated and, thus, more able 
to detect earnings management and beat the individual owners (Shang, 2003). 
Meanwhile, the investment horizons of the institutional shareholders influence earnings 
management behaviour. Short-term institutional owners may drive firms to manage 
earnings in order to buy shares at a lower value or sell their investments at a higher 
price (Lakonishok et al., 1991; Yu, 2008). On the other hand, long-term institutional 
owners have more influence on firm decisions because they hold their shares for more 
than a year. Therefore, they use earnings information to monitor management 
performance and prevent earnings management behaviour that might be discounted by 
the market. As a result, long-term institutional owners serve as gatekeepers that reduce 
the noise associated with earnings compared to the short-term institutional owners 
(Bushee, 1998; Koh, 2005; Srivardhan, 2009). 
Based on their listing status, public firms are less inclined to manage earnings 
than private firms because of the monitoring by the stock market and the higher 
governance requirements (Prencipe and Bar-Yosef, 2011). However, some studies 
document the opposite because private firms are more closely monitored by their 
owners (Burgstahler et al., 2006). Therefore, the public listing of a firm cannot 
guarantee a better earnings quality as the stock market may sometimes create pressure 
on the listed firms to manage earnings (Jeong-Bon and Cheong, 2006; Givoly et al., 
2010). 
Furthermore, family ownership may stimulate earnings management because of 
the less visible performance to the public and the higher probability of collusion 
between the owners (Siregar and Utama, 2008; Jaggi et al., 2009; Haw et al., 2011; 
Prencipe and Bar-Yosef, 2011). Therefore, family-owned businesses are expected to 
receive less monitoring than other firms. However, the lower agency problem in such 
firms may mitigate earnings management (Dechun, 2006). 
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4.3.4.2 Board of Directors 
The board of directors is the body charged in governance for maintaining the interests of 
the shareholders. To achieve the previous target, the board of directors monitors 
management using the available information (McAnally et al., 2008; Jaggi et al., 2009; 
Prencipe and Bar-Yosef, 2011). However, information is provided by management 
which makes the board’s monitoring role difficult to be achieved. Furthermore, 
management may have some control over the appointment of the board members and 
thus both parties may collude in managing the earnings of the firm (Boone et al., 2004).  
The emphasis of the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX) on the role of the board of 
directors in improving firm performance has resulted in an overall increase in board size 
in public companies (Linck et al., 2006). Although this increase can be beneficial in 
some aspects, it may have some negative consequences. On the bright side, a larger 
board may result in lower levels of earnings management because of the higher number 
of independent and more experienced directors who are more able to monitor 
management activities (Chtourou et al., 2001; Xie et al., 2003). On the dark side, larger 
board size may drive more earnings management because of the high cost and time 
required for information flow between the firm and the directors. It also results in a 
bigger free-rider problem where the directors tend to rely on each other due to the 
distributed responsibility (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Blair, 1995; Yermack, 1996). In 
this sense, the board of directors is less effective because it basically serves as part of 
the public firm’s prestige to impress investors (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). In 
addition, the more diverse and conflicting demands of a larger board may impose more 
pressure on managers to manipulate earnings (Aggarwal and Nanda, 2004). 
The effect of the board independence on earnings management is also debatable. 
On the one hand, more independent directors can be associated with better earnings 
quality because they do not have direct employment benefits to collude with 
management compared to the internal directors (Vancil, 1987; Blair, 1995; Klein, 2002; 
Peasnell et al., 2005). In this sense, independent directors are in a better position to 
monitor management and take critical decisions, e.g., the restructuring and layoffs, and 
thus serve in aligning the interests of shareholders and management (Weisbach, 1988; 
Perry and Shivadasani, 2005; Visvanathan, 2008). On the other hand, more independent 
directors can stimulate earnings management because they are less knowledgeable about 
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firm-specific operations; hence result in higher communication costs (Yermack, 2004). 
In addition, no pure independent board members exist because management frequently 
interferes in the nomination of those members (Monks and Minow, 2004). 
Other board attributes, e.g., the multiple directorships, position-duality, number 
of board meeting, directors’ equity holdings, age and tenure, and staggered boards, may 
also influence earnings management behaviour. Multiple directorships, in the form of a 
single director holding a similar position in the boards of other companies, contribute 
more experience to the firm and allows for more connections; hence result in better 
earnings quality (Conyon and Read, 2006). A position-duality happens when a board 
chairman holds the position of the CEO at the same time. As a result, he/she obtains 
more power and control over the firm that may allow for more earnings management 
(He et al., 2003). The number of board meetings indicates the efforts made by the 
directors in monitoring management performance which may prevent earnings 
management (Jiraporn et al., 2007). Long-term equity holdings of the directors may 
align their interests with shareholders, but short-term holdings may encourage the 
collusion of the directors with the management (Perry, 2000; Chtourou et al., 2001). 
Age and tenure of a board member indicate more experience and familiarity with firm 
transactions and thus enhance better monitoring. However, they result in closer relations 
with management that may allow collusion to occur (Niskanen, 2005). Finally, 
staggered boards appear when the directors are elected partially each year; resulting in 
better earnings quality because they do not suffer from the takeover risk (Zhao and 
Chen, 2008). 
 
4.3.4.3 Audit Committee 
The audit committee is part of the board of directors and plays an important role in 
corporate governance that has been emphasized in most of the regulations, e.g., SOX. 
Overall, the empirical evidence documents that a strong audit committee provides high 
earnings quality. However, different attributes of the audit committee contribute to 
determining earnings management behaviour. The independence of the committee’s 
members, their financial and governance expertise, and the higher frequency of 
meetings contribute to mitigating earnings management. However, while the high 
tenure implies more experience, it may allow the collusion with management. Similarly, 
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the larger size may result in including more experienced members in the committee but 
higher cost of communication. The terms of the directors’ equity holdings may also 
align their interests with the shareholders or drive them to collude with the management 
(Klein, 2002; DeFond and Francis, 2005; Zhang et al., 2006). On the other hand, 
Peasnell et al. (2005) document that the audit committee does not influence earnings 
management behaviour or even does not create any market response (Peasnell et al., 
2005; Anderson et al., 2006). Finally, the high quality of the internal audit results in less 
earnings management (Prawitt et al., 2009). 
 
4.3.5 Loans  
Before taking a loan, firms might be motivated to manipulate earnings upward in order 
to avoid reporting low earnings (Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009). This way, they aim to get 
a better evaluation by debtors about their credit worthiness and, consequently, receive 
debt at a lower cost according to the debt hypothesis (Das and Shroff, 2002). Firms may 
also manipulate earnings downward because entering a loan agreement means a long 
term commitment that requires firms to meet the debtors’ expectations over time. 
Therefore, firms would be motivated to report conservatively in order to mitigate the 
conflict between shareholders and creditors; hence keep the expectations of creditors 
and shareholders as low as possible (Ahmed et al., 2002). On the other hand, debt 
contracts may include restrictions on how management reports earnings (Smith Jr, 
1993). In this sense, firms may not be motivated to use earnings management before 
taking a loan (DeAngelo et al., 1994).  
After taking a loan, the probability of earnings management depends on the 
financial health of the borrowing firm and the flexibility of the lender to renegotiate the 
debt (Zang, 2012). Financially distressed firms are more likely to manage earnings 
when there are difficulties in renegotiating debt according to the debt-covenant 
hypothesis (Hassabelnaby et al., 2005). As a result, the borrower may manage earnings 
upward to relax the debt covenants or manage earnings downward to influence the 
future renegotiation of the debt (Jaggi and Picheng, 2002). 
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4.3.6 Firm Characteristics 
Firm attributes related to the contracting between the shareholders may also influence 
management behaviour. Although some studies document that the size of the firm has 
an impact on its earnings management behaviour (Lee and Choi, 2002), others 
document no influence (Siregar and Utama, 2008). It is difficult to distinguish between 
earnings management behaviour of small and large firms because both types of firms 
face pressure to manage earnings in order to maintain them at an optimal level (Moses, 
1987; Albrecht and Richardson, 1990; Michelson et al., 1995; Lee and Choi, 2002). 
Earnings management is expected in small firms because they have less predictable 
operations and less diversified businesses. Similarly, managers of large firms have 
opportunities to manipulate earnings because of their huge number of transactions and 
complicated operations (Demerjian et al., 2013b). Another firm attribute that may 
influence earnings management is its operating cycle. Longer operating cycles increase 
the levels of uncertainty and therefore, the potential for earnings management (Dechow 
and Dichev, 2002). Finally, business complexity in the form of the number of business 
segments and the frequency of foreign transactions may drive managers to use more 
earnings management, and particularly real earnings management because it is less 
likely to be detected than discretionary revenue manipulation (Karuna et al., 2012). 
 
4.4 Capital Market Motives of Earnings Management 
This group of motives involves factors that drive earnings management through their 
impact on the firm’s stock price. If the stock price fully reveals information about the 
firm’s underlying economic value, then the capital market motives are not expected to 
have any influence on earnings management. However, because of the noisy nature of 
the capital markets, stock prices do not completely reflect the firms’ values; hence 
earnings management is likely to occur. (Ronen and Yaari, 2008).  
 
4.4.1 Stock Market 
Earnings are associated with stock prices and, therefore, managers are motivated to 
manage earnings in order to improve stock prices and raise more capital (Lev, 1989; 
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Ramakrishnan and Thomas, 1998; Kothari, 2001; Gelb and  Zarowin, 2002). As a result, 
earnings management creates a difference between the stock price of a firm and its 
fundamental economic value6 which is unknown to most of the shareholders (Ronen 
and Yaari, 2008; Beyer, 2009). The previous effect is evidenced in inefficient markets 
where discretionary accruals influence stock prices and, therefore, managers may 
opportunistically manipulate accruals to improve the capital market valuation of their 
firms (Guay et al., 1996; Subramanyam, 1996). Badertscher (2011) finds that with 
longer periods of overvaluation, more total earnings management is evidenced with a 
tendency to switch from the within-GAAP to the non-GAAP accounting discretion. 
The market reaction to the reported earnings is measured by the earnings 
response coefficient (Feltham and Jinhan, 2000). In cases of unmanaged earnings, a 
linear earnings response coefficient with a unit slope is expected (Sankar, 1999). The 
reaction of the market to earnings management, however, depends on the ability of the 
market to detect earnings management which, in turn, relies on the firms’ disclosures, 
investors’ sophistication, and the market optimism (Shivakumar, 2000; Balsam et al., 
2002; Coles et al., 2006). Although the chance that the market learns about earnings 
management attempts after the announcement of earnings always exists, detecting 
earnings management may sometimes take years (Karpoff et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
the market needs time to collect more information before it reacts to the manipulation. 
Earnings management may even go undetected and, thus, the market may over-value 
firms that manage their earnings upwards and undervalue those that manage their 
earnings downwards (Chambers, 1999). The tendency to detect earnings management 
increases with the sophistication of the investors and decreases in optimistic 
environments where the investors more readily believe the reported earnings (Daneshfar 
et al., 2009; Coffee, 2003; Roychowdhury, 2006). 
If the market detects the manipulation, it negatively prices any upward earnings 
management and positively prices the downward attempts. The response of stock prices 
is expected to be less than a unit slope in the case of myopic earnings management that 
emphasizes the short-term horizons (Sankar, 1999). Similarly, Feltham and Jinhan 
(2000) find that the earnings response coefficient is lower with more noise associated in 
                                            
6  The fundamental economic value is calculated as the discounted dividends expected to be 
distributed by the firm in the future. 
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communicating the earnings. While the market discounts any good news when it doubts 
the occurrence of earnings management, Ronen et al. (2003) document that the reaction 
to the negative earnings surprises is higher than that to the positive ones. Furthermore, 
investors consider firms that meet analysts’ forecasts with zero or small earnings as a 
signal of earnings management and, therefore, punish management with a lower 
earnings response coefficient (Lin and Shih, 2006). 
Management may also use earnings smoothing to positively influence their share 
prices and reduce their volatility. However, the market responds negatively to the lower 
quality of information when earnings smoothing is used opportunistically and thus it 
discounts them to end up in more volatile share prices. In this sense, the investors 
demonstrate a sophisticated response to earnings smoothing by incorporating their 
perceptions about the risk of the different management activities when determining 
shares’ values (Markarian and Gill-de-Albornoz, 2012).  
Overall, the results of the previous studies show that the response of the stock 
market to earnings management is debatable between the ‘accruals anomaly’ stream and 
the ‘cost of capital’ stream (Walker, 2013). According to the ‘accruals anomaly’ stream, 
accrual earnings management may allow managers to beat the market because it results 
in low correlation between accruals and cash flows and ultimately drives the mispricing 
of accruals by the stock market. In this sense, earnings management can be used as a 
method to positively influence market prices and ultimately improve stock returns 
(Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001; Collins et al., 2003; Beneish and Nichols, 2005; Chan et al., 
2006; Pincus et al., 2007; Soares and Stark, 2009). On the other hand, the ‘cost of 
capital’ stream is in line with the efficient markets hypothesis and assumes that markets 
are smart enough to discount earnings management. In this sense, the cost of capital 
depends on earnings quality i.e. accruals’ quality is a priced risk factor. Although most 
of the studies in this regard have emphasized the efficient markets hypothesis (Francis 
et al., 2004; Francis et al., 2005; Lambert et al., 2007; Francis et al., 2008; Ogneva, 
2012), other studies document insignificant results (Core et al., 2008; McInnis, 2010). 
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4.4.2 Issuance of Equity  
Initial public offerings (IPO) and seasoned equity offerings (SEO) can create incentives 
for managers to manipulate earnings. Earnings at IPOs are important because some 
investors may request earnings information before purchasing stocks and subsequently 
will compare firms’ future performance to the IPO earnings (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
At the same time, IPOs are associated with high information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders because little information is known about the firms 
before they go public (Cheung and Krinsky, 1994). In addition, IPOs might be 
perceived as a final stage for the early investors who want to convert their investments 
to cash (Li and Zhou, 2006). All the previous reasons may drive managers to 
manipulate earnings in order to influence the valuation of their firms in the market (Fan, 
2007). Mainly, high quality firms are expected to send signals that reflect their superior 
performance because they might be underpriced (Fan, 2007).  The selection of a specific 
type of earnings management at the IPOs depends on the relative importance of the 
financial statements’ items for each firm. Science- and internet-based firms are more 
inclined to manipulate their research and development costs, while asset-based firms are 
more likely to exert discretion over sales’ accruals (Singer, 2007). Overall, IPOs may 
motivate both accrual and real earnings management (Darrough and Rangan, 2005; Lo, 
2008). 
On the other hand, earnings can be considered invaluable in the case of IPOs 
because they might not reflect a firm’s future performance and, therefore, the market 
values the firms based on other criteria e.g., cash flows (Cheng and Firth, 2000; Bartov 
et al., 2002b).  Meanwhile, an IPO might be perceived as a first stage to raise capital for 
future growth. Furthermore, reporting misleading earnings may drive shareholders to 
sue the firms once the manipulation is detected (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). In this sense, 
IPOs would not create an incentive for management to manipulate earnings. On the 
contrary, they would demotivate earnings management behaviour so that firms maintain 
their credibility and keep their future financing opportunities necessary for their growth, 
especially under the higher monitoring of IPO firms (Li and Zhou, 2006; Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2008).  
SEOs also have a dual effect on earnings management. Firms manage earnings 
around SEOs in order to improve their stock prices and, therefore, increase the wealth of 
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the current owners (Teoh et al., 1998; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). On the other hand, a 
number of restrictions appear around SEOs including the high analysts’ coverage, 
information requirements by the market and the auditors, and the possibility of being 
sued when the manipulation is detected (Teoh et al., 1998). Therefore, the market 
discounts earnings management, especially when real earnings management is used, 
because it expects bad performance after the SEOs (Teoh et al., 1998; Shivakumar, 
2000; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). The previous factors drive the firms to avoid earnings 
management in the periods of SEOs. Overall, there is a general trend of a drop in stock 
prices after SEOs because investors consider an SEO as a way of raising capital due to 
bad financial situation or stocks being overpriced (Brazel and Webb, 2006). 
 
4.4.3 New Listing and Cross-Listing 
New listings influence earnings management in two opposing ways. Firms listed in a 
new market have incentives to manage earnings in order to improve their stock prices; 
although such aggressive behaviour may result in negative returns in the future (Lin, 
2003; Lang et al., 2006). From another point of view, firms may avoid earnings’ 
manipulation due to the restrictions they face in the new markets where they are listed 
(Ronen and Yaari, 2008).  
Earnings management appears more vividly in firms listed in non-US markets as 
they have less restrictions in terms of investor protection and legal requirements. Even 
if a firm is listed in the US at the same time, the SEC conventions cannot replace the 
local regulations in the firm’s home country (Lang et al., 2006). Firms usually select the 
time of peak performance when they attempt to list in a new market. At this point, they 
are more likely to use earnings management in order to improve their stock prices and 
get more cash infusion (Ndubizu, 2007). 
 
4.4.4 Mergers and Acquisitions 
The acquirer firm aims to improve its stock price in order to decrease the number of 
stocks transferred to the target firm in case of stock mergers and acquisitions; hence 
avoids the dilution of the current shareholders’ ownership. In this sense, acquirers select 
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to manage earnings in order to avoid bad results that might drive the market to discount 
their stock prices. Acquiring firms also tend to manage earnings to sell their shares at a 
higher price so that they can finance a cash acquisition with a lower cost (Erickson and 
Wang, 1999; Efendi et al., 2007). On the other hand, the length of the negotiation 
process between the acquirer and the target firm may prevent earnings management 
behaviour because it gives a chance for the target to understand the acquirer’s 
transactions and detect the manipulation, especially the discretionary accruals that 
reverse in the next accounting period. Therefore, target firms are required to perform 
their due diligence in evaluating the acquirer’s financial statements; otherwise they 
might get subsequently sued by their shareholders (Erickson and Wang, 1999; Gong et 
al., 2008).  
The target firms may also manage earnings to improve their stock prices and, 
consequently, get a higher value for the acquisition transaction. This particularly applies 
to hostile takeovers where targets attempt to avoid the acquisition (Easterwood, 1997). 
On the other hand, the target firms may be less inclined to manage earnings because the 
price of the transaction is mostly determined by the bargaining power of the acquirer 
and the target rather than the reported earnings of the target firm (Erickson and Wang, 
1999). 
 
4.4.5 Insider Trading  
According to the Security and Exchange Act of 1934, insiders are defined as parties that 
own more that 10% of any class of firm’s equity. The definition includes any employees 
or beneficial owners in the firm like lawyers and accountants. The act considers trading 
based on private information illegal if such information has material consequences on 
decision making (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Since then, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), the Congress, and the courts in the United States have been 
attempting to prevent insider trading especially before critical corporate announcements 
e.g., earnings’ announcements (Bainbridge, 2001).  
 Managers may achieve self-benefits by making use of their access to private 
information and, thus, they buy stocks if their values are expected to increase in the 
future while sell those whose values are expected to decrease (Lakonishok and Lee, 
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2001; Brochet, 2016). In this sense, insider trading is likely to motivate earnings 
management to meet analysts’ expectations and, thus, managers can sell their stocks at 
better prices (Beneish and Vargus, 2002; Hochberg et al., 2003; Park and Park, 2004; 
McVay et al., 2006; Sawicki and Shrestha, 2016). Elitzur and Yaari (1995) document 
that the effect of insider trading on earnings management is based on how the market 
reacts to earnings management. If managers expect the market to react positively, they 
buy more shares at the current cheaper prices and manage earnings upwards to increase 
their wealth. They may also sell their shares at the current higher prices and 
subsequently manage earnings downwards. The opposite applies if the managers expect 
the market to react negatively to earnings management. Therefore, insider trading is a 
good tool to predict the direction of earnings’ manipulation (Elitzur and Yaari, 1995).  
On the other hand, insider trading is sometimes perceived as an efficient 
contractual arrangement, which is part of management compensation scheme, to 
maximize the welfare of both the managers and the shareholders (Dye, 1984; Seyhun, 
1992; Noe, 1997; Bainbridge, 2001; Bolton et al., 2006). In this sense, insider trading 
mitigates the agency problem as it allows private information to be reflected in the stock 
prices (Manne, 1966). In this line, Boyer et al. (2003) emphasize the ethical, rather than 
the opportunistic, aspect of insider trading. They suggest that the relation between 
insider trading and earnings management depends on the degree of optimism/pessimism 
of the managers about the firm performance. Optimistic managers tend to manage 
earnings upwards and still buy more stocks. Pessimistic managers, however, manipulate 
earnings downwards while selling more shares (Boyer et al., 2003). Their findings 
suggest the need for selective, and not prohibitive, regulations to control the insider 
trading phenomenon (Manne, 1966). 
 
4.4.6 Management Buyouts  
Mangers may attempt to purchase the firm they are working for. A conflict of interests 
appears between managers and shareholders as the managers want to pay less while the 
shareholders want to receive more (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Therefore, managers are 
expected to manage earnings downwards before the buyout, so that they can purchase 
the firm at a lower price. In this line, Wiedman and Marquardt (2002) document that 
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managers tend to defer revenue recognition before the buyout announcement. Wu (1997) 
find that managing discretionary accruals downwards before the announcement of the 
buyout bid drives stock prices down; which is not observed in the case of third party 
takeover. Therefore, management buyouts raise concerns about the negative 
consequences on the shareholders’ interests (Perry and Williams, 1994). 
 
4.4.7 Meeting or Beating a Benchmark   
Managers may get motivated to manage earnings under the incentive of meeting or 
beating a benchmark. Based on the degree of information asymmetry, the firm and the 
market implicitly agree on the benchmarks. Benchmarks can take the form of zero 
earnings, prior years’ earnings, or analysts’ forecasts (Xue, 2003). Managers generally 
try to avoid reporting losses (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). They also prefer to show 
an increase in their earnings compared to a similar prior period and, therefore, even 
profitable firms would have the incentives to manage earnings (DeAngelo et al., 1996; 
Ayers et al., 2006; Barua et al., 2006; Roychowdhury, 2006; Myers et al., 2007; Cohen 
et al., 2008; Osma and Young, 2009). In addition, managers try to meet analysts’ 
forecasts because they reflect the general market expectations that will give the firms 
more credibility in the market if they are met (Graham et al., 2005).  
The market takes into consideration meeting the benchmarks when valuing the 
firms (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Barua et al., 2006). Firms that meet their 
benchmarks are valued at different valuation models than those which do not. Therefore, 
meeting or beating a benchmark is expected to have a positive influence on firms’ stock 
prices (Durtschi and Easton, 2005). Because of the important role of the analysts as 
gatekeepers in preventing market deception by earnings management, their effect on 
earnings management is going to be discussed separately in the next section.  
 
4.4.8 Analysts 
Analysts are gatekeepers that monitor management performance in order to protect the 
shareholders’ welfare. Consequently, they reduce the agency costs and improve the 
public confidence to invest in the markets (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Analysts’ coverage 
Chapter 4  





is negatively associated with information asymmetry and, thus, it is used as a measure 
of information asymmetry variable in some studies (Houston at al., 2008). They play an 
important role in simplifying the complicated information reported by management to 
the users of the financial reports and providing relevant analysis about the future for 
decision making (Brennan and Hughes, 1991).  
Analysts’ coverage has been increasing over time leading to a more influential 
role in the stock market (Francis et al., 2004). Analysts’ forecasts influence market 
prices as they improve the efficiency of communicating the financial information and, 
thus, allow a closer view by the investors (Barth and Hutton, 2000; Brennan and 
Tamarowski, 2000; Shroff at al., 2004). Therefore, investors prefer to invest in firms 
that are covered by more analysts (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Brennan and Hughes, 
1991). The response of the stock market to earnings’ announcements revised by analysts 
is higher than the response to other strategic business information because analysts 
provide information that can be directly used in firm valuation models (Bagnoli et al., 
2005).  
Analysts are expected to provide accurate forecasts because the clients pay 
commissions to the brokers and investment banks where analysts work (Ronen and 
Yaari, 2008). In this sense, analysts use their professional experience in analyzing the 
financial information and identifying management incentives and, therefore, providing 
valuable information in their forecasts to the different users (Gu and Chen, 2004; Barton 
and Mercer, 2005; Lin and Shih, 2006).  As a result, analysts mitigate earnings 
management because they are able to detect opportunistic behaviour and discount 
inflated earnings, especially in environments where transparent financial disclosures 
exist (Ke, 2001; DeGeorge et al., 2004; Brown, 2004; Yu, 2008).  
Astonishingly, most of the literature provides evidence on the positive effect of 
analysts on earnings management. Analysts’ may face pressure from their employers or 
clients to make optimistic forecasts (Francis and Philbrick, 1993; O’Brien et al., 2005). 
They are also limited to the amount of information provided by the management. In this 
sense, analysts are more inclined to tolerate earnings management or even collude with 
the management by reducing their expectations to be easily met; hence reflecting better 
market values (Bartov et al., 2002a; Griffin, 2003). Under the previous incentives, 
analysts may not report overestimated accruals that might reduce firms’ future earnings. 
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They may even not distinguish between discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals 
when making their forecasts. Consequently, analysts do not always discount earnings 
management and thus may ultimately provide biased forecasts (Bradshaw et al., 2001; 
Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Ahmed et al., 2005).  
Accordingly, meeting analysts’ expectations is more subjective compared to 
meeting other benchmarks (e.g., prior years’ earnings), and thus firms may not only use 
earnings management but also expectation management to achieve their opportunistic 
targets (Barua et al., 2006; Kross et al., 2011). Expectation management allows for 
guiding the perceptions of the analysts whether explicitly through firm announcements 
or implicitly by staying silent without advising the analysts to review their forecasts. 
Das et al. (2011) find that the relationship between expectation management and 
earnings management is complementary. Managers tend to manage analysts’ 
expectations when earnings management activities involve higher costs (Das et al., 
2011).  Similarly, management may use classification shifting to meet or beat analysts’ 
forcasts (McVay, 2006; Athanasakou et al., 2009; Yun et al., 2010). However, 
Athanasakou et al. (2009) document that the market rewards firms that manipulate their 
accounts’ classification less than those that genuinely achieve their targets. 
 
4.5 Third-Party Motives of Earnings Management 
The relations of the firm with the external parties may shape its earnings management 
behaviour to be able to maintain its future interests with them. Third parties need the 
accounting information to make decisions related to directly entering into business 
transactions with the firm or indirectly revising the structure of the environment where 
the firm is operating. In this sense, third parties influence the firm’s strategies in 
managing its resources to generate earnings (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). The third-party 
motives are also referred to as the external motives of earnings management in this 
thesis.  
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4.5.1 Industry  
Firms within the same industry generally have similar legal and financial incentives, 
and thus they tend to take into consideration the behaviour of the other firms in that 
industry when making their decisions (Kallunki and Martikainen, 1999; Popp et al., 
2003; Othman and Zeghal, 2006). Consequently, earnings management activities of a 
firm are correlated with the levels of comparable activities in the same industry 
(Bagnoli and Watts, 2000). In contrast, different industries develop based on different 
resources that ultimately determine their distinct structures and characteristics and 
contribute to the variation in performance and profitability between them (McGahan 
and Porter, 1997; Popp et al., 2003). Eventually, the variation in managerial incentives 
between the different industries results in the variation in the type and extent of earnings 
management activities used in each sector (Aharony et al., 2000; Gu et al., 2005). In this 
sense, industry may have an impact on discretionary accruals as well as real earnings 
management activities (Roychowdhury, 2006; Toniato et al., 2006; Sundvik, 2013).  
The accounting choices available to the managers in an industry may allow the 
use of earnings management practices specific to each sector.  For example, firms in the 
manufacturing sector have the opportunity of manipulating the amount of units 
produced. Overproduction as a real earnings management strategy would lead to a lower 
cost of goods sold and ultimately improve net revenue figures (Gu et al., 2005; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). Under different conditions, firms in the retail sectors are 
expected to have higher receivable balances and, therefore, may be subject to more bad 
debt manipulation (Gu et al., 2005). 
In the same way, the technology associated with specific industry sectors may 
create incentives for the firms to manage earnings. Industries which share chemical or 
physical technologies tend to use less real earnings management activities because of 
the information shared with the competitors that imposes a restriction on earnings 
manipulation (Bagnoli and Watts, 2010). In contrast, industries with less similar 
technologies, such as services, are more likely to smooth their earnings since it is more 
difficult for other firms to obtain knowledge about their unique transactions (Bagnoli 
and Watts, 2010). Overall, high-tech firms exhibit better earnings quality due to 
industry specific factors like litigation, the funding needs, and the bigger investments 
(Kwon et al., 2006). 
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Regulation and state-protection also play an important role in determining 
earnings management behaviour in the different industries; hence differences in 
earnings manipulation are evidenced between regulated and unregulated sectors. In this 
line, lower levels of earnings management are expected in highly regulated industries as 
there is less space for management discretion in selecting and using the accounting 
principles (Gu et al., 2005). High-tech firms represent an example of a highly regulated 
industry sector that exhibits more conservatism in financial reporting (Kwon et al., 
2006). The same applies to the state-protected industries due to the high supervision and 
distinctive treatment by the regulatory bodies (Aharony et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, differences in earnings management appear between core and 
peripheral industries as the core sectors are less likely to manage earnings than the 
peripheral sectors (Sun and Rath, 2009). Core sectors represent industries with more 
economic and political influence like the construction, manufacturing, and extraction 
industries in the US. The enhanced earnings quality in such industries is attributed to the 
lower competition and environmental uncertainty, along with the higher profitability, 
unionization, capital investments, and more sophisticated regulations (Albrecht and 
Richardson, 1990).  
While the previous studies focus on a dual-industry view, others implement a 
multiple perspective to examine the effect of industry on earnings management. Toniato 
et al. (2006) consider the impact of industry on accrual earnings management activities 
in Brazil and document that most of the industry sectors do not have a significant 
impact on discretionary accruals. On the other hand, Sundvik (2013) applies the same 
idea on the industries in Finland and identifies some differences in using discretionary 
accruals between the different sectors. The results of the two studies reflect the 
differences in industry characteristics and earnings management behaviour between the 
different economies. 
Overall, industry reflects firms’ strategic objectives and competitive advantages; 
hence plays a major role in determining managerial choices and earnings quality 
(Demerjian et al., 2013a). However, all of the studies in this area of research focus on 
accrual earnings management. Furthermore, although the multiple-economy approach 
followed by Toniato et al. (2006) and Sundvik (2013) allows the revelation of each 
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industry’s behaviour separately, the specific industry characteristics need to be 
examined in order to explain their influence on earnings management. 
 
4.5.2 Industrial Diversification 
The operations of industry-diversified firms are complex for the shareholders to 
understand and thus create more information asymmetry between the managers and the 
shareholders and more chances for earnings management. On the other hand, diversified 
firms may not need to manipulate earnings because they have different sources for 
earnings and cash flows. In addition, the correlation between accruals of the divisions in 
the different industries makes it difficult for top management to decide on the overall 
result of earnings management activities that may cancel each other. In this line, 
Jiraporn et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence on the low association between 
industrial diversification and earnings management.  
 
4.5.3 Regulations  
Although regulation is generally perceived as a mechanism that limits opportunistic 
behaviour (Graham et al., 2005), it may have the opposite effect (Goldman and Slezak, 
2006). While it controls financial disclosures, regulation may prohibit firms from 
disclosing their private information and thus end up in violating the revelation principle 
(Ronen and Yaari, 1993). In the same line, while regulations generally aim at enhancing 
management incentives to improve performance and firm value, such incentive may 
create a pressure to manage earnings and thus reduce firm value (Cheng et al., 2011). 
The emphasis of regulations on the role of auditors can also mitigate earnings 
management, but it contributes to a decrease in the value of the firm as it encourages 
management conservative behaviour (Goldman and Slezak, 2006).  
Firms may manage earnings in different ways under the pressure of regulation. 
Regulatory investigations or new regulatory projects drive firms to manage 
discretionary accruals downwards in order to demotivate the regulators from issuing 
strict regulations that might harm the firms (Jones, 1991; Cahan, 1992; Cahan et al., 
1997). Poorly performing firms in regulated industries, however, manage earnings 
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upwards by decreasing their reserves and allowances to avoid any intervention that 
might result in losing some of their benefits or even getting their businesses closed 
(Petroni, 1992; Gaver and Paterson, 2000; Gray and Clarke, 2004). Firms may also 
respond to the regulatory power by manipulating their non-operating activities (Chen 
and Yuan, 2004). In contrast, the lack of regulation can drive firms to manage earnings 
upwards due to the absence of protection in the market (Aharony et al., 2000). 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US is the main body that 
regulates the capital market and the listed firms’ affairs (Giroux, 2004).  One of the 
most famous and recent regulations is the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX) that followed the 
Enron scandal in 2002. SOX incorporated lots of emphasis on corporate governance 
including the independence of the board of directors, the audit committee, and the 
external auditor (Hossain et al., 2011; Krishnan et al., 2011). While such regulatory 
intervention seems to decrease accrual earnings management and the opportunistic non-
GAAP disclosures, firms tend to use other methods to achieve their opportunistic targets 
like real earnings management or the abuse of special items (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 
2005; Cohen et al., 2008; Heflin and Hsu, 2008; Kolev at al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 
2009; Hutton et al., 2009; Baber et al., 2011; Badertscher, 2011). Ghosh et al. (2010), 
however, document that SOX did not have any significant influence on earnings 
management behaviour; hence they raise concerns about the context and conditions of 
applying the different studies in this area.  
 
4.5.4 Political Environment and Country-Specific Policies 
Firms are inclined to manage earnings under political pressure. For example, oil firms 
managed earnings downwards during the Second Gulf War in order to avoid any 
unfavourable interventions after the sudden increase in petrol prices (Han and Shiing-
wu, 1998). The distinct policies of each country also influence earnings management 
behaviour. Firms in countries with strong investor protection policies are involved in 
less earnings management compared to those in other countries (Leuz et al., 2003; Lang 
et al., 2006; Haw et al., 2011; Gopalan and Jayaraman, 2012; Houqe et al., 2012). Firms 
in countries with common laws use less earnings smoothing than firms in countries with 
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code laws7 (Gassen et al., 2006). However, Gaio (2010) document that the differences 
in policies between countries do not influence earnings quality as it is basically 
attributed to the differences in individual firm characteristics.   
 
4.5.5 Accounting Standards 
Although the voluntary adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) has resulted in a better quality of earnings, the bright side of the effect needs to 
be interpreted with care (Barth et al., 2008). In this sense, the researchers have to take 
into consideration that the adoption of IFRS allows firms to have a fresh start. Therefore, 
making a fair comparison between the pre-adoption period and the post-adoption period 
might be impractical (Walker, 2013).  
In contrast, examining the influence of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 
on earnings management is difficult because of the continuous changes in the economic 
conditions before and after the adoption, e.g., the financial crisis in the late 2007. In 
addition, the mandatory adoption of IFRS has provided the firms with the chance to 
clean-up their financial statements before the adoption (Garcia-Osma and Pope, 2011; 
Walker, 2013). The empirical evidence shows that the influence of the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS differs in different countries. While no influence was noticed in 
Australia, a significant increase in accrual earnings management has occurred in the 
French firms (Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008). Meanwhile, the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS depends on the enforcement regime in a particular country, e.g., the adoption of 
IFRS in the UK has resulted in less accrual earnings management because of the strong 
enforcement regime (Ipino and Parbonetti, 2011). It has been also noticed that income 
smoothing has increased in the European Union firms after the adoption of IFRS in 
2005 because of the clean-up that was taken by most firms prior to the adoption (Callao 
and Jarne, 2010; Capkun et al., 2016).  
Similar to the regulatory intervention effect on earnings management, the 
adoption of IFRS has driven the trade-off between the different earnings management 
methods. Ipino and Parbonetti (2011) document that while the adoption of IFRS in the 
                                            
7 While the common laws develop based on the cases experienced in the courts of a specific country 
over time, code laws represent systematic legislation enforced by law.  
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UK has resulted in a decrease in accrual earnings management, firms have started to use 
more real earnings management and earnings smoothing (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005). 
Furthermore, managers develop the skills to manipulate the new accounting standards 
over time; hence there is a continuous need for updating the accounting regulation 
(O’Brien, 2005). 
 
4.5.6 Tax Considerations  
Firms may manage earnings downwards to decrease their tax expenses which are 
calculated based on their earnings’ numbers (Boynton et al., 1992). In this sense, 
taxation mitigates the upward earnings management and, thus, decreases the pernicious 
manipulation (Eilifsen et al., 1999). Furthermore, taxation mitigates aggressive earnings 
management as huge differences between book income and tax income can be easily 
noticed by the tax authorities and the stock market. Therefore, while the managers aim 
to achieve tax benefits, they take into consideration the costs of earnings management 
they will subsequently incur (Badertscher et al., 2006). 
To achieve tax advantages, firms manage earnings through their deferred tax 
allowances that are kept open until the last moment before the financial reporting to the 
public. Therefore, the allowances allow managerial judgment to manipulate the tax 
expenses so that firms can meet their earnings’ targets (Bauman et al., 2001; Kumar and 
Visvanathan, 2003).  In addition, the flexibilities in tax laws give a suitable chance for 
earnings management behaviour. For example, allowing income adjustment for tax 
purposes drives firms to manage earnings downwards, while reducing tax rates over 




Market competition influences earnings management behaviour as firms in the same 
industry tend to take each other’s performance into consideration when manipulating 
their earnings (Kallunki and Martikainen, 1999; Bagnoli and Watts, 2000). Therefore, 
incentives of the opportunistic behaviour exist within the same sector so that a firm 
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manages its earnings when the expected costs of this behaviour are lower than those of 
the rival firms (Bagnoli and Watts, 2010). While some of the studies perceive 
competition as a motive of earnings management (Karuna et al., 2012; Datta et al., 
2013), the opposite results have been also documented (Dalia and Park, 2009; 
Markarian and Santalo, 2010). 
The relationship between competition and earnings management can be 
interpreted based on two different perspectives in information theory. From one point of 
view, market competition is associated with more information and thus allows the 
stakeholders to make comparisons between the firms. Therefore, managers face more 
pressure to improve performance relative to their rivals and more incentives exist for 
managerial myopia and earnings management (Karuna et al., 2012; Datta et al., 2013). 
From another point of view, the less information asymmetry raises the managerial 
concerns about market punishment due to the higher monitoring by the stakeholders 
(Dalia and Park, 2009). In this sense, market competition moderates the agency problem 
and contributes to minimizing managerial incentives to manage earnings in order to 
protect their firms and individual reputations (Tinaikar and Xue, 2009; Bagnoli and 
Watts, 2010; Datta et al., 2013).  
In addition, the impact of competition on earnings management can be explained 
from two different points of view based on profit volatility. Market competition 
increases price elasticity and, therefore, makes profits more volatile. As a result, the cost 
of borrowing, the required rate of return, and the audit fees are expected to increase 
leading to more incentives for the firms to manage earnings in order to avoid such 
costly outcomes. At the same time, it becomes difficult for the stakeholders to 
understand management sophisticated activities or build expectations under the higher 
levels of uncertainty; hence profit volatility may create less pressure on management to 
manipulate earnings (Kole and Lehn, 1999; Christie et al., 2003; Tinaikar and Xue, 
2009). 
Furthermore, managerial incentives can explain the effect of market competition 
on earnings management from two different points of view. On the one hand, firms in 
competitive markets are likely to hire more skilled managers and offer better incentives 
to maintain a competitive advantage (Hubbard and Palia, 1995; Kole and Lehn, 1999; 
Karuna, 2007). In this sense, competition enhances the disciplined behaviour of 
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management. On the other hand, the lower rewards to the managers in competitive 
markets compared to those in less competitive industries e.g., monopolies, may 
discourage innovation and productivity and stimulate indifference and demoralization 
(Karuna, 2007). Therefore, competition may be perceived as a motive of earnings 
management.  
Various proxies have been used to measure market competition in the industrial 
organization and accounting literature e.g., product substitutability, market size, entry 
barriers, pricing power, and market concentration (Dalia and Park, 2009; Markarian and 
Santalo, 2010; Karuna et al., 2012; Datta et al., 2013). Product substitutability reflects 
the amount of similar products produced by rival firms; market size represents the 
number of customers demanding those products in the market, entry costs reflect the 
hurdles in front of the new entrants to go into the market, and market pricing power 
implies the firms’ abilities to set higher price-cost margins (Tinaikar and Xue, 2009; 
Karuna et al., 2012; Datta et al., 2013). While higher product substitutability and bigger 
market size reflect more intense competition, higher entry costs and greater pricing 
power imply less competition in the industry. In contrast, while higher market 
concentration implies less competition, it might result from the excessive competitive 
forces that drive less competent companies to exit the market (Markarian and Santalo, 
2010; Karuna et al., 2012; Datta et al., 2013). 
The previous measures have been used by different studies to examine the effect 
of market competition on earnings management. Datta et al. (2013) focus primarily on 
pricing power and its impact on accrual earnings management. They find that firms with 
higher pricing power exhibit less discretionary accruals because it is a cushion that can 
absorb any revenue shocks and, therefore, relieves management from the need to 
manage accruals. In addition, firms with higher market pricing power have less pressure 
to meet market expectations or hide information from the other competitors. Datta et al. 
(2013) conclude that the mechanisms of pricing power and discretionary accruals are 
used as substitutes. Overall, the results emphasize a positive impact of market 
competition on accrual earnings management.  
Karuna et al. (2012) focus on other measures of competition which include 
product substitutability, market size, and entry costs. Their study is the only one, to my 
knowledge, that covers both accrual and real earnings management activities in its 
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scope. They extend the results of Datta et al. (2013) by documenting a positive impact 
of market competition on both accrual and real earnings management. According to 
their explanation, competition enhances managerial incentives to improve firm 
efficiency and thus may drive earnings management. However, the reverse result is 
achieved when using market concentration as a measure of competition because of the 
imprecise meaning of market concentration relative to the other competition measures. 
In particular, Karuna et al. (2012) believe that high competition drives less competent 
companies to exit; ending up with a more concentrated market in the long run. 
Therefore, although higher concentration intuitively implies less competition, it can be 
sometimes associated with high competition. As a result, the study of Karuna et al. 
(2012) claims that market concentration does not reflect a precise meaning of 
competition.  
The study of Markarian and Santalo (2010) uses market concentration measure 
to examine the relation between market competition and discretionary accruals from a 
different perspective. It uses information as a basis for explaining the previous relation 
and documents that competition mitigates discretionary accruals because of the 
decreased information asymmetry in the market. According to their explanation, 
earnings management becomes costlier when the stakeholders can access more 
information about the firm and its competitors. Similarly, Dalia and Park (2009) 
examine the impact of market concentration on accrual earnings management and 
document that competition discourages discretionary accruals. According to Dalia and 
Park (2009), information in competitive markets allows the stakeholders to punish the 
firms engaged in the manipulation. However, the study is exclusively performed in the 
manufacturing sector in the US and focuses on accrual earnings management and 
earnings smoothing while entirely ignores real earnings management activities. 
Other measures of competition exist at the individual firm level e.g., market 
leadership, and the international market levels e.g., foreign markets’ entry barriers. At 
the firm level, a market leader in the industry tends to use more real earnings 
management because of its high competitive status, specialized knowledge, bargaining 
power, and economies of scale (Zang, 2012). At the international market level, 
competition also tends to enhance earnings management behaviour as the imposed 
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pressure from foreign suppliers and the low price-cost margins result in more profit 
uncertainty (Tinaikar and Xue, 2009). 
Overall, the role of market competition has been perceived from the bright side 
as enhancing firm performance to attain a competitive advantage in the market.  
However, it might be viewed from the dark side as one of the motives of earnings 
management because it results in lower profits to the existing firms, stimulates harmful 
signals from the rivals, and motivates hiding private information from the stakeholders 
e.g., new entrants, suppliers, customers, and investors (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986; 
Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Ettredge et al., 2002; Dharan, 2003; Karuna et al., 2012).   
Competition may even result in aggressive forms of earnings management which take 
the shape of structured transactions or huge restatements e.g., the cases of Enron, 
WorldCom, and Xerox Corporations (Dharan, 2003; Ronen and Yaari, 2008).  
 
4.5.8 Suppliers and Customers 
Earnings management is also determined by the extent to which the firm depends on its 
suppliers in providing the raw materials and customers in purchasing its final products. 
A firm that extensively relies on specific suppliers or customers is more inclined to 
manage earnings in order to influence their perception of its performance (Raman and 
Shahrur, 2008; Ronen and Yaari, 2008). As the relationships between the firm and its 
suppliers and customers last over the long horizons, its reputational concerns may also 
drive upward earnings management so that it can meet their expectations in the long run 
(Bowen at al., 1995). Overall, further research is recommended in this area.  
 
4.5.9 Auditors 
Auditors provide an attestation function that gives credibility to the financial statements 
and thus they are important gatekeepers for maintaining earnings’ quality and protecting 
the shareholders’ welfare. The role of the independent auditors has been emphasized by 
the SOX through its Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) that 
regulates their work. To maintain their independence, the regulation has assigned the 
responsibility of dealing with auditors to the audit committee instead of management. In 
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this sense, auditors are expected avoid earnings management to protect their reputations 
and avoid the costly litigation. 
However, auditors may fail to detect and report earnings management because of 
some uncontrollable factors like the increased complexity of business transactions in the 
modern firms (Ronen and Berman, 2004). In addition, audit failure may occur because 
of the auditor’s fear of losing its clients, especially under the growing competition in the 
audit market (Antle and Nalebuff, 1991; Nelson et al., 2002, 2003). In this sense, 
auditors are not independent anymore and may act for the interest of management who 
directly pays their fees and determines their employment terms (Abdel-Khalik, 2002). 
The situation gets worse when the auditor highly relies on a specific client in its income 
or when its non-audit services make a major source of its income e.g., the consulting 
services that have been increasingly provided by the auditors over time (Coffee, 2003; 
Walker, 2013).  Therefore, auditor’s service has been always criticized for targeting 
money instead of aiming at protecting the shareholders’ welfare (Branson, 2006).  
Different audit-related factors influence earnings management behaviour e.g., 
the auditor’s opinion, quality, fees, effort, tenure, experience, and turn over. The 
auditor’s opinion may provide an idea about the occurrence of earnings management, 
e.g., the auditor is expected to give a qualified opinion after incidences of earnings 
management to drive a negative market response (Lennox, 2005). The auditor’s quality 
also influences earnings management as it is generally associated with better earnings 
quality. For example, big audit firms have more economies of scale and valuable 
reputations that motivate more due diligence (Danos and Eichenseher, 1981; Coffee, 
2003; Kim et al., 2003; Francis and Wang, 2004; Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Francis 
and Wang, 2008). However, while high quality auditors do not accept discretionary 
accruals, they may allow real earnings management as a substitute (Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Chi et al., 2011). Overall, the auditor’s quality depends on the business 
environment e.g., stronger investor protection policies assist the high quality auditors in 
assuring high quality earnings (Francis and Wang, 2008). The audit fees are negatively 
associated with earnings management while the non-audit fees are positively associated 
with earnings management; hence the emphasis of SOX on increasing the audit fees and 
avoiding the non-audit services can be justified (Frankel et al., 2002). Auditor effort in 
the form of more working hours and skeptical attitude contributes to mitigating earnings 
Chapter 4  





management (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008; Cohen et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2012). 
Audit tenure and the industry experience result in better earnings quality attributed to 
the extensive knowledge about the client (Gul et al., 2009). Meanwhile, long tenure 
results in closer auditor-auditee relations and thus may violate the auditors’ 
independence requirement (Davis et al., 2006). Auditors leaving their audit firms and 
moving into managerial positions in one of their clients are more likely to manage 
earnings; hence a cooling-off period has been required by SOX (Lennox, 2005). Finally, 
the resignation of the current auditor and assigning the job to a new one may imply the 
occurrence of earnings management (DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Davidson et al., 
2006).  
Overall, although auditors are one of the critical gatekeepers that monitor firms’ 
performance and protect shareholders’ interests, the auditing standards have ignored 
their role in mitigating earnings management. Instead, they only focus on assuring the 
fair presentation of the financial statements according to the generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) and reporting material misstatements whether due to 
fraud or error in the audit report. As a result, auditors are not expected to detect and 
report earnings management because it is within GAAP and thus does not violate the 
accounting standards. In this sense, the matter of reporting earnings management by the 
auditors remains subjective although it may materially influence decision making.  
 
4.5.10 Other Gatekeepers 
The press is one of the most influential gatekeepers in the market and thus contributes to 
mitigating earnings management. It provides stakeholders with information about 
accounting manipulation, fraud, and changes in the regulations and, therefore, it assists 
them in making their decisions (Borden, 2007). Turner (2001) reports that the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) may rely on the press more than it does on its own 
investigations to learn about cases of accounting restatements. As a result, the revelation 
of bad news about a firm in the press e.g., fraud or earnings management attempts, will 
negatively influence its stock price (Foster, 1987). 
Lawyers have been criticized for losing their influence as gatekeepers and 
transforming their profession to a routine job recently (Branson, 2006). They basically 
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play a role in structuring the contracts and thus establishing the relations between the 
firm and the external or internal parties (Giroux, 2004). However, lawyers’ role can be 
more influential in mitigating earnings management if they provide advice on those 
contracts to the less knowledgeable shareholders and thus contribute to maximizing firm 
wealth.   
Employee unions are also important gatekeepers in preventing earnings 
management. Firms negotiating their contracts with the employees have incentives to 
manage earnings downwards so that they can convince the employee unions to accept 
lower payments (Liberty and Zimmerman, 1986; Bowen at al., 1995). However, 
restrictions on earnings management may exist when a firm negotiates its employment 
contracts because the employees are able to expect the earnings and the employee 
unions usually hire experts who assist in making their decisions (Liberty and 
Zimmerman, 1986). A poorly performing firm is less likely to face a pressure from its 
employees and the involved unions because they already have low expectations based 
on its poor performance (Liberty and Zimmerman, 1986; Peltier-Rivest, 1999).  
Finally, investment banks are responsible for arranging the new share issues of 
the firms in addition to hiring analysts to provide their forecasts and recommendations 
(Giroux, 2004). In this way, investment banks play an important role as gatekeepers to 
mitigate earnings management. Credit rating agencies play a similar role by rating the 
firms according to their credit worthiness and thus contribute to decreasing the 
information asymmetry in the market.  
 
4.6 Conclusions  
This chapter has summarized the motives of earnings management that have already 
been identified in the literature. Based on the theories of earnings management 
discussed in the previous chapter, three groups of motives have been identified. First, 
contracting motives arise from the conflict of interests in the contracts between the firm 
and the other stakeholders. Second, capital market motives exist because of the 
inefficiency of the stock markets to reflect firms’ intrinsic values. Finally, third-party 
motives appear due to the influence of external parties on firm performance. Overall, 
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the previous motives are influential when the managers expect to achieve more benefits 
from earnings management than those from revealing the truth.  
The three groups of earnings management motives are not completely distinct 
because more than one theory may explain a specific motive. For example, while 
auditors are considered as a third-party motive because it is related to the influence of 
an external party on the firm, auditors are involved in contracts with the firm to avoid 
any conflict of interests. Similarly, although the role of analysts is included in the 
capital market motives because they influence firms’ stock values, they are also 
considered as external parties that may exert pressure on the firm to manage earnings. 
For the purpose of this thesis, I have classified each of the previous motives based on its 
major role in determining earnings management behaviour that has been identified in 














Finally, the three main theories that have explained earnings management behviour so 
far i.e., contracting theory, bounded rationality theory, and information theory, shape 
firm performance which, in turn, plays a mediating role in determining earnings 
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management behaviour. Therefore, I suggest identifying firm performance as a fourth 
group of motives for earnings management according to Figure 4.4. The group includes 
factors like firm profitability and social responsibility. While less profitable firms are 
motivated to manage earnings to avoid reporting losses, more profitable firms may also 
manage earnings to meet the expected dividends, improve their share prices, and beat 
benchmarks (McVay, 2006; Roychowdhury, 2006; Kerstein and Rai, 2007; Cohen et al., 
2008; Daniel et al., 2008; Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009). In addition, firms that perform 
ethically at the social and environmental levels are more likely to report earnings with 
better quality (Patten and Trompeter, 2003; Kim et al., 2012). The next chapter explains 
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This chapter constructs the data and methodology for the thesis to examine the influence 
of some contracting motives (executive compensation and managerial ability) and 
external motives (market concentration and market competition) on earnings 
management. It explains the procedures followed to select the sample and presents the 
sources used to collect data, models used in estimating accrual and real earnings 
management, and the methodology that will be adopted in the empirical analysis.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 explains the 
overall sample construction of the thesis. Section 5.3 presents the sources used to collect 
data. Section 5.4 explains the different models that will be used in the following 
empirical chapters to measure accrual and real earnings management. Section 5.5 
discusses the general basis for selecting the methodology of the thesis. Finally, section 
5.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 Sample Construction 
For the empirical work of Chapter 6, I select all the firms in the United States that have 
the required data for calculating the measures of managerial ability, management 
compensation, and earnings management. However, the Execucomp database only 
provides compensation data starting from 1992. Furthermore, I use the number of board 
meetings among the controls for corporate governance, which is only available until 
2006. As a result, Chapter 6 only covers the period from 1992 to 2006 with a sample of 
6,974 observations.  
To perform the empirical analysis of Chapter 7, I include all the firms in the 
United States that have the required data for calculating the measures of market 
concentration, information asymmetry, and earnings management during the time 
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period between 1989 and 2011. The time period begins in 1989 because the cash flow 
statement has been adopted since 1988 and a minimum of one year for cash flow data is 
needed as a basis for the calculation of earnings management metrics. The analysis ends 
in 2011 when the work on this thesis has started. As a result, Chapter 7 ends up with a 
sample that consists of 25,119 observations only.  
Finally, the sample of Chapter 8 includes all the firms in the United States that 
have the required data for calculating the measures of earnings management, managerial 
ability, and competition for the same previous period from 1989 to 2011. As a result, 
the sample ends up with 66,695 observations. The samples used in the three empirical 
chapters of this thesis are summarized in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Summary of the samples used in the thesis 
Empirical 
chapter* 
Major variables Sample size Start date Reason End date Reason 










2006 Availability of 
governance 
variables 







25,119 1989 Cash flow 
statement 
availability 
2011 Not applicable 





66,695 1989 Cash flow 
statement 
availability 
2011 Not applicable 
The table presents the differences in sample construction between the three empirical chapters of the thesis based on 
the major variables, the sample size, the start date, the reason of selecting the start date, the end data, and the reason 
of selecting the end date. Each of these samples will be discussed individually in the related chapters. * indicates the 
chapter number in the thesis. 
 
In all of the previous samples, and following Cheng et al. (2011), I exclude regulated 
industries such as banks, credit institutions, brokers, insurance, real estate, holding 
companies, and investment firms. These industries have their unique accounting and 
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financial practices and are subject to distinct regulations. Therefore, managers in these 
industries have different motivations to manipulate earnings than those of managers in 
other industry sectors.8 In addition, I exclude firm-years where accounting changes, 
merger and acquisition activities, or discontinued operations occur.9  
Furthermore, following prior literature I exclude any industry with fewer than 
six observations for each SIC code in a specific year to ensure sufficient data exists to 
calculate earnings management measures and the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
assumption regarding the normality of the error term holds (e.g., Rosner, 2003; García 
Lara et al., 2005; Kothari et al., 2005; Athanasakou et al., 2009; Iqbal et al., 2009). For 
that purpose, I follow the SIC classification of Fama-French (1997). As the models 
introduced in the thesis are dynamic, I ensure that information is available for at least 
five consecutive years for each firm over the study period (Miguel et al., 2004).  
 
5.3 Data Sources 
I use different data sources that include the Annual Compustat, Quarterly Compustat, 
and Historical Segments Compustat to collect data from the financial statements i.e., 
statement of financial position, income statement, and cash flow statement. I use the 
IBES database to collect data related to the analysts and their forecasts. Execucomp 
database is used for management compensation data. Finally, I use the dataset made 
available by Demerjian et al. (2012) for the estimates of managerial ability. 10  The 
sample construction of each of the empirical chapters is discussed in detail in Chapter 6, 
7, and 8.  
 
                                            
8 I exclude firms with the following SIC codes: 4000 ≤ SIC ≥ 4900 and 6000 ≤ SIC ≥ 6300. 
9 According to McNichols (2002), I specifically exclude firm quarters or years with non-blank values 
for accounting changes cumulative effects (ACCCHGQ_FN), or merger and acquisition activities 
(ACQMETH_FN), or discontinued operations (DOQ_FN) in the Compustat database. 
10 Data are obtained from the following link: 
https://community.bus.emory.edu/personal/PDEMERJ/Pages/Home.aspx. 
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5.4 The Estimation of Earnings Management  
5.4.1 Accrual Earnings Management 
Stubben’s Model (2010) is primarily used for measuring accrual earnings management 
in this thesis. The model focuses on discretionary revenues which are the largest 
component of earnings in most firms (Stubben, 2010). Using revenues as an estimate of 
discretion reduces measurement error and makes the model less biased and more 
specified than other accrual models due to three reasons (Demerjian et al., 2013b). First, 
discretionary revenues reflect receivables’ accruals, rather than aggregate accruals. 
Receivable accruals, in turn, are more directly related to revenues than other working 
capital accruals. Second, the model focuses on reported revenues rather on cash 
revenues. While this results in understating discretionary revenues estimate, it is 
unlikely to overestimate discretion for firms that are less expected to collect their credit 
revenues by the year end e.g. growth firms. Finally, the model examines receivable 
accruals for the fourth quarter separately because they are less likely to be collected 
before the year end. As a result, it prevents overstating discretion when the revenues of 
the fourth quarter are relatively high or understating discretion when the revenues of the 
fourth quarter are relatively low (Stubben, 2010).  Discretionary revenues are estimated 
using the following cross sectional OLS regression for each industry-year group with at 
















+εit  (5.1) 
In equation (5.1), AR represents accounts receivable; Aavg represents average total assets 
calculated as the average of total assets at the beginning of the year plus total assets at 
the end of the year; R1_3  represents revenues in the first three quarters; and R4 
represents revenues in the fourth quarter. All variables are scaled by average total assets 
(Aavg) to avoid heteroskedasticity problems. The residual (εit) from the regression is the 
measure of discretionary revenues ( DiscRev ) that represents accrual earnings 
management (AccrualEM). The measure is decile ranked for better comparability and to 
avoid outliers biasing the results. 
In addition to using Stubben’s Model (2010) as the main proxy for accrual 
earnings management based on the previously mentioned reasons, the Modified Jones’ 
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Model is also used as a corroborating measure (Cohen et al., 2008).11 Again, a cross 
sectional model is used in the calculations of this measure for each industry-year group 
with at least 6 observations. Finally, the decile ranks are taken for better comparability 
and to mitigate for the effect of the outliers. The measurement of the Modified Jones’ 
Model has been already explained in detail in section 2.4.6. 
 
5.4.2 Real Earnings Management  
To estimate real earnings management, the model of Gunny (2010) is used as it captures 
more aspects of real earnings management activities compared to other models (Gunny, 
2010; Demerjian et al., 2013b). The model measures four components of real earnings 
management that include reducing discretionary research and development expense 
( REMRD ) as in equation (5.2), decreasing discretionary selling, general, and 
administrative expense (REMSGA) as in equation (5.3), timing of fixed asset sales to 
report gain (REMAsale) as in equation (5.4), and overproduction (REMProd) to cut prices 
or decrease the cost of goods sold (COGS) as in equation (5.5) (Gunny, 2010). The 
following cross sectional OLS regressions for each industry-year group with at least 6 





















































































Production  (5.5) 
                                            
11 The results using the Modified Jones’ Models are presented in the appendices of this thesis. The 
inferences are the same as those I make from the Stubben’s model. 
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In the previous equations, RD  represents R&D expense; SGA  represents sales and 
general admin (SG&A) expense; GainA  represents income from asset sales; PROD 
represents cost of goods sold (COGS) plus change in inventory;  A represents total 
assets; MV represents the natural logarithm of market value calculated as the number of 
common shares outstanding multiplied by the share price; Q  represents Tobin’s Q 
calculated as the sum of the market value of common shares, the book value of 
preferred shares, long term debt and current debt divided by total  equity and liability; 
INT represents internal funds calculated as the sum of income before extraordinary 
items, research and development expense, and depreciation and amortization expenses; 
S represents total sales; DD represents an indicator variable that reflects the sticky cost 
behaviour for the intentional reduction in SG&A when the demand drops, which equals 
1 when total sales decrease between t-1 and t, and zero otherwise; ASales represents the 
sales of long-lived assets; and ISales represents the sale of long-lived investment. To 
keep the relation between GainA, ASales, and ISales monotonic in equation (5.4), all 
their signs are made negative when GainA is negative according to Gunny (2010). All 
variables are scaled by average total assets (Aavg) of the beginning and ending asset 
balances to avoid any heteroschedasticity. A cross-sectional model is applied in the 





Production) from the regressions represent the measures 
for the R&D, SG&A, fixed assets’ sale, and production components of real earnings 
management (REMRD , REMSGA , REMAsale, REMProd ) respectively. However, the first 
and second residuals are multiplied by negative one so that cutting the discretionary 
expense reflects an increase in real earnings management. Finally, the four measures are 
decile ranked for better comparability and to avoid the effect of the outliers. 
Using the sample of 66,695 observations identified above that includes all data 
required to calculate the four components of real earnings management, I follow 
Demerjian et al. (2013b) in performing a principal component analysis with varimax 
rotation to obtain an overall estimate for real earnings management. This step prevents 
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the inclusion of highly correlated variables in the measure.12 As a result, I obtain two 
real earnings management factors according to the following equations: 
 
REMSGA_Prod= (0.22REMRD)+( 0.64REMSGA)  




REMRD_AssetSale= (0.66REMRD)+( 0.25REMSGA)  
                           + (-0.65REMAsale)+(-0.25REMProd)  
(5.7) 
The first factor represents discretionary reduction in SG&A expenses and 
overproduction to cut prices or to decrease the cost of goods sold. The second factor 
reflects the discretionary reduction in R&D expense and the sale of fixed assets to report 
gains. As the first factor explains most of the variance in the dataset, it is used for the 
discussion of real earnings management (RealEM) results in this thesis.13  
In addition to using the Gunny’s Model (2010) as the main proxy for real 
earnings management, the Roychowdhury’s Model (2006) is used as a corroborating 
measure for real earnings management (Cohen et al., 2008).14 Again, a cross sectional 
model is used in the calculation of this measure for each industry-year group with at 
least 6 observations and the decile ranks are taken for better comparability and to 
mitigate for the outliers’ impact. The measurement of the Roychowdhury’s Model has 
been already explained in detail in section 2.5.1. 
 
5.5 Methodology  
To solve the models introduced in the empirical chapters of this thesis, the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) estimator is not used because the models suffer from unobservable 
individual heterogeneity (Pindado and Requejo, 2014). This heterogeneity is attributed 
to time-invariant firm and/or managerial effects (Graham et al., 2012; Demerjian et al., 
2013b). The selection of managers by the boards of directors in line with their firms’ 
                                            
12  The principal component analysis step turns the set of correlated variables to be linearly 
uncorrelated according to the weights of their variances, thus reducing the number of variables to 
their principal components.   
13  The same inferences are obtained using the two factors in this thesis. 
14 The calculations and results of the Roychowdhury’s Model are presented in the appendices of this 
thesis. The inferences are the same as those made from the Gunny’s Model. 
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strategies or corporate cultures results in managers with specific abilities to end up in 
firms with specific earnings’ qualities. Similarly, hiring managers with specific inborn 
capabilities, personalities, or tendencies to take risk leads managers with certain skills to 
arrive at firms with specific earnings’ qualities. Consequently, the samples are expected 
to be heterogeneous, as some companies are more predisposed to earnings management 
than others because of their own specificities. The models introduced later in the 
empirical chapters can be expressed in general terms according to the following 
equation for the ith observation at time t: 
 Yit= ∝0 +∝1Xi,t+∝2Yi,t-1+εit  5.8 
Whrere, (Yit) is the dependent variable, (Xit) is the explanatory variables, and (εit) is an 
error term. However, to avoid bias in the error term ( εit ) it is split it into three 
components. First, I introduce (ɳ
i
) to control for the impact of the unobserved effects in 
any model.15 Second, I add a time specific effect (dt) to control for the macroeconomic 
variables that may interfere with the results over the period of the study. Finally, I 
consider the remaining part of the error term (εit) to be a random disturbance (ʋit).  
 Yit= ∝0 +∝1Xi,t+∝2Yi,t-1+ ɳi + dt + ʋit  5.9 
The correlation between the unobservable heterogeneity ( ɳ
i
) and the explanatory 
variable (Xit) violates one of the key assumptions of OLS [E(εit Xit) =0]. As a result, I 
replace the OLS estimator with a static fixed effects model that takes the impact of the 
unobservable heterogeneity into consideration by demeaning the variables in the 
equation.   
The empirical model, however, suffers from endogeneity problem because of the 
mutual causality and/or simultaneity between the explanatory variable and the 
dependent variable. In addition, some variables might be omitted, and measurement 
errors could be expected in the proxies of the different variables. The three factors result 
in correlation between the explanatory variable (Xit) and the error term (εit) expressed as 
[ E(εit Xit) ≠0 ]. Therefore, the endogeneity problem leads to violating the OLS 
assumption mentioned above. 
The static fixed effects model disregards the endogeneity problem. It assumes 
strict exogeneity [E(εit Xit) =0] where the error term is always uncorrelated with the 
                                            
15 ɳi controls for both firm specific effects and manager specific effects. 
Chapter 5  





explanatory variables. This assumption never occurs in the micro/macroeconomic field. 
Therefore the within groups estimator (WG) is also invalid and gives a biased 
estimation in dynamic models (Nickell, 1981). The common use of the fixed effects 
estimator by researchers in earnings management literature is an outcome of ignoring its 
dynamic behaviour. Passing over this problem results in another source of endogeneity 
and ultimately biased inferences (Wintoki et al., 2012).  
To deal with the previous problem, I treat the explanatory variable as a 
predetermined variable that, over different periods (s), is influenced by present and past, 
but not future, economic shocks [ E(εit Xit) = 0 , for all s ≥t ]. I then introduce an 
instrumental variable (IVit) to solve for the endogeneity in the conditional expectation 
function [E (Yit- ∝0 − ∝1Xi,t- ∝2Yi,t-1 |  IVit) =0] (Pindado and Requejo, 2014). Using 
one instrument, however, is inefficient because it makes the model less informative. 
Therefore, I use a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator that uses more 
than one instrument for each variable.  
When selecting an instrument (IVit), it is essential that it satisfies two conditions. 
First, it has to be highly correlated with the instrumented variable, so that it explains it. 
Second, it has to be uncorrelated with the error term [E(εit IVit) =0] (Pindado and 
Requejo, 2014). Because it is difficult to obtain external instruments that satisfy the two 
previous conditions, I use internal instruments in the form of lagged values of the 
instrumented variables (the right-hand side variables of the model). Such instruments 
obviously satisfy the first condition. Besides, current shocks in performance have no 
effect on historical characteristics; hence the instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
term and ultimately satisfy the second condition.   
Although the first differenced GMM estimator uses all available instruments, it 
incorporates weak ones because they are inadequately correlated with the differenced 
predetermined variables (Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1999). In this situation, the 
autoregressive parameter ( ∝2 ) approaches unity and the relative variance of fixed 
effects (σɳ
2 σʋ
2⁄ ) becomes high. Therefore, although no correlation exists between the 
instruments and the error term, this estimator does not properly explain the model. 
Consequently, I use a system GMM estimator that uses level equations in addition to 
difference equations (Blundell and Bond, 1998). System GMM solves for errors in 
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levels; thus adds more instruments to the linear dynamic model and makes it more 
efficient and informative (Pindado and Requejo, 2014).  
The equation in levels of the system GMM estimator, however, may still include 
unobserved heterogeneity. To solve this problem, I presume that the correlation between 
the variables to be instrumented and the unobserved individual effects (ɳ𝑖) is constant 
over time (Pindado and Requejo, 2014). By applying the assumption on the explanatory 
variable, I find that the increments in ( X ) are uncorrelated with the unobserved 
heterogeneity [E(∆Xi,t-1 ɳi)=0]. In this way, I transform the instruments to be exogenous 
to ɳ
i
. Therefore, in addition to using the moment conditions of the first difference 
equations [E(∆ʋit Xi,t-s)=0], I invest the previously explained lack of correlation in the 
level equations of the system GMM estimator according to Blundell and Bond (1998) as: 
 E(∆Xi,t-1 εit)=E(∆Xi,t-1 ɳi)+E(∆Xi,t-1ʋit)-E(∆Xi,t-2 ʋit)=0+0-0=0  5.10 
To justify the stationarity assumption, the unobservable individual effects identified 
earlier in the model have to be considered. The impacts of self-selection, corporate 
culture, inborn capabilities, personality, and the tendency to take risk are all constant 
over time. In addition, the change in the explanatory variable over time (∆Xi,t-1) does not 
depend on those unobserved factors, e.g., managerial ability is the aptitude to generate 
revenues from firm resources and thus depends on factors like the amount of experience 
and training managers receive. Therefore, I expect the correlation of the unobservable 
effects with the explanatory variable to remain constant over time. The same logic is 
applied to the remaining instrumented variables. 
Nevertheless, because the thesis is covering a relatively long time period, remote 
lags are weak instruments. They are not highly correlated with the current values of the 
instrumented variables. The poor correlation violates the first condition of IVit 
mentioned above. To avoid the decrease in statistical efficiency due to the high number 
of instruments, I reduce the width of the instruments matrix. Therefore, I choose the 
closest instruments (Pindado and Requejo, 2014), which include the first to third lagged 
values in the difference equations and only one lag in the level equations (Hillier et al., 
2011). 
Finally, I present the system GMM results compared to those obtained using the 
OLS and the within-groups estimators for two of the basic models in the thesis. Panel A 
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in Table 5.2 shows the results from examining the impact of managerial ability on 
management compensation that is examined in detail in Chapter 6 (see Table 6.5), while 
Panel B in the same table presents the effect of managerial ability on accrual earnings 
management discussed further in Chapter 8 (see Appendix C Table V). In line with the 
previous studies, the results show that the coefficients estimated by the OLS estimator 
are biased upwards while those estimated by the within-groups estimator are biased 
downwards (Hillier et al., 2011; Nickell, 1981). The system GMM estimator provides 
lowest error and highest significance compared to the other estimators as it solves for 
the problems of heterogeneity and endogeneity in these models as explained above.  
Table 5.2 The selection of estimator 
Panel A: The effect of managerial ability on management compensation 









  0.085*** 0.013 0.076*** 
 (0.0166) (0.012) (0.001) 
z1  598.723 2.854 10,640.780 
m1    -1.490 
m2    -1.520 
Hansen    482.630 







method of moments 
estimator 
MgrlAbilityit  0.988*** 0.650** 0.973*** 
 (0.055)  (0.035) (0.004) 
z1  144.293 4.634 627.450 
m1    
-17.950 
m2    
-0.760 
Hansen    1,512.910 
Notes: This table presents the key parameter estimates for two basic models examined in the thesis later. Panel A 
presents the effect of managerial ability on management compensation examined in Chapter 6 (see Table 6.5) and 
Panel B presents the effect of managerial ability on accrual earnings management examined in Chapter 8 (see 
Appendix C Table V). The most common estimators are used to solve the models in the following order: (1) ordinary 
least squares, (2) within-groups and (3) system generalized of moments estimators. Each coefficient represents the 
change in the dependent variable based on a one unit change in the determinant. Variables are defined in the 
(Variable Definitions) sections in Chapter 6 and 8. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. The Wald test (z1) 
checks for the joint significance of the reported coefficients in the model. The AB test (Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
examines the serial correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and takes the shape of a 
normal distribution with N(0,1). m1 values represent the results of the 1st order serial correlation test, while m2 
values represent the results of the 2nd order serial correlation test. Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions takes 
the shape of χ2 distribution and checks for the orthogonality between the instrumental variables (IVit) and the error 
term (εit). *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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This chapter has explained the sample construction, data sources, the models used in 
estimating accrual and real earnings management, and the panel data methodology used 
in solving the empirical models of the thesis. Three different samples have been selected 
and different databases have been used for the three empirical chapters because of the 
different data requirements of each chapter.  
For measuring accrual earnings management, I select Stubben’s Model because 
it emphasizes the receivable accruals that are closely related to discretionary revenues, 
in addition to the Modified Jones Model which shows strong power in explaining total 
accruals (Dechow et al., 1995). For measuring real earnings management, I use the 
Gunny’s Model and the Roychowdhury’s Model because they measure different aspects 
of this activity. 
Finally, to solve the empirical models of this thesis, panel data methodology is 
implemented using a system Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator that 
solves for the problems of unobservable individual heterogeneity and endogeneity 
encountered by those models. In this sense, the pooled OLS estimator, the fixed effects 
estimator, and the differenced Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimators 
have been ignored.  
Data and research methods identified in this chapter will be used in the next 
three chapters i.e., Chapters 6, 7, and 8, that represent the empirical chapters of the 
thesis. Each of these chapters will examine a specific question about the variables 
identified earlier. As will be discussed soon, Chapter 6 examines the impact of earnings 
management behaviour on executive compensation taking into consideration the 







Chapter 6  





6 Chapter 6  
Management Compensation: The Impact of 




This chapter examines management compensation and managerial ability, which form 
part of the contractual motives of earnings management, to explain the previous finding 
in the literature of high quality managers using more accrual and less real earnings 
management (Demerjian et al., 2013b). Compared to accrual earnings management that 
only allows discretionary choices of accrual accounting, real earnings management 
involves undertaking actions that have economic consequences for the firm, such as 
cutting R&D expenditure, and thus may adversely affect its future performance. 
However, it is questionable whether accrual and real earnings management influence 
managers’ welfare by tarnishing their reputations and future compensation or allowing 
them to achieve more benefits. Therefore, this chapter examines the impact of earnings 
management on management compensation conditioned on managerial abilities. 
If managerial quality was to be viewed as homogenous, then managers may use 
earnings management to signal better performance as a result of information asymmetry 
and incomplete contracting between managers and shareholders (Strong and Walker, 
1987; Carter et al., 2009). However, shareholders monitor managerial activities by 
evaluating the wealth consequences of managerial actions and pay incentives to 
reinforce those that are likely to improve firm value in the future (Adut et al., 2013). In 
this sense, firms are likely to reward or punish earnings management activities based on 
the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) in their compensation contracts with management 
(Strong and Walker, 1987; Hart, 1995; Dutta and Fan, 2014).  
Managerial ability is, however, heterogeneous and allowing it to vary adds 
considerable complexity to the situation. Superior managers, therefore, may manage 
earnings to draw attention to their own performance, and shareholders may adjust their 
rewards by reducing their compensation. However, the PPS in firm contracts with more 
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able managers is influenced by the higher costs of contracting that involve a lot more 
negotiation and rewriting, and the better skills of more able managers that result in a 
greater knowledge gap between shareholders and managers (Oberholzer-Gee and Wulf, 
2012; Demerjian et al., 2013b). In support of this view, superior managers are likely to 
be aware of the consequences of their behaviour on their firms and personal benefits in 
the short- and long-run, and thus less monitoring might be required from shareholders to 
evaluate the performance of management (Oberholzer-Gee and Wulf, 2012; Walker, 
2013). Therefore, it can be more difficult for shareholders to detect or completely 
understand the sophisticated behaviour of superior managers and they may be less likely 
to punish their value-reducing activities (Demerjian et al., 2013b).  
Based on the documented individual effects of managerial ability and earnings 
management and the expectation that both influence firms’ managerial compensation 
decisions, I examine how managerial ability influences the relation between earnings 
management and management compensation. I use total compensation that includes 
salaries, bonuses, option awards, stock awards, and long term incentive plans (LTIPs) 
(Adut et al., 2013). In measuring managerial ability, I follow the model developed by 
Demerjian et al. (2012) who define it as the leverage to generate revenues from firm 
resources. Finally, to measure earnings management I use both the Stubben (2010) and 
the Modified Jones (1995) models to measure accrual earnings management, and the 
Gunny (2010) and Roychowdhury (2006) models to measure real earnings management.  
I contribute to the literature by documenting that firms punish their managers for 
real earnings management more than accrual earnings management. Furthermore, I find 
that firms respond more carefully when the compensation decision is related to top 
quality managers; and thus they punish/reward them less extremely than they do other 
managers. The results further explain those of Adut et al. (2013) by distinguishing 
between the effects of accrual and real earnings management on management 
compensation.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I review 
the related studies from the literature and build the hypotheses of the chapter. In section 
6.3 I explain the process of data collection, variable definitions, and the descriptive 
statistics. In section 6.4 I explain the methodology used in this chapter. In section 6.5 I 
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present and explain the results. In section 6.6 I perform some additional analysis.  
Finally, in section 6.7 I conclude the chapter. 
 
6.2 Literature and Hypotheses Development 
The previous literature has documented that superior managers use more accrual and 
less real earnings management compared to other managers in the market (Demerjian et 
al., 2013b). To explain this behaviour, it is essential to understand how high quality 
managers trade-off between the benefits and costs of earnings management activities. In 
particular, I focus on management compensation which represents one of the major 
rents managers extract from their firms. To achieve the goal, I first examine how 
managerial ability and earnings management individually influence future management 
compensation.  Then, I test the simultaneous effect of managerial ability and earnings 
management on future management compensation.  
 
6.2.1 Managerial Ability and Management Compensation 
The principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Holmström and Milgrom, 1987) 
assumes that there are two parties (shareholders and managers) who attempt to 
maximize their expected payoffs (Stathopoulos et al., 2007). The separation of 
ownership and control between these parties leads to specialized risk bearing and 
specialized decision skills in the organization. While shareholders are assumed to carry 
the risk, managers are expected to possess the decision making capabilities regardless of 
their personal wealth (Strong and Walker, 1987). 
The conflict in interests between the risk bearing shareholders and the decision 
making managers raises uncertainty due to the information asymmetry and potential 
moral hazard between the two parties. Therefore, an optimal structure of contracts is 
required that links managerial compensation to firm earnings in an optimal pay-
performance structure (PPS) and hence motivates managers to exert effort and enhance 
earnings (Strong and Walker, 1987; Hart, 1995; Dutta and Fan, 2014). Furthermore, 
because of the strong relation between PPS and firm risk, an efficient contract ideally 
combines incentives and risk sharing (Stathopoulos et al., 2007). As a result, it helps in 
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resolving the previous conflict by minimizing the monitoring costs incurred by the 
principals and the bonding costs incurred by the agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Harris and Raviv, 1979; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006).   
Managerial ability is likely to influence the PPS as able managers possess the 
skills to improve firm performance (Strong and Walker, 1987). In essence, shareholders 
tend to offer greater incentives to managers with better abilities to compensate them for 
their superior efforts and minimize the information gap - especially under high levels of 
uncertainty (Hart, 1995; Stathopoulos et al., 2007; Baranchuk et al., 2011). While the 
optimal incentive scheme allows the trade-off between optimal incentives and optimal 
risk sharing, it enables the firm to attract new superior managers and prevents the 
mobility of the current ones to competing firms - thus avoiding productivity crises 
(Eaton and Rosen, 1983; Hart, 1995; Hayes and Schaefer, 1999).  
As high quality managers are able to implement more discretion in their 
decisions, there is higher uncertainty about the outcomes of such decisions in the short-
run (Eaton and Rosen, 1983). Therefore, the current firm performance measures will be 
associated with more noise; and hence management compensation is likely to be 
determined by future results (Lambert and Larcker, 1987). In a multi period agency 
model, a firm can assess the labour marginal product in the long-run and thus reveal 
more information about the quality of managerial performance (Hayes and Schaefer, 
1999). Consequently, I expect more able managers to be associated with higher 
compensation in the long-run and, therefore, I develop the following hypothesis. 
H1: Managerial ability has a positive effect on future management 
compensation.  
 
6.2.2 Earnings Management and Management Compensation 
Prior research has focused on management compensation, particularly performance-
based payments in the form of bonuses, stock grants, and stock options, as an incentive 
for earnings management behaviour (Healy, 1985; Gao and Shrieves, 2002; Cheng and 
Warfield, 2005; Graham et al., 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns and 
Kedia, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Carter et al., 2009; Feng et al., 2011; Oberholzer-Gee 
and Wulf,  2012). As compensation relies on reported earnings, managers attempt to 
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reflect better performance and meet earnings’ targets to extract more benefits. Goldman 
and Slezak (2006) document that managers are inclined to manage earnings upwards in 
the periods when they are expecting low rewards from their firms. In this sense, the 
association between earnings management and executive compensation in firms with 
low-compensation schemes implies a lack of efficiency in contracting (Sun, 2014). 
Dutta and Fan (2014) examine the same behaviour over a two-year period and 
document that managers shift earnings from periods with low pay-performance 
sensitivity to periods with high pay-performance sensitivity. Managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour is supported by their limited liabilities, intentions to sell their stocks and 
options in the short-run, and their ability to influence the compensation decision that is 
made by the board of directors and not directly by the shareholders of the firm (Ronen 
and Yaari, 2008).  
In contrast, some studies consider compensation as a governance mechanism 
that mitigates managerial discretion over financial reporting, especially under the long-
term compensation plans where managers aim to reduce analysts’ future expectations or 
decrease the exercise price of their option rewards (Richardson and Waegelein, 2002; 
O’Connell, 2004; Bauman et al., 2005; Coles et al., 2006; Carter et al., 2009). Therefore, 
while a compensation contract may fail to improve a firm’s intrinsic value and eliminate 
earnings management when viewed as an incentive, it may be considered as a device 
that mitigates the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders when viewed 
as a governance mechanism according to the positive accounting theory (Sun, 2012; 
Dutta and Fan, 2014).  
However, the empirical literature that examines the effect of earnings 
management on compensation has basically focused on the impact during the same 
period and documented a negative relation. Adut et al. (2013) point out that bad 
earnings quality, measured as the  poor accruals mapping into cash flows, is associated 
with lower management compensation as firms tend to punish managers for providing 
less informative earnings. In other words, firms only offer compensation to managers 
when the net present value (NPV) of the additional incentive is positive i.e. the expected 
marginal outcome is more than the compensation paid; which is likely to occur when 
earnings quality is high. In essence, the better the earnings quality, the higher the 
tendency of firms to rely on earnings in determining management compensation (Peng, 
Chapter 6  





2011). However, Adut et al. (2013) focus on the mapping of discretionary accruals into 
future cash flows according to the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model; which creates a 
link between accrual and real earnings management but does not distinguish between 
the individual effects of each activity per se. 
Theoretically, the study of Sun (2014) develops a model to study the relation 
between earnings management and executive compensation. The pay-performance 
sensitivity increases when managers have more opportunities to manage earnings and 
shareholders are less likely to detect earnings management. Put differently, the 
additional incentives are required to eliminate the desire of management to manipulate 
earnings; and thus the positive association between earnings management and executive 
compensation reflects optimal contracting. As compensation incentives motivate 
managerial effort as well as the desire to manipulate earnings, managers are always 
expected to manage earnings as part of their optimal contracts with their firms. In a 
similar way, the study of Dutta and Fan (2014) develops a model to examine the effect 
of earnings management cost on managerial compensation through its impact on the 
pay-performance sensitivity. As the cost of earnings management decreases (e.g., due to 
the lack of effective governance mechanisms), managers are more inclined to use 
earnings management to extract rents and thus firms tend to pay lower compensation. In 
contrast, when the cost of earnings management increases (e.g., under strong 
governance mechanisms), managers are motivated to exert more effort which requires 
firms to pay higher compensation. Thus the study documents a positive relation between 
the cost of earnings management and managerial compensation. 
Although earnings reflect the effort made by management during the current 
accounting period, such effort may influence firms’ future cash flows (Basu, 1997; 
Barclay et al., 2005). Therefore, this chapter examines the effect of earnings 
management on future compensation to see whether shareholders reward or punish 
managers for this behaviour when detected. Because of the information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders, shareholders are imperfectly informed about firm 
performance. As shareholders might not distinguish the quality of earnings because of 
their bounded rationality, managers send signals in their reported earnings to improve 
the performance measures that are tied to their compensation plans (Strong and Walker, 
1987; Carter et al., 2009). Earnings management assists in improving the security 
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market performance measures and hence results in better market valuation that allows 
managers to exercise larger amounts of their stock options and/or sell their stock 
compensation before the higher anomalous returns disappear (Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006). Furthermore, earnings management allows the improvement of some 
of the accounting measures that reflect a high quality of performance and allow 
managers to extract better salaries and bonuses (Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Strong and 
Walker, 1987). 
On the other side of the agency problem, shareholders deal with the information 
asymmetry by screening the information provided by managers and sorting firms 
according to the quality of their earnings (Strong and Walker, 1987). Shareholders 
essentially take into account the consequences of the different earnings management 
activities before deciding on management compensation. As accrual earnings 
management unwinds in the next accounting period, it does not severely influence 
future cash flows and hence it would not cause harm to management compensation in 
the future as far as the net present value of the additional incentive is positive  (Adut et 
al., 2013). In contrast, real earnings management is found to have severe negative 
consequences for subsequent operating and stock return performance (e.g., Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2016) and thus is likely to have a negative effect on 
managers’ future compensation. Accordingly, I develop the following two hypotheses.  
H2a: Accrual earnings management has a positive effect on future management 
compensation;  
H2b: Real earnings management has a negative effect on future management 
compensation.  
 
6.2.3 Managerial Ability, Earnings Management, and Management 
Compensation 
As shareholders might not be able to distinguish the quality of earnings because of their 
bounded rationalities, high quality managers are also motivated to use earnings 
management to signal a better performance quality. While shareholders still screen 
management signals based on the consequences of earnings management activities as 
mentioned above, they are more likely to detect earnings management when the 
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conditions of the revelation principle are satisfied. These conditions include the low 
contracting costs that allow for perfect contracts between shareholders and management, 
shareholders’ rationalities that enable them to maximize their wealth, the presence of 
common knowledge that assists shareholders in understanding management behaviour, 
and the costless communication due to the absence of third parties that might interfere 
with the transfer of information to shareholders (Walker, 2013). 
The high contracting costs between firms and superior managers that include the 
need to negotiate and rewrite the contracts may render their contracts inadequate to 
monitor performance. In addition, management activities are unlikely to be detected 
because of the knowledge gap between the highly able managers and less informed 
shareholders and the tendency of the shareholders to trust the decisions of superior 
managers who possess the skills to successfully manage their firms (Oberholzer-Gee 
and Wulf, 2012; Demerjian et al., 2013b). Consequently, I develop the following two 
hypotheses. 
 H3a: Higher managerial ability lessens the positive effect of accrual earnings 
management on future management compensation;  
H3b: Higher managerial ability lessens the negative effect of real earnings 
management on future management compensation. 
 
6.3 Data, Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
6.3.1 Data 
I include all firms in the United States from the Annual Compustat, Quarterly 
Compustat, Historical Segments Compustat, and IBES databases. I also make use of the 
dataset made available by Demerjian et al. (2012) for the managerial ability variable 
during the same time period. 16  For management compensation data, I use the 
Execucomp database which only provides data from 1992. Among the controls for 
corporate governance, I use the number of board meetings, which is only available until 
2006. As a result, I only cover the period from 1992 to 2006 in the analysis. Finally, I 
                                            
16 Data are obtained from the following link: 
https://community.bus.emory.edu/personal/PDEMERJ/Pages/Home.aspx. 
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exclude firm-years experiencing accounting changes, merger or acquisition activities, or 
discontinued operations.17  
I start with all firms that have the required data for calculating the measures of 
earnings management, managerial ability, and management compensation. Following 
Cheng et al. (2011), I exclude regulated industries that contain banks, credit institutions, 
brokers, insurance, real estate, holding companies, and investment firms. These 
industries have their unique accounting and financial practices and are subject to distinct 
regulations. Therefore, managers in these industries have different motivations to 
manipulate earnings than those of managers in other industry sectors.18  
Following the previous literature I exclude any group of firms with fewer than 6 
observations for each SIC code to make sure that sufficient data exists to calculate 
earnings management measures and the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) assumption 
regarding the normality of the error term holds (e.g., Rosner, 2003; García Lara et al., 
2005; Kothari et al., 2005; Iqbal et al., 2009; Athanasakou et al., 2011). For that purpose, 
I follow the SIC classification of Fama-French (1997). As the model is dynamic, I make 
sure that information is available for at least five consecutive years for each firm over 
the study period (Miguel et al., 2004). When combining between the cross-sectional and 
time-series dimensions of the data, I obtain total observations of 6,974 in an unbalanced 
panel dataset. I use an unbalanced panel to avoid survivorship bias. 
 
6.3.2 Earnings Management Measures  
Based on the discussion in Chapter 5, I use Stubben’s Model (2010) for measuring 
accrual earnings management because it focuses on discretionary revenues which 
represent the largest component of earnings in most firms (Stubben, 2010). I also use 
Gunny’s Model (2010) for real earnings management because it covers more types of 
this activity compared to other models (Gunny, 2010). In addition, I use two other 
widespread models as corroborating measures that include the Modified Jones’ Model 
(1995) for measuring accrual earnings management and Roychowdhury’s Model (2006) 
                                            
17 According to McNichols (2002), I specifically exclude firm quarters or years with non-blank 
values for accounting changes cumulative effects (ACCCHGQ_FN), or merger and acquisition 
activities (ACQMETH_FN), or discontinued operations (DOQ_FN) in the Compustat database. 
18 I exclude firms with the following SIC codes: 4000 ≤ SIC ≥ 4900 and 6000 ≤ SIC ≥ 6300. 
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for measuring real earnings management. Again, for each of these measures I use a 
cross sectional model in the calculations for each year and each industry classified by its 
four-digit SIC code with at least 6 observations. I also take the decile ranks for better 
comparability and to avoid the effect of the outliers. For the purpose of calculating an 
overall measure of real earnings management using Gunny’s Model (2010) and 
Roychowdhury’s Model (2006), a principal component analysis with varimax rotation is 
performed to avoid the inclusion of highly correlated variables in the overall measure 
(Demerjian et al., 2013b).19 
 
6.3.3 Managerial Ability Measure  
To calculate the managerial ability variable, I adopt the approach of Demerjian et al. 
(2012) as discussed in section 4.3.3. The measure represents managerial potential of 
generating revenues from the available firm resources. It uses Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) to calculate firm efficiency then excludes some firm specific 
characteristics that may influence the performance of managers. The remaining residual 
(εi) is the ultimate measure of managerial ability (MgrlAbility). Finally, I take the decile 
ranks of these measures by industry-year to obtain better comparability and to avoid the 
effects of outliers. 
 
6.3.4 Compensation Variables 
I specifically focus on management benefits in the future because earnings management, 
and particularly real activities, have a long-term influence on firm performance and the 
consequences of the sophisticated decisions of high quality managers are more likely to 
be detected and understood over time. As I aim to examine future compensation as an 
outcome of the current earnings management behaviour, I emphasize total management 
benefits as the main measure of compensation. Although the type of compensation may 
influence earnings management behaviour when compensation is regarded as an 
incentive (Oberholzer-Gee and Wulf, 2012), I do not expect it to make any significant 
                                            
19  The principal component analysis step turns the set of correlated variables to be linearly 
uncorrelated according to the weights of their variances, thus reducing the number of variables to 
their principal components.   
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difference when compensation is viewed as an outcome of the manipulation. I take the 
natural logarithm of the average over the next three years for the measure of 
management compensation I have identified (Adut et al., 2013). 
I include all the executives’ team of each firm in the measurement of 
compensation variables including the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) because those senior officers make the firms’ major operating, 
financing, and investment decisions and are responsible for financial reporting under the 
approval of the board of directors. Therefore, they possess enough knowledge that can 
be used to achieve compensation benefits via earnings management (Ronen and Yaari, 
2008). This point of view is based on studies that have attempted to distinguish between 
the individual members of the management team and provided evidence that both of the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) manage earnings 
in order to meet earnings benchmarks (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Cheng and Warfield, 
2005; Jiang et al., 2011). 
 
6.3.5 Control Variables  
In the control variables I include some firm characteristics like firm size (TotalAssets), 
sales volatility (SalesVolatility), cash flow volatility (CashFlowVolatility), operating 
cycle (OperCycle), and loss history (Losses) (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Adut et al., 
2013). I use a national auditor indicator (NationalAuditor) to control for an auditor 
effect (Becker et al., 1998), and another indicator variable to control for litigious 
industries (LitigationInd) (Francis et al., 1994).  I add the market to book ratio (MB) and 
the one year sales growth (SalesGrowth) (Hribar and Nichols, 2007). I also control for 
analysts’ coverage (NumAnalyst), industry revenue leadership (IndRev%), and returns 
momentum (Momentum ) (Dechow et al., 2011; Zang, 2012). I use the number of 
segments (Segments) and the frequency of foreign transactions (Foreign) to control for 
the complexity of businesses (Karuna et al., 2012).  Finally, I use a dummy for 
executives who serve as directors (ExecDir), the executive tenure (Tenure), and the 
number of board meeting ( BoardMtgs ) to control for the impact of corporate 
governance (Adut et al., 2013). I present the detailed calculations for each of the 
previous variables in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 Calculation of all variables 
Variable Calculation 
AccrualEM  The residual form using Stubben’s Model (2010) as explained in the ‘Variable 
Definitions’ section above. 
 
RealEM  The first component generated by using Gunny’s Model (2010) that represents the 
discretionary reduction in SG&A expenses and the overproduction to cut prices or to 
decrease the cost of goods sold as explained in the ‘Variable Definitions’ section above. 
 
MgrlAbility  The potential of generating revenues from firm resources measured by the model of 
Demerjian et al. (2012) as explained in the ‘Variable Definitions’ section above. 
 
TotalCompensation  The natural log of the sum of salaries, bonuses, option awards, stock awards, and long 
term incentive plans (LTIPs) averaged over the next three years as explained in the 
‘Variable Definitions’ section above. 
 
FirmSize  The natural log of the firm’s assets as of the end of year t. 
 
SalesVolatility  The standard deviation of (sales / average assets) over at least three of the last five years 
(t–4, t). 
 
CashFlowVolatility  The standard deviation of (cash from operations / average assets) over at least three of 
the last five years (t–4, t). 
 
OperCycle  The operating cycle is the natural log of average sales turnover plus days in inventory 
over at least three of the last five years (t–4, t). 
 
Losses  Loss history is the percentage of years reporting losses in net income before 
extraordinary items over at least three of the last five years (t–4, t). 
 
NationalAuditor  An indicator variable equals one for firms audited by national audit firms in year t; zero 
otherwise. 
 
LitigationInd  Litigious industry indicator that equals one for firms in industries with SIC Codes: 
2833-2836 (biotechnology), 3570-3577 and 7370-7374 (computers), 3600-3674 
(electronics), and 52(X)-5961 (retailing). 
 
MB  The market to book ratio that equals the firm’s market capitalization divided by book 
value for year t. 
 
SalesGrowth  Current year’s sales less prior year’s sales less the increase in receivables all scaled by 
prior year’s sales and decile ranked by industry and year. 
 
NumAnalyst  The log of 1+ the number of analysts covering the firm in year t. 
 
IndRev%  Industry revenue leadership measured by the firm’s sales in year t-1 divided by the total 
sales for the firm’s industry in year t-1. 
 
Momentum  Returns momentum calculated by the decile rank (by industry and year) of asset returns 
during the two years preceding the start of year t. 
 
Segments  The natural log of 1+ the number of firm’s business segments in year t. 
 
Foreign  The frequency with which the firm has a non-zero foreign currency transactions during 
the sample period. 
 
ExecDir  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the executive served as director during the year.  
 
Tenure  The log of the executive tenure measured in days. 
 
BoardMtgs  The number of board meetings held during the year.  
 
Notes: This table presents the detailed calculations for each of the variables identified in the model as discussed in 
the (Variable Definitions) section above. 
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Larger firms have huge and more diversified operations and thus are likely to pay higher 
compensation to keep managers motivated to successfully manage the massive business 
(Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Adut et al., 2013; Demerjian et al., 2013a, 2013b). 
Although sales volatility, cash flow volatility, and the operating cycle reflect higher 
uncertainty in operations which is expected to negatively influence management 
compensation, it may result in higher payments especially in optimistic firms or those 
that aim to motivate managers to improve their business stability (Dechow and Dichev, 
2002). Prior losses are likely to result in a lower compensation to management because 
of the lack of resources to make such payments, but they may also drive firms to pay 
more rewards so that managers are motivated to improve firm performance to meet 
investors’ expectations (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). 
Firms audited by national auditors are expected to pay lower compensation 
compared to those audited by international audit firms (Becker et al., 1998). I also 
expect firms in litigious industries to pay less compensation than those in other industry 
sectors to avoid any subsequent punishments (Francis et al., 1994). Market to book ratio, 
sales growth, and returns momentum reflect the growth prospects of a firm and hence 
may lead to a higher management compensation. Meanwhile, the high growth might 
reduce the need to make high payments to management (Hribar and Nichols, 2007; 
Dechow et al., 2011).  
The presence of more analysts suggests higher management compensation to 
keep the motivation of meeting the analysts’ expectations. I also expect industry leaders 
to make higher payments to their managers to be able to stay in their leadership 
positions. The number of segments and the foreign currency transactions reflect the 
complexity of the business and imply higher payments to compensate management for 
the greater efforts (Karuna et al., 2012). Finally, I introduce a dummy for executives 
who serve as directors, executive tenure, and the number of board meetings as controls 
for corporate governance. I expect these governance factors to significantly influence 
management compensation based on management performance (Adut et al., 2013). I 
summarize the expected and actual signs of all control variables in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 Expected and actual signs of the control variables 
Variables 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 Predicted sign Actual sign 
FirmSize  + + 
SalesVolatility  +/- - 
CashFlowVolatility  +/- + 
OperCycle  +/- + 
Losses  +/- +/- 
NationalAuditor  - - 
LitigationInd  - - 
MB  +/- +/- 
SalesGrowth  +/- + 
LnNumAnalyst  + + 
IndRev%  + + 
Momentum  +/- + 
Segments  + + 
Foreign  + + 
ExecDirit  +/- + 
Tenureit  +/- - 
BoardMtgs
it
  +/- +/- 
Notes: This table presents the signs expected and actually obtained for the effect of the control variables identified in 
the models and discussed in the (Variable Definitions) section above on management compensation.  
 
6.3.6 Descriptive Statistics 
I present the descriptive statistics in Table 6.3. Accrual earnings management, real 
earnings management, and managerial ability have means of zero. This is because they 
are calculated as the residuals from the selected models above. The measures of 
compensation are comparable to those of Adut et al. (2013). However, the differences 
are due to presenting the untransformed variables in the descriptive statistics. Similarly, 
the managerial ability measure is in line with that calculated by Demerjian et al. (2013b). 
The high standard deviations associated with the compensation measures, firm size, and 
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Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Median Std Dev P25 P75 
      
AccrualEM  0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.01 
RealEM  0.00 -0.00 1.00 -0.72 0.70 
MgrlAbility  -0.00 -0.01 0.15 -0.09 0.07 
TotalCompensation  654.53 493.62 682.93 343.73 731.95 
Salary  388.02 348.20 203.08 254.90 475.96 
Bonus  266.48 122.21 591.56 32.60 289.36 
OptionAwards  483.67 222.68 997.01 24.63 595.90 
StockAwards  825.78 462.61 1,295.90 151.55 1,067.88 
LTIP  69.07 0.00 261.87 0.00 0.00 
TotalAssets  
2,835.91 719.07 9,333.30 275.55 2,054.50 
SalesVolatility  
0.22 0.14 0.31 0.08 0.25 
CashFlowVolatility  
0.07 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.09 
OperCycle  
127.19 117.05 69.68 80.58 163.04 
Losses  
0.17 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.25 
NationalAuditor  
0.03 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 
LitigationInd  
0.14 2.69 0.34 0.00 0.00 
MB  
3.94 0.10 14.22 1.69 4.44 
SalesGrowth  
0.24 4.00 4.06 0.02 0.22 
NumAnalyst  
3.76 0.04 1.66 3.00 5.00 
IndRev%  
0.12 0.14 0.18 0.01 0.15 
Momentum  
0.10 1.00 0.32 0.05 0.22 
Segments  
2.18 0.00 1.77 1.00 3.00 
Foreign  
0.25 481.33 0.35 0.00 0.44 
ExecDir  0.95 1.00 0.20 1.00 1.00 
Tenure  2,833.87 2,010.00 2,684.47 974.00 3,744.00 
BoardMtgs  7.32 7.00 3.28 5.00 9.00 
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables identified in the model for 6,974 firm-year 
observations obtained from Compustat from 1992 to 2006. Variables are defined in the (Variable Definitions) section 
above. I present the untransformed variables for ease of interpretation. 
 
Table 6.4 represents the correlation matrix between the main variables in this chapter: 
earnings management, managerial ability, and compensation. The correlations between 
the control variables have not been displayed here for easier demonstration. To control 
for the multicollinearity between the different variables, however, I make sure that all 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are less than 10. Managerial ability is positively 
correlated with accrual earnings management and negatively correlated with real  
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Table 6.4 Correlation table 























0.05*** -0.05***        
 
Total  
Compensation  -0.01 -0.01* 0.08***       
 
Salary  -0.00 0.01** 0.04*** 0.56***      
 
Bonus  -0.01 -0.02*** 0.07*** 0.95*** 0.31***     
 
Option  
Awards  0.01 -0.01 0.05*** 0.23*** 0.31*** 0.13***    
 
Stock  
Awards  0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.35*** 0.44*** 0.21*** 0.16***   
 
LTIP  0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.25*** 0.31*** 0.20*** 0.00 0.00  
 
Notes: This table presents the correlation matrix for 6,974 firm-year observations obtained from Compustat from 1992 to 2006 between the measures of accrual earnings management measured 
by Stubben’s Model (2010), real earnings management measured by Gunny’s Model (2010), managerial ability measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012), and total management 
compensation and its individual components that include salaries, bonuses, option awards, stock awards, and long term incentive plans (LTIPs) averaged over the next three years. Variables are 
defined in the (Variable Definitions) section above. Pearson correlation coefficients are presented. To control for the multicollinearity between the different variables I make sure that all VIF 
factors are less than 10. VIF factors, however, are not tabulated.   *, **, *** denotes a statistical coefficient at the 10, 5 and 1 percent alpha level, respectively. 
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earnings management; which suggests that high quality managers are more inclined to 
use accrual rather than real earnings management. Managerial ability is also positively 
correlated with all compensation measures; which implies that more able managers 
receive higher compensation. The significant correlations between earnings 
management and compensation measures show mainly a negative correlation between 
real earnings management and total management compensation; which suggests that 
firms are inclined to punish this kind of behaviour but not accrual earnings management. 
 
6.4 Methodology 
To test the first hypothesis (H1), I derive a model that identifies management 
compensation as the dependent variable ( Yi,t+1,t+3 ). I introduce managerial ability 
(MgrlAbility
it
) as an explanatory variable (Xit).
 20 To complete the model, I add the 
previously identified control variables (Controlsit) and an error term (εit).   
The model suffers from the problem of unobservable individual heterogeneity 
attributed to time-invariant firm and/or managerial effects. For example, the selection of 
managers by the boards of directors in line with their firms’ strategies or corporate 
cultures results in managers with specific abilities to end up in firms with specific 
compensation schemes. Similarly, hiring managers with specific inborn capabilities, 
personalities, or tendencies to take risk leads managers with certain skills to arrive at 
firms with specific compensation schemes. Consequently, the sample is expected to be 
heterogeneous, as some companies would pay higher compensations to their managers 
than others because of the previous specificities (Graham et al., 2012; Demerjian et al., 
2013b). 
In addition, the model suffers from an endogeneity problem because of the 
mutual causality between managerial ability and compensation. While more able 
managers are expected to be rewarded as they contribute to better performance over 
time, they are attracted to stay or join firms that are expected to pay higher 
compensation. This effect would be captured in the error term and ultimately results in a 
                                            
20 MgrlAbilityDum
it
 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ability of a manager in an industry is 
high  (greater than the median) and zero otherwise.  
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correlation between the explanatory variable and the error term (Pindado and Requejo, 
2014).  
Therefore, the OLS estimator will not be able to solve the model as it ignores the 
impact of the unobservable individual heterogeneity or endogeneity problems. 
Furthermore, while the fixed effects estimator tackles the unobservable heterogeneity by 
demeaning the variables in the model it does not solve for the endogeneity problem as it 
assumes strict exogeneity. Therefore, I solve the model using a system generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator that demeans the variables in the model to solve 
for the heterogeneity and introduces instrumental variables to solve for the endogeneity 
problem as explained earlier in the methodology section of Chapter 5.21  
As a result, I split the error term (εit ) it into three components to avoid the 
consequent bias. First, I introduce (ɳ
i
) to control for the impact of the unobserved 
effects in the model. 22  Second, I add a time specific effect (dt ) to control for the 
macroeconomic variables that also interfere with the results over the time period of the 
study. 23   Finally, I consider the remaining part of the error term ( εit ) a random 
disturbance (ʋit). Consequently, I express the model in general terms in equation (6.1) 
and in more specific terms in equation (6. 2). 






                          +∝4CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t +∝5OperCyclei,t-4,t  
         +∝6Lossesi,t-4,t+∝7NationalAuditorit 
                            +∝8SalesGrowthrkit+∝9MBit+∝10LitigationIndit 
                                   +∝11LnNumAnalystit+∝12IndRev%+∝13Momentumit 
                        +∝14Segmentsit+∝15Foreignit +∝16ExecDirit  
                 +∝17Tenureit+∝18BoardMtgsit+ɳi+dt+ʋit 
(6.2) 
To test the second hypothesis (H2), I again derive a model that identifies management 
compensation as the dependent variable (Yi,t+1,t+3). I introduce earnings management 
                                            
21 Solving for these two problems using a system GMM estimator allows us to obtain less biased and 
more significant results compared to the previous studies.   
22 ɳ𝑖 controls for both firm specific effects and manager specific effects. 
23 I do not tabulate the coefficients of time periods later in the results. 
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) as an explanatory variable (Zit). To complete the model, I add 
the previously identified control variables (Controlsit) and an error term (εit).   
This model also suffers from the problem of unobservable individual 
heterogeneity attributed to time-invariant firm effects. The selection of earnings 
management activities in line with firms’ strategies results in firms rewarding/punishing 
earnings management behaviour through specific compensation schemes in the future. 
Consequently, the sample is expected to be heterogeneous, as some companies are more 
likely to reward earnings management behaviour than others (Graham et al., 2012; 
Demerjian et al., 2013b). 
In addition, the model suffers from an endogeneity problem because of the 
mutual causality between earnings management and future compensation. While 
earnings management behaviour would be reflected on firm performance in the future, it 
is likely to influence management compensation. On the other hand, the expected 
compensation would set the current motivation to manage earnings. This effect is 
captured in the error term and ultimately results in a correlation between the explanatory 
variable and the error term (Pindado and Requejo, 2014).  
Because of the previously explained shortcomings of the OLS and the fixed 
effects regressions, I solve this model using a system generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimator and split the error term (εit) into three components (ɳi,dt, and ʋit). I 
express the model in general terms in equation (6.3) and in more specific terms in 
equation (6.4). 






           +∝2FirmSizeit+∝3SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t  
                           +∝4CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t +∝5OperCyclei,t-4,t  
         +∝6Lossesi,t-4,t+∝7NationalAuditorit 
                           +∝8SalesGrowthrkit+∝9MBit+∝10LitigationIndit 
                                  +∝11LnNumAnalystit+∝12IndRev%+∝13Momentumit 
                      +∝14Segmentsit+∝15Foreignit +∝16ExecDirit  
               +∝17Tenureit+∝18BoardMtgsit+ɳi+dt+ʋit 
(6.4) 
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Finally, to test the third hypotheses (H3), I again derive a model that identifies 
management compensation as the dependent variable (Yi,t+1,t+3). I introduce managerial 
ability ( MgrlAbility
it
) and earnings management ( EarningsManagement
it
) as 
explanatory variables ( Xit  and Zit  respectively). I also add the interaction term of 
earnings management (EarningsManagement
it
) and managerial ability (MgrlAbility
it
).24 
To complete the model, I add the previously identified control variables (Controlsit) and 
an error term ( εit ).  This model also suffers from the problems of unobservable 
individual heterogeneity and endogeneity as explained above (Pindado and Requejo, 
2014), and, therefore, I solve it using a system generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimator. However, I also present the results of the OLS regression as a robustness test 
in Appendix A Table II. I express the model in general terms in equation (6.5) and in 
more specific terms in equation (6.6). 













           +∝3FirmSizeit+∝4SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t  
                           +∝5CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t +∝6OperCyclei,t-4,t  
         +∝7Lossesi,t-4,t+∝8NationalAuditorit 
                             +∝9SalesGrowthrkit+∝10MBit+∝11LitigationIndit 
                                  +∝12LnNumAnalystit+∝13IndRev%+∝14Momentumit 
                      +∝15Segmentsit+∝16Foreignit +∝17ExecDirit  
               +∝18Tenureit+∝19BoardMtgsit+ɳi+dt+ʋit 
(6.6) 
After examining the individual effect of the moderating variable (MgrlAbilityDum
it
) and 
the independent variable (EarningsManagement
it
), I test for their combined influence. 
For this purpose, I use a linear restriction test (LRT) that examines the significance of 
(∝1+β1). The results of this test are presented in Table 6.7 and show that the combined 
effect of managerial ability and earnings management is statistically significant. 
                                            
24 MgrlAbilityDum
it
 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ability of a manager in an industry is 
high  (greater than the median) and zero otherwise. Therefore, ∝1  is the coefficient of 
( EarningsManagement
it
) when managerial ability is low; ( ∝1+β1 ) is the coefficient when 
managerial ability is high. 
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To ensure that the assumptions of the estimator hold and the model is valid, I 
initially test whether the GMM estimator properly addresses the problem of endogeneity. 
For this purpose, I use the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions. It takes a χ2 
distribution and checks for the orthogonality between the instrumental variables (IVit) 
and the error term (εit). The models use multiple lags of the right-hand side variables as 
instruments, which make them over-identified. Consequently, if I accept Hansen’s null 
hypothesis that the instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit) are uncorrelated, 
I guarantee that the instruments are valid and that the estimator is appropriate. I present 
the results of Hansen test in tables 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7, which show that the instruments are 
valid. 
Additionally, I implement Arellano and Bond (1991) to check for the validity of 
the model. It takes the shape of a normal distribution with N(0,1). It mainly examines 
the serial correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) over different periods (s) by 
using the (𝑚𝑗) statistic [E(ʋit ʋis)=0, while t≠s]. I accept first order serial correlation in 
the model because the estimator takes the first difference to eliminate the individual 
specific effects (ɳ𝑖 ). However, I reject second order serial correlation (m2 ) in the 
residual because it indicates a problem in the model. I present the results of the AB test 
in tables 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7, which confirm that no second order serial correlations exist in 
the model. 
Finally, I use the Wald test (z1) to check for the joint significance of the reported 
coefficients in the model. If I reject the null hypothesis that states no relationship 
between the dependent and explanatory variables, I make sure that the model is jointly 
significant. I present the results of the Wald test in tables 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7. They all 
support the joint significance of the reported coefficients. 
 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Managerial Ability and Management Compensation   
I start by examining the effect of managerial ability on future management 
compensation.  The results appear in the first row of Table 6.5 and show a significant 
positive coefficient of managerial ability variable (+0.076***); which supports 
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hypothesis H1 of this chapter. The result suggests that high quality managers receive 
higher compensation in the future.  
 
Table 6.5 The effect of managerial ability on management compensation 
Variables 






  0.076*** 
FirmSizeit  0.073*** 
SalesVolatility
i,t-4,t
  -0.026*** 
CashFlowVolatility
i,t-4,t
  0.229*** 
OperCycle
i,t-4,t
  0.005*** 
Lossesi,t-4,t  0.006*** 
NationalAuditorit  -0.009** 
LitigationInd
it
  -0.025*** 
MBit  -0.000*** 
SalesGrowthrkit  0.011*** 
LnNumAnalyst
it
  0.030*** 
IndRev%  0.111*** 
Momentumit  0.057*** 
Segments
it
  0.004*** 
Foreign
it
  0.077*** 
ExecDirit  0.069*** 
Tenureit  -0.013*** 
BoardMtgs
it
  -0.000 
Hansen  482.630 
m1  -1.490 
m2  -1.520 
z1  10,640.780 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the effect of 
managerial ability measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012) on total management compensation measured as 
the natural logarithm of the sum of salaries, bonuses, option awards, stock awards, and long term incentive plans 
(LTIPs) averaged over the next three years. The sample includes 6,974 firm-year observations obtained from 
Compustat from 1992 to 2006. Each coefficient represents the change in management compensation based on a one 
unit change in the determinant. Variables are defined in the (Variable Definitions) section above. Hansen test for 
over-identifying restrictions takes the shape of χ2  distribution and checks for the orthogonality between the 
instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test (Arellano and Bond, 1991) examines the serial 
correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and takes the shape of a normal distribution 
with N(0,1). m1 values represent the results of the 1st order serial correlation test, while m2 values represent the 
results of the 2nd order serial correlation test. The Wald test (z1) checks for the joint significance of the reported 
coefficients in the model.  Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01, respectively. 
 
Firms always try to resolve the conflict of interests arising from the separation of 
ownership from control and thus create a balance between risk bearing and decision 
making between shareholders and managers. They can achieve this target by 
introducing a suitable pay-performance structure into their contracts with managers to 
encourage them to share some risk under the condition of paying higher rewards for the 
better performance. As high quality managers possess the abilities to take more risk and 
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improve performance, firms compete in attracting them to join or stay by rewarding 
their superior efforts. Such rewards tend to increase over time as firms gradually realize 
the consequences of their sophisticated decisions. 
 
6.5.2 Accrual Earnings Management and Management Compensation 
The results appear in the first line of the first column of Table 6.6 and represent the 
average effect of accrual earnings management on management compensation. They 
show a significant positive coefficient of accrual earnings management variable 
(+0.004***); which suggests that accrual earnings management results in higher 
management compensation in the future. The finding supports hypothesis H2a of this 
chapter.  
Accrual earnings management contributes to improving the measures used in 
evaluating management performance. However, it does not influence future cash flows 
as it reverses in the subsequent period. Therefore, accruals’ manipulation is perceived as 
a harmless activity to the firms and thus managers use accrual earnings management as 
a tool to signal better performance and extract more rewards in the future. In this sense, 
it can be considered as a less costly activity from the managers’ point of view.  
The results contribute to the previous literature by specifically explaining the 
relation between accrual earnings management and management future compensation. I 
support the argument of Gao and Shrieves (2002) who document that accruals’ 
manipulation merely gives managers a timing option to maximize their compensation. I 
agree with Dutta and Fan (2014) who document that firms generally pay higher 
compensation when they do not expect management to extract high benefits from 
earnings manipulation. I also agree with Sun (2014) who documents that firms highly 
reward their managers whenever there is a potential of earnings management. However, 
while Adut et al. (2013) document that shareholders generally punish their managers for 
low earnings quality, I find that they do not particularly penalize for accrual earnings 
management because it is not perceived as costly to their firms.  
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Table 6.6 The effect of earnings management on management compensation 
Variables 
(1) 
Total management  
compensation 
(2) 
Total management  
compensation 
   
AccrualEarningsManagement
it
  0.004*** - 
RealEarningsManagement
it
  - -0.005*** 
FirmSizeit  0.074*** 0.067*** 
SalesVolatility
i,t-4,t
  -0.043*** -0.047*** 
CashFlowVolatility
i,t-4,t
  0.269*** 0.194*** 
OperCycle
i,t-4,t
  0.007*** 0.009*** 
Lossesi,t-4,t  -0.007** -0.020*** 
NationalAuditorit  -0.023*** -0.044*** 
LitigationInd
it
  -0.014*** -0.024*** 





  0.027*** 0.035*** 
IndRev%  0.136*** 0.141*** 
Momentumit  0.060*** 0.069*** 
Segments
it
  0.011*** 0.002*** 
Foreign
it
  0.076*** 0.064*** 
ExecDirit  0.070*** 0.088*** 
Tenureit  -0.012*** -0.006*** 
BoardMtgs
it
  0.001*** 0.001*** 
Hansen  469.660 478.940 
m1  -1.500 -1.440 
m2  -1.440 -1.380 
z1  14,716.530 7,718.130 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the effect of 
earnings management (in the following order: (1) accrual earnings management measured by Stubben’s Model 
(2010), and (2) real earnings management measured by Gunny’s Model (2010)) on total management compensation 
measured as the natural logarithm of the sum of salaries, bonuses, option awards, stock awards, and long term 
incentive plans (LTIPs) averaged over the next three years. The sample includes 6,974 firm-year observations 
obtained from Compustat from 1992 to 2006. Each coefficient represents the change in total management 
compensation based on a one unit change in the determinant. Variables are defined in the (Variable Definitions) 
section above. Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions takes the shape of χ2  distribution and checks for the 
orthogonality between the instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test (Arellano and Bond, 
1991) examines the serial correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and takes the shape 
of a normal distribution with N(0,1). m1 values represent the results of the 1st order serial correlation test, while m2 
values represent the results of the 2nd order serial correlation test. The Wald test (z1) checks for the joint significance 
of the reported coefficients in the model. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes significance at 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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6.5.3 Real Earnings Management and Management Compensation 
 The results appear in the first line of the second column of Table 6.6 and represent the 
average effect of real earnings management on management compensation. They show 
a significant negative coefficient of real earnings management variable (-0.005***); 
which suggests that real earnings management results in a lower management 
compensation in the future. The finding supports hypothesis H2b of this chapter.  
Although real earnings management can be used by managers as a tool to send 
signals that reflect better current performance, it seriously affects firm future 
performance as it involves economic actions that may result in sacrificing future 
projects and losing cash flows. Therefore, real earnings management is perceived as a 
harmful activity and firms punish their managers for using it. In this sense, shareholders 
screen real earnings management as a sign of bad performance and poor earnings 
quality and pay less rewards to managers in the future; hence it can be considered as a 
more costly activity from management perspective. 
Taking the previous studies into consideration, the results agree with those of 
Adut et al. (2013) in terms of punishing managers for manipulating earnings. However, 
I document that the penalty occurs when real earnings management specifically takes 
place as it is a costly activity from the firm’s perspective. This part of the results also 
supports the argument of Dutta and Fan (2014) that firms generally pay lower rewards 
when they believe that management is already extracting high benefits from earnings 
management.  Finally, the generalization in the study of Sun (2014) regarding how 
expected earnings management behaviour drives firms to make higher compensation 
payments does not apply on detrimental activities like real earnings management. 
 
6.5.4 Managerial Ability, Accrual Earnings Management and Management 
Compensation 
The results appear in the second line of the first column of Table 6.7. They show a 
significant negative coefficient of the interaction term; which suggests that managerial 
ability significantly influences the relation between accrual earnings management and 
management compensation in the future. The finding supports hypothesis H3a of this 
chapter. The coefficient of accrual earnings management that drives superior managers’ 
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compensation in the future (∝1+β1 =0.006-0.003=0.003) is less than that for other 
managers (∝1=0.006). In addition, the t value of the linear restriction test (LRT) in 
Table 6.7 shows that the combined effect of managerial ability and accrual earnings 
management on future management compensation is significantly different from zero. 
Similar results are obtained by using the Modified Jones’ Model (1995) as shown in 
Appendix A Table I and the OLS estimator as shown in Appendix A Table II. 
Shareholders tend to believe in superior managers because of their high skills 
and thus expect them to demonstrate better performance without the need of high 
monitoring efforts. However, superior managers keep sending signals to show their 
distinctive efforts in improving the business under the fear that the less sophisticated 
shareholders will not be able to directly realize their sophisticated skills compared to 
those of other managers in the market. Therefore, high quality managers are also 
inclined to manage earnings. Because accrual earnings management does not require 
high skills to detect and understand, it can be easily screened by the shareholders; and 
thus firms tend to punish high quality managers for such activity more severely than 
other managers. However, the overall effect of accrual earnings management on future 
compensation is still positive which justifies why superior managers continue to use 
more accrual earnings management. Therefore, although accrual earnings management 
is generally considered less costly than real earnings management from managers’ 
perspective, it is relatively more costly to superior managers than to other managers.  
The results contribute to the previous literature by showing how accrual earnings 
management behaviour particularly influences the future compensation of high quality 
managers. The results are still in line with those of Dutta and Fan (2014) as firms 
continue to pay higher compensation to superior managers when they do not expect 
them to achieve high benefits from their opportunistic behaviour. Similarly, I continue 
to support the results of Sun (2014) as firms still reward the high quality managers when 
they expect a chance of earnings manipulation. Finally, the results here extend the work 
of Adut et al. (2013) by demonstrating how shareholders punish superior managers for 
low earnings quality compared to other managers.  
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Table 6.7 The effect of earnings management and managerial ability on management compensation 
Variables 
(1) 
Total management  
compensation 
(2) 
Total management  
compensation 
   
AccrualEarningsManagement
it





  -0.003*** - 
   
RealEarningsManagement
it





  - 0.001*** 
   
MgrlAbility
it
  0.013*** 0.017*** 
FirmSizeit  0.079*** 0.070*** 
SalesVolatility
i,t-4,t
  -0.055*** -0.054*** 
CashFlowVolatility
i,t-4,t
  0.320*** 0.281*** 
OperCycle
i,t-4,t
  0.006*** 0.002** 
Lossesi,t-4,t  0.002 -0.019*** 
NationalAuditorit  -0.013** -0.043*** 
LitigationInd
it
  -0.017*** -0.024*** 





  0.034*** 0.034*** 
IndRev%  0.135*** 0.134*** 
Momentumit  0.066*** 0.067*** 
Segments
it
  0.016*** 0.004*** 
Foreign
it
  0.083*** 0.064*** 
ExecDirit  0.077*** 0.089*** 
Tenureit  -0.013*** -0.010*** 
BoardMtgs
it
  0.001*** 0.000*** 
t  -23.577 19.229 
Hansen  467.370 464.170 
m1  -1.570 -1.460 
m2  -1.420 -1.430 
z1  6,902.840 3,350.260 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the effect of 
managerial ability measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012) and earnings management (in the following 
order: (1) accrual earnings management measured by Stubben’s Model (2010), and (2) real earnings management 
measured by Gunny’s Model (2010)) on total management compensation measured as the natural logarithm of the 
sum of salaries, bonuses, option awards, stock awards, and long term incentive plans (LTIPs) averaged over the next 
three years. The sample includes 6,974 firm-year observations obtained from Compustat from 1992 to 2006. Each 
coefficient represents the change in total management compensation based on a one unit change in the determinant. 
Variables are defined in the (Variable Definitions) section above. The t values of the linear restriction tests (LRT) 
reflect the joint significance of the explanatory and moderating variables. The test is performed under the null 
hypothesis Ho:∝1+β1=0. Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions takes the shape of χ
2 distribution and checks for 
the orthogonality between the instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test (Arellano and Bond, 
1991) examines the serial correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and takes the shape 
of a normal distribution with N(0,1). m1 values represent the results of the 1st order serial correlation test, while m2 
values represent the results of the 2nd order serial correlation test. The Wald test (z1) checks for the joint significance 
of the reported coefficients in the model. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes significance at 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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6.5.5 Managerial Ability, Real Earnings Management and Management 
Compensation 
The results appear in the second line of the second column of Table 6.7. They show a 
significant positive coefficient of the interaction term; which suggests that managerial 
ability significantly influences the relation between real earnings management and 
management compensation in the future. The finding supports hypothesis H3b of this 
chapter. The coefficient of real earnings management that drives superior managers’ 
compensation in the future (∝2+β1=-0.003+0.001=-0.002) is higher than that for other 
managers (∝2=-0.003). The 𝑡  value of the linear restriction test (LRT) in Table 6.7 
shows that the combined effect of managerial ability and real earnings management on 
future management compensation is significantly different from zero. Similar results are 
obtained by using the Roychowdhury’s Model (2006) as shown in Appendix A Table I 
and the OLS estimator as shown in Appendix A Table II.  
High quality managers are also inclined to send signals through real earnings 
management. However, real earnings management is more complicated for shareholders 
to detect or understand compared to accrual earnings management; and thus it cannot be 
easily screened. Therefore, firms tend to reward superior managers for their 
sophisticated behaviour that demonstrates their high skills and specialized knowledge. 
Nevertheless, the overall effect of real earnings management on future compensation is 
still negative which again justifies why superior managers continue to avoid real 
earnings management. In this sense, although real earnings management is generally 
considered more costly than accrual earnings management from managers’ perspective, 
it is not as costly to superior managers as to other managers.  
The results build on those of Adut et al. (2013) by showing that firms ultimately 
punish superior managers for real earnings management behaviour which is still 
considered as a costly activity to the firm. I also confirm the work of Dutta and Fan 
(2014) and demonstrate that firms pay overall lower rewards when they realize that high 
quality managers can extract benefits from real earnings management.  Finally, I extend 
the work of Sun (2014) and show how expected earnings management behaviour 
relatively drives firms to make higher compensation payments but only to superior 
managers when using real earnings management.  
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6.6 Additional Analysis: Managerial Ability, Earnings Management and 
Operating Performance 
To further explain the influence of earnings management on management future 
compensation, I try to examine how earnings management influences firm future 
performance that will subsequently determine management compensation. I particularly 
focus on earnings management behaviour of high quality managers and its impact on 
operating performance (OpPerformance ) measured as the average return on assets 
(ROA) over the next three-year-period. Therefore, I develop the following model that 





) and managerial ability(MgrlAbility
it
) as 
explanatory variables, in addition to the interaction term between them. 25 I add the 
control variables and an error term that is split into (ɳ
i
)26 to control for the impact of the 
unobserved effects, (dt)
27 to control for the macroeconomic variables, and (ʋit) as a 












            +∝3FirmSizeit+∝4SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t  
                            +∝5CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t +∝6OperCyclei,t-4,t  
           +∝7Lossesi,t-4,t+∝8NationalAuditorit 
                                  +∝9SalesGrowthrkit+∝10MBit+∝11LnNumAnalystit 
                              +∝12IndRev% +∝13Momentumit+∝14Segmentsit 
                           +∝15ExecDirit +∝16Tenureit+∝17BoardMtgsit 
                                           +ɳ
i
+dt+ʋit  (6.7) 
 
The model suffers from the previously explained problem of unobservable individual 
heterogeneity that may result in managers with specific abilities and behaviours to end 
up in firms at certain levels of performance (Pindado and Requejo, 2014). However, no 
                                            
25 MgrlAbilityDum
it
 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ability of a manager in an industry is 
high (greater than the median) and zero otherwise. Therefore, ∝1  is the coefficient of 
( EarningsManagement
it
) when managerial ability is low; ( ∝1+β1 ) is the coefficient when 
managerial ability is high. 
26 ɳ
i
 controls for both firm specific effects and manager specific effects. 
27 I do not tabulate the coefficients of time periods later in the results. 
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endogeneity can be claimed in this case because it is difficult to predict firm future 
performance at the moment due to different factors that might interfere in determining 
such variable. As a result, I use a fixed-effects (FE) estimator to solve the model.  
 






   
AccrualEarningsManagement
it





  0.001 - 
   
RealEarningsManagement
it





  - 0.008* 
   
MgrlAbility
it
  0.004 0.005 
FirmSizeit  -0.057*** -0.031*** 
SalesVolatility
i,t-4,t
  0.025 0.050 
CashFlowVolatility
i,t-4,t
  -0.164*** 0.697*** 
OperCycle
i,t-4,t
  -0.032*** -0.017 
Lossesi,t-4,t  0.016 0.085*** 
NationalAuditorit  0.014 0.003 
MBit  -0.000 -0.001* 
SalesGrowthrkit  0.012 -0.000 
LnNumAnalyst
it
  -0.001 -0.004 
IndRev%  0.017 0.004 
Momentumit  -0.042*** -0.040** 
Segments
it
  0.010 0.019* 
ExecDirit  -0.008 -0.007 
Tenureit  -0.008*** -0.007* 
BoardMtgs
it
  -0.003*** -0.002** 
R2 0.208 0.177 
F-statistic 9.520 7.820 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table presents the results from the fixed effect regressions for the influence of managerial ability 
measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012) and earnings management (in the following order: (1) accrual 
earnings management measured by Stubben’s Model (2010) and (2) real earnings management measured by Gunny’s 
Model (2010)) on future operating performance measured as the average return on assets (ROA) over the next three-
year-period. The sample includes 6,974 firm-year observations obtained from Compustat from 1992 to 2006. Each 
coefficient represents the change in future operating performance based on a one unit change in the determinant. 
Variables are defined in the (Variable Definitions) section above. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** 
denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
The results appear in Table 6.8 and show that managerial ability does not play any 
significant role in the relationship between accrual earnings management and firm 
future performance. On the other hand, and as expected, real earnings managed by high 
quality managers negatively influence firm future operating performance as the 
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coefficient of real earnings management that drives lower operating performance in the 
future is still negative when high quality managers are involved in such behaviour 
(∝1+β1 =-0.010+0.008=-0.002). The results strongly support the argument that real 
earnings management is more costly to superior managers than accrual earnings 
management because it results in a deteriorated firm future performance and 
subsequently a decrease in management future compensation. 
 
6.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter I provide an explanation of the earnings management behaviour of high 
quality managers that has shown a tendency towards more accrual and less real earnings 
management according to the previous literature. To do so, I examine the cost and 
benefit of each of these activities by particularly focusing on their effects on future 
compensation as a major rent that superior managers might partially lose when 
manipulating earnings. In other words, I examine the individual and joint effects of 
managerial ability and earnings management on future compensation.  
First, I document that firms reward their managers for their high abilities as the 
outcomes of their sophisticated decisions are realized in the future. High quality 
managers contribute towards a better performance over time; which results in higher 
payments in order to keep the current managers motivated to perform at a high-quality 
level or attract new ones to move to these firms. The findings suggest that contracts 
have to take the quality of managers into consideration to establish the optimal pay-
performance that keeps a balance between optimal effort and optimal incentives.  
Second, I document that firms do not punish their managers for accrual earnings 
management as much as they do for real earnings management through decreasing their 
compensation in the future. The findings suggest that firms expect accrual earnings 
management to reverse in the next accounting period but consider real earnings 
management as a harmful activity because it severely influences future cash flows. In 
this sense, I extend the previous literature by documenting that real earnings 
management is more costly not only from the firm’s perspective but also from the 
management’s point of view. 
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When examining the earnings management behaviour of high quality managers 
in particular, I find that they extract less rents from accrual earnings management but 
more from real earnings management compared to other managers. However, real 
earnings management continues to be more costly from the perspective of high quality 
managers as they are overall punished for real earnings management compared to 
accrual earnings management that accounts for the main source of their manipulation. 
The results show that managerial ability contributes to strong governance by 
enhancing better performance in the future. While accrual earnings management is not 
seen as harmful to the firm, real earnings management seems detrimental whether 
viewed by firms, managers, or even high quality managers. This overall consent should 
make any regulation that attempts to mitigate real earnings management easier to 
implement but the challenge will remain in detecting such sophisticated activities and 
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Appendix A Table I The effect of earnings management and managerial ability on management compensation 
Variables 
(1) 
Total management  
compensation 
(2) 
Total management  
compensation 
   
AccrualEarningsManagement
it





  -0.001*** - 
RealEarningsManagement
it





  - 0.008*** 
MgrlAbility
it
  0.016*** 0.017*** 
FirmSizeit  0.084*** 0.078*** 
SalesVolatility
i,t-4,t
  -0.033*** -0.018*** 
CashFlowVolatility
i,t-4,t
  0.253*** 0.221*** 
OperCycle
i,t-4,t
  -0.001 0.006*** 
Lossesi,t-4,t  -0.010*** -0.028*** 
NationalAuditorit  0.014 -0.011* 
LitigationInd
it
  -0.026*** 0.000 





  0.034*** 0.029*** 
IndRev%  0.105*** 0.046*** 
Momentumit  0.056*** 0.054*** 
Segments
it
  0.003** 0.010*** 
Foreign
it
  0.047*** 0.073*** 
ExecDirit  0.081*** 0.075*** 
Tenureit  -0.015*** -0.011*** 
BoardMtgs
it
  0.000** 0.000 
t  -22.944 5.021 
Hansen  477.850 477.880 
m1  -1.450 -1.460 
m2  -1.480 -1.430 
z1  8,780.850 11,487.290 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the effect of 
managerial ability measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012)  and earnings management (in the following 
order: (1) accrual earnings management measured by Modified Jones’ Model (1995), and (2) real earnings 
management measured by Roychowdhury’s Model (2006)) on total management compensation measured as the 
natural logarithm of the sum of salaries, bonuses, option awards, stock awards, and long term incentive plans (LTIPs) 
averaged over the next three years. The sample includes 6,974 firm-year observations obtained from Compustat from 
1992 to 2006. Each coefficient represents the change in total management compensation based on a one unit change 
in the determinant. Variables are defined in the (Variable Definitions) section above. The t values of the linear 
restriction tests (LRT) reflect the joint significance of the explanatory and moderating variables. The test is performed 
under the null hypothesis Ho:∝1+β1=0. Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions takes the shape of χ
2 distribution 
and checks for the orthogonality between the instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) examines the serial correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) 
statistic and takes the shape of a normal distribution with N(0,1). m1 values represent the results of the 1st order serial 
correlation test, while m2 values represent the results of the 2nd order serial correlation test. The Wald test (z1) 
checks for the joint significance of the reported coefficients in the model. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, 
**, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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Appendix A Table II The effect of earnings management and managerial ability on management compensation 
Variables 
(1) 
Total management  
compensation 
(2) 
Total management  
compensation 
   
AccrualEarningsManagement
it





  -8.71e-05* - 
RealEarningsManagement
it





  - 0.009* 
MgrlAbility
it
  0.022** 0.019** 
FirmSizeit  0.092*** 0.092*** 
SalesVolatility
i,t-4,t
  0.003 0.008 
CashFlowVolatility
i,t-4,t
  0.379*** 0.362*** 
OperCycle
i,t-4,t
  -0.003 -0.002 
Lossesi,t-4,t  -0.016 -0.023 
NationalAuditorit  -0.009 -0.005 
LitigationInd
it
  -0.013 -0.015 





  0.051*** 0.055*** 
IndRev%  0.089*** 0.089*** 
Momentumit  0.038 0.042* 
Segments
it
  0.008 0.004 
Foreign
it
  0.064*** 0.064*** 
ExecDirit  0.087* 0.087* 
Tenureit  0.002 0.001 
BoardMtgs
it
  -0.001 -0.001 
t  -3.248 4.009 
R2 0.379 0.380 
F-statistic 40.900 42.150 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table presents the results from the ordinary least square regressions for the effect of managerial ability 
measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012) and earnings management (in the following order: (1) accrual 
earnings management measured by Stubben’s Model (2010), and (2) real earnings management measured by Gunny’s 
Model (2010)) on total management compensation measured as the natural logarithm of the sum of salaries, bonuses, 
option awards, stock awards, and long term incentive plans (LTIPs) averaged over the next three years. The sample 
includes 6,974 firm-year observations obtained from Compustat from 1992 to 2006. Each coefficient represents the 
change in total management compensation based on a one unit change in the determinant. Variables are defined in the 
(Variable Definitions) section above. The t values of the linear restriction tests (LRT) reflect the joint significance of 
the explanatory and moderating variables. The test is performed under the null hypothesis Ho:∝1+β1=0. Intercept is 
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7 Chapter 7  
Market Concentration and Earnings Management: 




While the previous chapter has examined the relationship between some of the 
contractual motives and earnings management, this chapter focuses on market 
concentration as one of the external drivers of earnings management. Market 
concentration plays a divergent role in shaping management behaviour. While it makes 
monitoring more difficult because of the higher information asymmetry according to the 
agency theory, it renders communicating information less costly due to the lower 
pressure from the few existing competitors based on the revelation principle (Strong and 
Walker, 1987; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Walker, 2013). The earnings management 
literature has emphasized the previous roles and found market concentration stimulates 
earnings management and brings discipline at the same time. While some studies 
document a positive effect of market concentration on earnings management based on 
an intensified agency problem (Dalia and Park, 2009; Markarian and Santalo, 2010; 
Karuna et al., 2012), others evidence a negative relation due to the lower competitive 
incentives in concentrated markets (Datta et al., 2013). The different points of view and 
findings in the previous studies suggest that a non-linear relationship can better explain 
the effect of market concentration on earnings management than a linear approach.   
Under both of the previous points of view, earnings management in concentrated 
markets tends to be determined by information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders (Dalia and Park, 2009). The quantity of information decreases in 
concentrated markets because of the lower analysts’ coverage that allows firms to 
obfuscate information; and thus aggravates adverse selection problem (Harris and Raviv, 
1979; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Ali et al., 2014; Elbadry et al., 2013; Walker, 2013; 
Salop, 2015). However, the less competitive environment motivates analysts’ discretion 
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over their forecasts and, therefore, may influence the quality of information up or down 
(Strong and Walker, 1987; Walker, 2013).  
Based on the previous contrasting effects of market concentration on earnings 
management, I examine a non-linear relation between market concentration and accrual 
and real earnings management activities. As the previous relations is based on the 
asymmetry of information, I explain them according to the changes in information 
quantity and quality in concentrated markets.  
For measuring market concentration, I use the Hall Tideman Index (Dalia and 
Park, 2009; Markarian and Santalo, 2010; Karuna et al., 2012; Datta et al., 2013). For 
measuring information asymmetry I use three measures that include earnings forecast 
error, earnings forecast dispersion, and analysts’ coverage (Ali et al., 2014; Dalia and 
Park, 2009). Finally, for measuring earnings management variables, I implement four 
different models which include Stubben’s model and the Modified Jones’ model for 
measuring accruals’ manipulation and Gunny’s model and Roychowdhury’s model for 
measuring real earnings management.  
This chapter shows a significant non-linear effect of market concentration on 
earnings management. The decrease in information quantity in concentrated markets 
allows firms to manage accruals until the quality of information starts to decline and 
thus enables managers to use more of the sophisticated real earnings management. 
Nevertheless, I find evidence of an optimal level of market concentration with a mutual 
decrease in accrual and real earnings management at concentration levels between 55% 
and 60%. The results extend the work of Guo et al. (2015) who examine a non-linear 
relation between market competition and earnings quality, but this chapter focuses on 
the effect of market concentration on accrual and real earnings management.   
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I review 
the related studies from the literature and build the hypotheses of the chapter. In section 
7.3, I explain the process of data collection, variable definitions, and the descriptive 
statistics. In section 7.4, I explain the methodology I use in this chapter. In section 7.5, I 
present and discuss the results. In section 7.6, I add some empirical analysis. Finally, in 
section 7.7, I conclude the chapter. 
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7.2 Literature and Hypotheses Development 
7.2.1 Market Concentration and Earnings Management 
According to the revelation principle, privately informed managers achieve more 
benefits from revealing the truth as it allows them to avoid any subsequent penalties of 
misreporting firm results (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). At the same time, shareholders can 
make better decisions and thus maximize their expected utilities (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992). In this sense, the revelation principle helps in solving the conflict between 
principals and agents and emphasizes truth telling equilibrium where the truthful 
revelation of private information leads to maximizing the utility functions of all players 
in the game.  
However, Walker (2013) identifies four conditions of the revelation principle 
that need to be violated for earnings management to occur. The first condition is 
violated when contracting costs are high and hence renders contracts between 
shareholders and management imperfect and difficult to enforce. Second, earnings 
management may occur because of shareholders’ imperfect rationalities, especially 
under conditions of market uncertainty, which makes them unable to take wealth 
maximizing decisions all the time. The third condition of the revelation principle is 
violated when there is no common knowledge between management and shareholders to 
enable the later to understand managers’ actions. Finally, managers may manipulate 
earnings when they find that communicating with shareholders is costly due to the 
presence of third parties like regulators, competitors, and tax authorities. Any of the 
previous violations is sufficient to give managers the chance to manage earnings 
(Walker, 2013).  
Based on the previous conditions, the effect of market concentration on earnings 
management can be viewed from two different perspectives of the revelation principle. 
In more concentrated markets, communicating with shareholders is less costly due to 
the lower pressure resulting from weak competition that creates fewer chances for 
comparisons between firms (Strong and Walker, 1987). Therefore, managers feel less 
need to take risk in order to keep pace with the behaviour of other aggressive 
competitors and adopt profit maximizing actions to improve their firms’ efficiencies 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). In this sense, I perceive a disciplinary influence of 
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market concentration on management behaviour, and according to the fourth condition 
of the revelation principle mentioned above I expect that earnings management is less 
likely to occur in concentrated markets. In contrast, concentrated markets are less 
informative causing the lack of common knowledge between management and 
shareholders. The high information asymmetry does not allow for monitoring 
management behaviour and thus results in poor follow-up by outsiders; which allows 
managers to take more non-value-maximizing actions (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). In 
this sense, market concentration scatters the interests of principals and agents and, thus, 
aggravates the agency problem. Consequently, managers may manage earnings as the 
shareholders are unable to understand their decisions under the uncertainty discussed in 
the third condition of the revelation principle mentioned earlier.  
The literature supports the previous points of view in the theory regarding the 
effect of market concentration on earnings management and documents contrasting 
results. Starting with accruals’ manipulation, Datta et al. (2013) find that market 
concentration leads to less accrual earnings management as it plays a disciplinary role 
and, therefore, mitigates the agency problem between managers and shareholders. On 
the other hand, Karuna et al. (2012) find that managers in concentrated markets use 
more accrual earnings management due to the fewer restrictions in such markets. 
Similarly, Dalia and Park (2009) find that firms in concentrated industries in the 
manufacturing sector in the United States engage in a higher level of discretionary 
accruals. They also document that market concentration changes the disciplining 
function of the market by aggravating the agency problem. Markarian and Santalo 
(2010) also confirm that the separation of ownership from control does not work 
efficiently in more concentrated markets. 
To the best of my knowledge, the study of Karuna et al. (2012) is the only one 
that examines the effect of market concentration on real earnings management. It finds 
that market concentration results in more real earnings management because managers 
have better opportunities to make benefit of such activities, especially that they can 
easily understand other managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings in such markets 
(Kallunki and Martikainen, 1999; Bagnoli and Watts, 2000).  
Although the previous studies only emphasize the linear relation between market 
concentration and earnings management, other studies show a non-linear effect of the 
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market structure on firm behaviour. Hermalin (1992) documents that the effect of 
competition on the agency problem and thus on firm efficiency and management 
behaviour depends on four different factors. First, the income effect as firms’ 
profitability is expected to decrease under higher competition and thus managers receive 
lower income. Second, the risk attitude effect as the willingness of managers to take risk 
changes under competition. Third, the information effect that is related to the influence 
of competition on information in the market. Finally, actions’ value effect because the 
outcome of different managerial actions may change under the effect of competition. 
The previous effects do not necessarily have similar signs and thus suggest a non-linear 
relationship between market competition and management behaviour.  
Schmidt (1997) documents a non-linear relationship between market 
competition and managerial incentives due to the two-sided effects of competition. On 
the one hand, market competition increases the pressure on management to improve 
performance in order to stay in the market and thus creates an incentive for more 
managerial efforts. On the other hand, competition results in lower profitability that is 
reflected in lower managerial rewards which may demotivate managerial efforts. The 
overall effect of market competition on managerial incentives is quadratic with 
managerial incentives increasing at lower levels of market competition and decreasing 
at higher levels of market competition. 
Scherer (1967) documents a non-linear relationship between market 
concentration and management innovative efforts because of the endogeneity between 
the two factors. To further explain the results, Aghion et al. (2005) find a non-linear 
quadratic relationship between market competition and innovation as innovation is 
endogenous in competitive markets. Therefore, competition may encourage or 
discourage innovation depending on the level of innovation in the market. At lower 
levels of competition, firms tend to be more equal in their technologies and thus exert 
more innovative efforts to escape the competition as the incremental benefits from 
innovation are increasing. However, at higher levels of market competition where there 
are big technological gaps between firms in the industry, innovative efforts tend to 
decrease as firms have already reached to an equilibrium position where the incremental 
benefit from innovation is decreasing.  
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 To my knowledge, the only study that examines a non-linear effect of market 
competition on earnings quality is that of Guo et al. (2015). Specifically, Guo et al. 
(2015) document a non-linear relationship between market competition and earnings 
quality that takes a quadratic shape. They find that earnings quality increases at lower 
levels of market competition but decreases at higher levels of market competition. They 
explain their results through the marginal benefit of earnings quality that increases at 
lower levels of market competition and decreases at higher levels as competitors can 
make advantage of the high quality information disclosed by a firm. The study uses 
different proxies for market competition including the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) that measures market concentration.  
Given the two contrasting views in the agency theory and the revelation 
principle in addition to the different findings in the previous studies, I expect managers 
to use different levels of earnings management under different degrees of market 
concentration. Therefore, I expect a non-linear relationship between market 
concentration and earnings management. For this purpose, I examine the influence of 
market concentration (MCit ) at two different levels and expect its relationship with 
earnings management (EMit) to take one of the two shapes that appear in Figure 7.1 and 
Figure 7.2 below. 
 
 











EMit   
Figure 7.1 First assumption for the effect of market concentration on earnings 
management 
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Both of the previous assumptions suppose that low and high levels of market 
concentration have different effects on earnings management. Whether I accept the 
assumption in Figure 7.1 or that in Figure 7.2, the hypothesis predicts a quadratic 
relationship between market concentration and earnings management. As I cannot 
decide which one prevails for now, I develop the following hypothesis.    
H1: The effect of market concentration on earnings management is different at 
low and high levels of market concentration.  
 
7.2.2 Market Concentration and Information Asymmetry 
To explain the previous double-edged effect of market concentration on earnings 
management, information asymmetry has to be considered as it represents the main 
problem between the principal and the agent. Concentrated markets are inefficient as 
managers may obfuscate information in order to protect their competitive advantages 
(Ali et al., 2014). Taken with the decreased coverage by analysts, a condition of 
imperfect information can be generally assumed in concentrated markets where 
information is not absent but still incomplete. The result will be a situation of 
information asymmetry between shareholders and management that can take one of the 
two forms: moral hazard and adverse selection (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; 
Boujelbene and Besbes, 2012). Moral hazard happens because shareholders do not 
possess information to monitor management and assess whether it works for 
maximizing the firms’ values; resulting in different attitudes and motivations for each 
Figure 7.2 Second assumption for the effect of market concentration on earnings 
management 
EMit   
MCit  
MC1  
Chapter 7  





party. On the other hand, adverse selection happens because managers have access to 
private information that allows them to make decisions for their own benefits and ignore 
shareholders’ value (Walker, 2013). The resulting uncertainty changes the costs and 
benefits of information for decision makers and gives rise to a problem of coordination 
in making decisions regarding what information is reported, how it is communicated, 
and who makes the decision (Harris and Raviv, 1979; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Elbadry 
et al., 2013; Walker, 2013; Salop, 2015). Overall, the decrease in information influences 
the agency problem by driving contracting costs like observing and monitoring (Hart, 
1995; Arroyo, 2007).  
From another perspective, firms have a chance to signal information under the 
lower competitive pressure in concentrated markets (Strong and Walker, 1987). 
Although management discretion over financial reporting may involve signaling low 
quality information, the signals may convey information about future performance and 
ultimately contribute to improving the quality of the reported information (Gunny, 2010; 
Walker, 2013). Similarly, the less competitive environment drives analysts’ judgements 
and further contributes to the variation in the quality of their forecasts.  
The literature provides evidence on the interaction between market competition 
and information asymmetry to determine the response of the market. Balakrishnan et al. 
(2012) examine the effect of market competition on the relation between information 
asymmetry and the cost of capital. They document that investors discount firms’ prices 
according to the level of information asymmetry and competition in the market. This 
implies a higher cost of capital and lower future returns to the firms under more intense 
competition and higher levels of information asymmetry. In this sense, both market 
competition and information asymmetry contribute to adverse selection problem.  
More specifically, other studies show the effect of market concentration on 
information asymmetry. Information asymmetry is likely to occur in markets where a 
specific group possesses information without allowing the others to access it 
(Boujelbene and Besbes, 2012). Dalia and Park (2009) find higher levels of analyst 
forecasts’ errors and dispersions at higher levels of market concentration and, therefore, 
lower financial reporting quality in more concentrated markets. On the other hand, they 
find less information asymmetry in competitive markets even when firms suffer from 
low profitability that is expected to create higher incentives to manage earnings. 
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Markarian and Santalo (2010) document that when shareholders do not have access to 
information about real firms’ outputs and market prices, it becomes easier for managers 
to justify the manipulation and, therefore, the cost of earnings management to the firms 
gets lower. Ali et al. (2014) find lower analysts’ coverage, higher forecasts’ errors and 
dispersions, and bigger bid-ask spreads in more concentrated markets that reflect a more 
serious adverse selection problem. They use market concentration as a proxy for firm 
disclosures because they expect firms in more concentrated markets to be less likely to 
disclose information to avoid losing their competitive advantages. However, the study 
uses the industry concentration measures available from the US Census Bureau, rather 
than the HHI, and for the manufacturing sector only. Finally, Bhattacharya et al. (2013) 
find a non-linear quadratic relationship between earnings quality and information 
asymmetry and document that information can be considered as a measure of the quality 
of disclosure (Bhattacharya et al., 2013). 
Although I can expect less information due to the lower analysts’ coverage in 
more concentrated markets according to the obfuscation hypothesis, the contrasting 
theoretical points of view in the signalling hypothesis and the different literature 
findings explained earlier suggest a changing information quality at different levels of 
market concentration. Accordingly, I develop the following two hypotheses.    
H2a: There is a negative effect of market concentration on the quantity of 
information in the market. 
H2b: The effect of market concentration on information quality is different at 
low and high levels of market concentration.  
 
7.3 Data, Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
7.3.1 Data 
I include all firms in the United States from the Annual Compustat, Quarterly 
Compustat, Historical Segments Compustat, and IBES databases, for the period from 
1989 to 2011. I also make use of the dataset made available by Demerjian et al. (2012) 
for managerial ability control variable during the same time period. I start with all firms 
that have the required data for calculating the measures of earnings management, 
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market concentration, and information asymmetry after excluding firm-years that 
experienced accounting changes, merger and acquisition activities, or discontinued 
operations.28  
Following Cheng et al. (2011), I exclude regulated industries that contain banks, 
credit institutions, brokers, insurance, real estate, holding companies, and investment 
firms because they have their unique accounting and financial practices and are subject 
to distinct regulations. Therefore, managers in these industries have different 
motivations to manipulate earnings than those of managers in other industry sectors.29  
Following prior literature, I exclude any industry with fewer than six 
observations for each SIC code in a specific year to ensure sufficient data exists to 
calculate earnings management measures and make sure that OLS assumption regarding 
the normality of the error term holds (e.g., Rosner, 2003; García Lara et al., 2005; 
Kothari et al., 2005; Athanasakou et al., 2009; Iqbal et al., 2009). For that purpose, I 
follow the SIC classification of Fama-French (1997). 
As the model is dynamic, I make sure that information is available for at least 
five consecutive years for each firm over the study period (Miguel et al., 2004). When 
combining between the cross-sectional and time-series dimensions of the data, I obtain 
total observations of 25,119 in an unbalanced panel dataset. I do not use balanced 
panels to avoid survivorship bias problem. 
 
7.3.2 Earnings Management Measures 
Based on the discussion in Chapter 5, I use Stubben’s Model (2010) for measuring 
accrual earnings management because it focuses on discretionary revenues which 
represent the largest component of earnings in most firms (Stubben, 2010). I also use 
Gunny’s Model (2010) for real earnings management because it covers more types of 
this activity compared to other models (Gunny, 2010). In addition, I use two other 
widespread models as corroborating measures that include the Modified Jones’ Model 
                                            
28 According to McNichols (2002), I specifically exclude firm quarters or years with non-blank 
values for accounting changes cumulative effects (ACCCHGQ_FN), or merger and acquisition 
activities (ACQMETH_FN), or discontinued operations (DOQ_FN) in the Compustat database. 
29 I exclude firms with the following SIC codes: 4000 ≤ SIC ≥ 4900 and 6000 ≤ SIC ≥ 6300. 
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(1995) for measuring accrual earnings management and Roychowdhury’s Model (2006) 
for measuring real earnings management. Again, for each of these measures I use a 
cross sectional model in the calculations for each year and each industry classified by its 
four-digit SIC code with at least 6 observations. I also take the decile ranks for better 
comparability and to avoid the effect of the outliers. For the purpose of calculating an 
overall measure of real earnings management using Gunny’s Model (2010) and 
Roychowdhury’s Model (2006), a principal component analysis with varimax rotation is 
performed to avoid the inclusion of highly correlated variables in the overall measure 
(Demerjian et al., 2013b).30 
 
7.3.3 Market Concentration Measures 
To measure market concentration, I use the Hall Tideman Index (HTI) because it takes 
into consideration the rank of each firm based on its market share in the industry. In this 
sense, the HTI  accounts for the absolute number of firms which reflects the entry 
barriers to the industry, in addition to emphasizing the relative sizes of those firms (Hall 
and Tideman, 1967). Finally, I decile rank the measure for better comparability and to 
mitigate for outliers. I present the calculation of the previous measure in Table 7.1. 
 
7.3.4 Information Asymmetry Measures 
As there is no “best” measure of information asymmetry (Elbadry et al., 2013), I use 
several proxies to calculate this variable. Analysts’ coverage is negatively associated 
with information asymmetry and, thus, used as a measure of this variable in many 
studies (Houston at al., 2008). Therefore, I particularly focus on analysts-related 
measures because financial analysts act as information intermediaries who generate 
information through their forecasts (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Information asymmetry is 
associated with a decrease in analysts’ coverage and an increase in the dispersion and 
error of their earnings forecasts (Ali et al., 2014). Thus, I identify earnings forecast error, 
earnings forecast dispersion, and analysts’ coverage as the proxies of information 
                                            
30  The principal component analysis step turns the set of correlated variables to be linearly 
uncorrelated according to the weights of their variances, thus reducing the number of variables to 
their principal components.   
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asymmetry (Dalia and Park, 2009). The calculation of each of these measures is 
presented in table 7.1. 
 
7.3.5 Control Variables 
Following Dechow and Dichev (2002), the first set of controls consider firm specific 
determinants and account for firm size (FirmSize), sales volatility (SalesVolatility), cash 
flow volatility (CashFlowVolatility), operating cycle (OperCycle), and historical losses 
(Losses). Larger firms have operations that are more predictable and more diversified 
businesses and thus earnings should be of higher quality and better communicated to the 
stakeholders (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Managers in these firms, however, have more 
opportunities to manipulate earnings because of the large number of transactions they 
undertake and their complicated operations (Demerjian et al., 2013b).  Sales volatility 
reflects uncertainty in operations and, therefore, implies a higher likelihood of earnings 
management (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Cash flow volatility also reflects increased 
volatility in the operations of the firm creating more opportunities for earnings 
management. Similarly, longer operating cycles increase uncertainty and therefore, the 
potential for earnings management (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). However, the higher 
uncertainty may draw the attention of the analysts to such firms. Prior losses are likely 
to result in more earnings management to meet investors’ expectations in making profit 
and thus more information asymmetry (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Equally, they may 
drive managers to avoid earnings management as they will be facing more scrutiny by 
the market.  
I also control for managerial ability (MgrlAbility) that drives more accrual but 
less real earnings management (Demerjian et al., 2013b). While superior managers 
make sophisticated decisions that contribute to more information asymmetry, they 
possess the skills to communicate information to the stakeholders. I use a national 
auditor indicator (NationalAuditor) to control for any auditor effects as firms audited by 
national auditors use more earnings management, particularly real activities, than those 
audited by international audit firms (Becker et al., 1998). Therefore, the overall result 
on information asymmetry can be positive or negative. I add another indicator variable 
to control for litigious industries (LitigationInd) following Francis et al. (1994) because 
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firms in such industries are more likely to be involved in earnings management. 
However, the opposite effect may appear because of the probable regulatory 
intervention.  
The market to book ratio (MB), the one year sales growth (SalesGrowth), and 
returns momentum ( Momentum ) are added as they have been found to influence 
earnings management (Hribar and Nichols, 2007; Dechow et al., 2011). As firms with 
higher market to book ratios have more growth prospects, they may be involved in more 
earnings management to meet market expectations (Hribar and Nichols, 2007). Firms 
with growing sales and high returns momentum also have high growth prospects but the 
increase in sales and returns reduces the pressure on management to manipulate 
earnings (Dechow et al., 2011). Therefore, the influence of the previous three factors 
can take two different directions.  
In addition, this chapter controls for analyst coverage ( NumAnalyst ). The 
presence of more analysts increases the burden on management to present better 
earnings and, therefore, may lead to more earnings management (Dechow et al., 2011; 
Zang, 2012). I also include an industry revenue leadership variable (IndRev%) (Dechow 
et al., 2011; Zang, 2012). As Zang (2012) could not specify the influence of industry 
revenue leadership, I expect it to be bi-directional due to the simultaneous high power 
of the industry leaders and the more scrutiny they face in the market.  
The number of segments (Segments) and the frequency of foreign transactions 
(Foreign) are used to control for businesses complexity (Karuna et al., 2012).  With 
more complex transactions managers use more real earnings management because they 
are less likely to be detected than discretionary revenue manipulation. Meanwhile, 
business complexity may drive more scrutiny to such firms (Karuna et al., 2012). As a 
result, it may have a double-edged effect on earnings management and information 
asymmetry.  
Finally, I use dummies for the global financial crisis (GFC) (Badertscher et al., 
2014; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014; Magnan et al., 2015), the dot-com bubble (DotCom) 
(Lieberman and Asaba, 2006), and the post-Sarbanes Oxley period (SOX) (Cohen et al., 
2008) to control for some macro-economic events over the study period. I present the 
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detailed calculations for each of the previous variables in Table 7.1 and summarize the 
expected and actual signs of all control variables in Table 7.2.  
 
Table 7.1 Calculation of the variables 
Variable Calculation 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑀  The residual from using Stubben’s Model (2010) as explained in the ‘Variable 
Definitions’ section above. 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑀  The first component generated by using Gunny’s Model (2010) that represents the 
discretionary reduction in SG&A expenses and the overproduction to cut prices or to 
decrease the cost of goods sold as explained in the ‘Variable Definitions’ section above.  
 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  Market concentration measured by the Hall Tideman index; calculated as 
HTI=1/[(2 ∑ (k*s))-1Ni=1 ] where 𝑠 represents market share, N is the number of firms per 




The log of 1 + the difference between the median next-year forecast earnings per share 
(EPS) and the realized EPS normalized by the median EPS forecast.  
 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛  The log of 1 + the standard deviation of EPS forecasts for the next year normalized by 




The log of 1 + the number of analysts covering the firm in year t, multiplied by -1 to 
reflect information asymmetry. 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒  The natural log of the firm’s assets as of the end of year t. 
 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  The standard deviation of (sales / average assets) over at least three of the last five years 
(t–4, t). 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  The standard deviation of (cash from operations / average assets) over at least three of 
the last five years (t–4, t). 
 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒  The operating cycle is the natural log of average sales turnover plus days in inventory 
over at least three of the last five years (t–4, t). 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠  Loss history is the percentage of years reporting losses in net income before 
extraordinary items over at least three of the last five years (t–4, t). 
 
𝑀𝑔𝑟𝑙𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  This measure represents how efficiently managers generate revenues from the available 
firm resources according to the approach of Demerjian et al. (2012). The variable was 
directly obtained from 
https://community.bus.emory.edu/personal/PDEMERJ/Pages/Home.aspx. 
 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟  An indicator variable equals one for firms audited by national audit firms in year t; zero 
otherwise. 
 
𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑  Litigious industry indicator that equals one for firms in industries with SIC Codes: 
2833-2836 (biotechnology), 3570-3577 and 7370-7374 (computers), 3600-3674 
(electronics), and 52(X)-5961 (retailing). 
 
( The table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 7.1 (continued)  
Variable Calculation 
𝑀𝐵  The market to book ratio that equals the firm’s market capitalization divided by book 
value for year t. 
 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  Current year’s sales less prior year’s sales less the increase in receivables all scalded by 





Returns momentum calculated by the decile rank (by industry and year) of asset returns 
during the two years preceding the start of year t. 
 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡  The log of 1+ the number of analysts covering the firm in year t. 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑣%  Industry revenue leadership measured by the firm’s sales in year t-1 divided by the total 
sales for the firm’s industry in year t-1. 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  The natural log of 1+ the number of firm’s business segments in year t. 
 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛  The frequency with which the firm has a non-zero foreign currency transactions during 
the sample period. 
 
𝐺𝐹𝐶  An indicator variable equals one for the years of the global financial crisis (2007-2009); 
zero otherwise. 
 
𝐷𝑜𝑡 − 𝐶𝑜𝑚  An indicator variable equals one for the years of the Dot-Com bubble (1997-2000); zero 
otherwise. 
 
𝑆𝑂𝑋  An indicator variable equals one for the years after the release of the Sarbanes Oxley act 
(2002-2005); zero otherwise. 
Notes: This table presents the detailed calculations for each of the control variables identified in the model as 
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Table 7.2 Panel A Expected and actual signs of the control variables - The effect on earnings management 
Variables AccrualEM RealEM 
 Predicted sign Actual sign Predicted sign Actual sign 
FirmSizeit  +/- + +/- + 
SalesVolatility
i,t-4,t
  + + + + 
CashFlowVolatility
i,t-4,t
  + + + + 
OperCycle
i,t-4,t
  + + + + 
Lossesi,t-4,t  +/- + +/- - 
MgrlAbility
it
  + + - - 
NationalAuditorit  +/- - + + 
LitigationInd
it
  +/- + +/- + 
MBit  +/- + +/- + 
SalesGrowthrkit  +/- - +/- + 
Momentumit  +/- + +/- - 
LnNumAnalyst
it
  + + + + 
IndRev%  +/- - +/- + 
Segments
it
  +/- - +/- - 
Foreign
it
  +/- - +/- + 
GFCit  +/- + +/- + 
Dot-Com
it
  +/- - +/- + 
SOXit  +/- - +/- + 




 Predicted sign Actual sign 
FirmSizeit  +/- - 
SalesVolatility
i,t-4,t
  +/- +/- 
CashFlowVolatility
i,t-4,t
  +/- - 
OperCycle
i,t-4,t
  +/- +/- 
Lossesi,t-4,t  +/- +/- 
MgrlAbility
it
  +/- - 
NationalAuditorit  +/- + 
LitigationInd
it
  +/- +/- 
MBit  +/- +/- 
SalesGrowthrkit  +/- - 
Momentumit  +/- - 
IndRev%  +/- +/- 
Segments
it
  +/- + 
Foreign
it
  +/- + 
Notes: This table presents the signs I expect and actually get for all control variables identified in the models and 
discussed in the (Variable Definitions) section above.  
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7.3.6 Descriptive Statistics 
I present the descriptive statistics in Table 7.3. Consistent with Demerjian et al. (2013b), 
both accrual and real earnings management measures have means and medians of zero 
because they are calculated as the residuals from the models selected above. Meanwhile, 
the measures of market concentration and information asymmetry are comparable to 
those of Karuna et al. (2012) and Dalia and Park (2009), taking into consideration the 
difference of the sample from those of the previous studies. 
 
Table 7.3 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Median Std Dev P25 P75 
      
AccrualEM  0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.01 
RealEM  0.00 -0.00 1.00 -0.72 0.70 
Concentration  0.22 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.29 
ForecastError  0.28 0.10 0.83 0.03 0.26 
ForecastDispersion  0.15 0.05 0.71 0.02 0.13 
AnalystsCoverage  1.22 1.09 0.41 0.69 1.60 
TotalAssets  2,622.85 147.34 14,666.88 30.75 789.46 
SalesVolatility  0.26 0.15 0.40 0.08 0.29 
CashFlowVolatility  0.12 0.06 0.34 0.04 0.12 
OperCycle  133.22 119.26 81.27 76.72 172.87 
Losses  0.37 0.25 0.36 0.00 0.67 
MgrlAbility  0.00 -0.01 0.15 -0.10 0.08 
NationalAuditor  0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 
LitigationInd  0.09 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 
MB  3.15 1.89 50.61 1.04 3.46 
SalesGrowth  0.90 0.08 66.38 -0.03 0.22 
Momentum  -0.17 0.06 2.09 -0.13 0.15 
NumAnalyst  3.05 3.00 1.71 2.00 4.00 
IndRev%  0.07 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.06 
Segments  2.04 1.00 1.72 1.00 3.00 
Foreign  0.21 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.33 
GFC  0.13 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.00 
Dot-Com  0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 
SOX  0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables identified in the model for 25,119 firm-year 
observations obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Variables are defined in the (Variable Definitions) section 
above. I present the untransformed variables for ease of interpretation. 
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The control variables are also comparable to Karuna et al. (2012) and Demerjian et al. 
(2013b) with some differences appearing because of the variations between the samples. 
Cash flow volatility is lower than sales volatility and thus implies that firms consider it 
more costly as it is negatively valued by the market (Allayannis and Weston, 2007).  A 
huge portion of the firms show losses during the recent years which ultimately resulted 
in negative returns momentum. Because of presenting the untransformed variables, firm 
size and operating cycle are associated with high standard deviations. 
Table 7.4 represents the correlation matrix between the major variables in the 
chapter: earnings management, market concentration, and information asymmetry. The 
correlations between the control variables have not been displayed here for easier 
demonstration. There is a negative correlation between accrual and real earnings 
management which suggests that they might be used as substitutes consistent with the 
subsequent findings in the results section. I also observe a strong correlation between 
the proxy of market concentration and both accrual and real earnings management, 
suggesting a potential impact of market concentration on earnings management. While 
for the proxies of information asymmetry, Table 7.4 shows a positive correlation 
between the three measures of information asymmetry, which implies that they all 
represent strong measures of the same variable. Further, I evidence a strong correlation 
between information asymmetry measures and market concentration measures that also 
shows a potential impact of market concentration on information asymmetry. Finally, I 
check the VIF between the previous variables and make sure that all VIF factors are less 
than 10 in order to control for multicollinearity. 
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Table 7.4 Correlation table 












      
Real  
EM  
-0.01**      
Concentration  0.04*** 0.03***     
Forecast  
Error  
-0.01* 0.00 -0.04***    
Forecast  
Dispersion  
-0.01* -0.01** -0.04*** 0.92***   
Analysts  
Coverage  
-0.01 -0.02*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.02***  
Notes: This table presents the correlation matrix for 25,119 firm-year observations obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011 between the measures of accrual earnings management 
measured by Stubben’s Model (2010), real earnings management measured by Gunny’s Model (2010), market concentration measured by the Hall Tideman Index (HTI), and information 
asymmetry measured by analysts’ coverage, and the dispersion and error of their earnings forecasts. Variables are defined in the (Variable Definitions) section above. Pearson correlation 
coefficients are presented. To control for the multicollinearity between the different variables I make sure that all VIF factors are less than 10. VIF factors, however, are not tabulated. *, **, *** 
denotes a statistical coefficient at the 10, 5 and 1 percent alpha level, respectively. 
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To test the first hypothesis (H1), I present a quadratic relationship in the model that 
identifies earnings management (EarningsManagement
t
) as the dependent variable (Yit) 
with its two proxies of real (RealEM) and accrual (AccrualEM) earnings management.31 
I introduce market concentration (Concentrationit) and its square (Concentration
2
it) as 
the explanatory variables (Xit) and (X
2
it) respectively. Meanwhile, I take the dynamic 
effect of earnings management into the model. Earnings performance in the past years 
determines earnings management behaviour during the current year (Kim et al., 2003). 
In addition, earnings management levels are associated with meeting prior earnings’ 
benchmarks (Graham et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008; Gunny, 2010). Consequently, 
managers look back at the previously manipulated earnings when contemplating to 
manage earnings of the current year. Based on this argument, I use the lagged values 
(Yi,t-1 ) of earnings management measures ( EarningsManagementi,t-1 ) to explain its 
current levels.  To complete the model, I add the previously identified control variables 
(Controlsit) and an error term (εit).   
The model suffers from the problem of unobservable individual heterogeneity 
attributed to time-invariant industry effects. The industry culture (e.g., the nature of 
relations and knowledge sharing between competitors in the same sector) may 
contribute to the information asymmetry in the market; hence using higher levels of 
earnings management activities by firms in specific industries compared to other sectors. 
Consequently, the sample is expected to be heterogeneous (Graham et al., 2012). 
In addition, the model suffers from an endogeneity problem because of the 
mutual causality between the dependent and explanatory variables. While market 
concentration influences information asymmetry and thus the levels of earnings 
management, earnings management and information asymmetry are  determinants of 
market concentration as they contribute to misleading investors and ultimately driving 
some firms to exit the market. This effect would be captured in the error term and 
                                            
31 The dependent variables have been tested for normality using the Jarque and Bera test which 








)]; where n is the 
number of observations, k is the number of regressors, S represents skewness and K represents 
kurtosis. The results provide statistics of 2.37 and 2.66 for accrual and real earnings management 
respectively leading to accepting the null hypotheses of normality with 95% confidence. 
Chapter 7  





ultimately results in a correlation between the explanatory variable and the error term 
(Pindado and Requejo, 2014).  
Therefore, the OLS estimator will not be able to solve the model as it ignores the 
impact of the unobservable individual heterogeneity or endogeneity problems. 
Furthermore, while the fixed effects estimator tackles the unobservable heterogeneity by 
demeaning the variables in the model it does not solve for the endogeneity problem as it 
assumes strict exogeneity. Therefore, I solve the model using a system generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator that demeans the variables in the model to solve 
for the heterogeneity and introduces instrumental variables to solve for the endogeneity 
problem as explained earlier in the methodology section of Chapter 5.32 In addition, I 
present the results of the OLS regression as a robustness test in Appendix B Table II. 
To avoid the consequent bias in the error term ( εit ) I split it into three 
components. First, I introduce (ɳ
i
) to control for the impact of the unobserved effects in 
the model.33 Second, I add a time specific effect (dt) to control for the macroeconomic 
variables that also interfere with the results over the time period of the study.34 Finally, I 
consider the remaining part of the error term ( εit ) a random disturbance ( ʋit ). 
Consequently, I express the model in general terms in equation (7.1) and in more 
specific terms in equation (7.2). 
 Yit=∝0+∝1Yi,t-1+∝2Xit+∝3X
2







                                            
32 Solving for these two problems using a system GMM estimator allows us to obtain less biased and 
more significant results compared to the previous studies.   
33 ɳi controls for industry specific effects. 
34 I do not tabulate the coefficients of time periods later in the results. 
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                                      +∝2Concentrationit+∝3Concentration
2
it  
                                      +∝4FirmSizeit  +∝5SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t   
                                      +∝6CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t   
                                      +∝7OperCyclei,t-4,t +∝8Lossesi,t-4,t  
                                      +∝9MgrlAbilityit+∝10NationalAuditorit  
                                      +∝11LitigationIndit+∝12MBit  
                                      +∝13SalesGrowthrkit+∝14Momentumit  
                                      +∝15LnNumAnalystit+∝16IndRev%  
                                      +∝17Segmentsit+∝18Foreignit+∝19GFCit  
                                      +∝20Dot-Comit+∝21SOXit+ɳi+dt+ʋit  
(7.2) 
After examining the relation between market concentration and earnings management, I 
find the breakpoints of the regression. As I study a quadratic relation, I calculate one 
breakpoint ( MC1 ) derived from differentiating value with respect to market 
concentration which equal – (∝2/2∝3 ). According to the hypothesis, I expect ∝2 and ∝3 
to have opposite signs. Accordingly, if I accept the assumption in Figure 7.1, MC1 will 
be a maximum but the opposite applies if I accept the assumption in Figure 7.2. 
Similarly, to test the second hypothesis (H2), I present a quadratic relationship 
in a model that identifies information asymmetry (InfoAssymetry
it
) as the dependent 
variable ( Zit ), where ( InfoAssymetryit ) is the proxy of ( ForecastError ), 
( ForecastDispersion ), and ( 𝐼𝑛𝑣AnalystsCoverage ). I again introduce market 
concentration (Concentrationit ) and its square (Concentration
2
it ) as the explanatory 
variables (Xit) and (X
2
it) respectively. To complete the model, I add the previously 
identified control variables (Controlsit) and an error term (εit). This model also suffers 
from the problems of unobservable individual heterogeneity and endogeneity as 
explained above (Pindado and Requejo, 2014), and, therefore, I solve it using a system 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator and split the error term (εit) into 
three components ( ɳ
i
,dt, and ʋit ). However, I also present the results of the OLS 
regression as a robustness test in Appendix B Table III. I express the model in general 
terms in equation (7.3) and in more specific terms in equation (7.4). 
 Zit=∝0+∝1Xit+∝2X
2
it+∝3-20Controlsit+εit  (7.3) 
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                                       +∝3FirmSizeit  +∝4SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t   
                                       +∝5CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t   
                                       +∝6OperCyclei,t-4,t +∝7Lossesi,t-4,t  
                                       +∝8MgrlAbilityit+∝9NationalAuditorit  
                                       +∝10LitigationIndit+∝11MBit  
                                       +∝12SalesGrowthrkit+∝13Momentumit  
                            +∝14IndRev% +∝15Segmentsit+∝16Foreignit 
                                            +ɳ
i
+dt+ʋit  (7.4) 
After the completion of the empirical work, I ensure that the assumptions of the 
estimator hold and that the model is valid. I initially test whether the GMM estimator 
properly addresses the problem of endogeneity. For this purpose, I use the Hansen test 
for over-identifying restrictions. It takes a χ2  distribution and checks for the 
orthogonality between the instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The 
model uses multiple lags of the right-hand side variables as instruments, which make it 
over-identified. Consequently, if I accept Hansen’s null hypothesis that the instrumental 
variables (IVit) and the error term (εit) are uncorrelated, I guarantee that the instruments 
are valid and the estimator is appropriate. I present the results of Hansen test in tables 
7.5 and 7.6, which show that the instruments are valid. 
Additionally, I implement Arellano and Bond (1991) to check for the validity of 
the model. It takes the shape of a normal distribution with N(0,1). It mainly examines 
the serial correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) over different periods (s) by 
using the (𝑚𝑗) statistic [E(ʋit ʋis)=0, while t≠s]. I accept first order serial correlation in 
the model because the estimator takes the first difference to eliminate the individual 
specific effects (ɳ𝑖 ). However, I reject second order serial correlation (m2 ) in the 
residual because it indicates a problem in the model. I present the results of the AB test 
in tables 7.5 and 7.6, which confirm that no second order serial correlations exist in the 
model. 
Finally, I use the Wald test (z1) to check for the joint significance of the reported 
coefficients in the model. If I reject the null hypothesis that states no relationship 
between the dependent and explanatory variables, I make sure that the model is jointly 
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significant. I present the results of the Wald test in tables 7.5 and 7.6. They all support 
the joint significance of the reported coefficients. 
 
7.5 Results 
7.5.1 Market Concentration and Earnings Management 
I start by examining the effect of market concentration, represented by the Hall Tideman 
index (HTI), on accrual earnings management. Column (1) of Table 7.5 presents the 
results of the system GMM estimation of the model. The results show that ∝1  is 
significantly positive while ∝2 is significantly negative; which support hypothesis H1 
and confirm the quadratic relationship between market concentration and accrual 
earnings management according to Figure 7.1. By calculating the breakpoint (MC1), I 
find that accrual earnings management increases at market concentration levels between 
0 and 55% but starts decreasing after that level.  Similar results are obtained by using 
the Modified Jones’ Model (1995) as shown in Appendix B Table I and the OLS 
estimator as shown in Appendix B Table II. 
I also show the results of the system GMM estimation for the effect of market 
concentration on real earnings management in column (2) of Table 7.5. They show that 
∝1  is significantly negative while ∝2  is significantly positive; which also support 
hypothesis H1 and confirm the quadratic relationship presented in Figure 7.2. By 
calculating the breakpoint, I find that real earnings management decreases at market 
concentration levels between 0 and 60% but starts increasing afterwards. Similar results 
are obtained by using the Roychowdhury’s Model (2006) as shown in Appendix B 
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Concentrationit 0.306*** -0.827*** 
Concentration
2
it    -0.276*** 0.694*** 
AccrualEMi,t-1 -0.092*** - 
RealEMi,t-1 - 0.323*** 
FirmSizeit  0.070*** 0.038*** 
SalesVolatility
i,t-4,t
  0.295*** 0.346*** 
CashFlowVolatility
i,t-4,t
  0.093*** 0.034*** 
OperCycle
i,t-4,t
  0.035*** 0.016*** 
Lossesi,t-4,t  0.073*** -0.032*** 
MgrlAbility
it
  0.930*** -0.084*** 
NationalAuditorit  -0.081*** 0.222*** 
LitigationInd
it
  0.109*** 0.072*** 
MBit  0.000*** 0.000*** 
SalesGrowthrkit  -0.721*** 0.040*** 
Momentumit  0.472*** -0.150*** 
LnNumAnalyst
it
  0.065*** 0.016*** 
IndRev%  -0.484*** 0.080*** 
Segments
it
  -0.100*** -0.056*** 
Foreign
it
  -0.049*** 0.165*** 
GFCit  0.021*** 0.142*** 
Dot-Com
it
  -0.083*** 0.120*** 
SOXit  -0.025*** 0.124*** 
Hansen  1,774.690 1,782.030 
m1  -19.450 -9.560 
m2  -1.110 1.600 
z1  31,069.380 2.3e+05 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the effect of 
market concentration on earnings management. The sample includes 25,119 firm-year observations obtained from 
Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Market concentration (Concentration) is measured using the Hall Tideman Index 
(HTI) and each column represents the estimate from examining its effect on earnings management activities in the 
following order: (1) accrual earnings management measured by Stubben’s Model (2010), and (2) real earnings 
management measured by Gunny’s Model (2010). Each coefficient represents the change in earnings management 
based on a one unit change in the determinant. Variables are defined in the (Variable Definitions) section above. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  is the Hall Tideman Index and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2  is its square. Hansen test for over-identifying 
restrictions takes the shape of χ2 distribution and checks for the orthogonality between the instrumental variables 
(IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test (Arellano and Bond, 1991) examines the serial correlation in the first 
difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and takes the shape of a normal distribution with N(0,1). m1 values 
represent the results of the 1st order serial correlation test, while m2 values represent the results of the 2nd order serial 
correlation test. The Wald test (z1) checks for the joint significance of the reported coefficients in the model. The 
table also displays evidence about the dynamic behaviour of earnings management in the third and fourth rows. 
Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.  
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The previous results emphasize the double-edged effect of market concentration on 
earnings management through decreasing the costs of communication while increasing 
the asymmetry of information between management and shareholders. Therefore, while 
Dalia and Park (2009), Markarian and Santalo (2010), Karuna et al. (2012), and Datta et 
al. (2013) find linear relations, I document a non-linear effect of market concentration 
on both accrual and real earnings management. On the other hand, the results support 
those of Scherer (1967), Hermalin (1992), Schmidt (1997), and Aghion et al. (2005) that 
document a non-linear effect of the market structure on firm behaviour. Particularly, I 
am in line with Guo et al. (2015) who find a non-linear relationship between market 
competition and earnings quality. However, I explain the double-edged effect of market 
concentration on earnings management based on information asymmetry theory in the 
next section. 
 
7.5.2 Market Concentration and Information Asymmetry 
I start by examining the effect of market concentration, represented by the Hall Tideman 
index ( HTI ), on information asymmetry measured by the inverse of analysts’ 
coverage.35 Column (1) of Table 7.6 presents the results of the system GMM estimation 
of the related model. I find that ∝1 is significantly positive; which supports hypothesis 
H2a and shows that there is more information asymmetry at higher levels of market 
concentration due to the lower analysts’ coverage.36 In this sense, the previous result 
shows a decline in the quantity of information with the increase in market concentration. 





                                            
35 The analysts’ coverage variable is multiplied by -1 to reflect information asymmetry as explained 
in Table 7.1. 
36 As I am already expecting a linear relationship in hypothesis H2a, I do not test for the quadratic 
effect of market concentration on the inverse of analysts’ coverage; and thus I leave a blank value 
for 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2𝑖𝑡 in table 7.6. 
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Table 7.6 The effect of market concentration on information asymmetry 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables InvAnalystsCoverage
it
 ForecastErrorit  ForecastDispersionit 
Concentrationit  0.222*** -0.395*** -0.418*** 
Concentration
2
it    - 0.339*** 0.393*** 
FirmSizeit  -0.134*** -0.039*** -0.019*** 
SalesVolatility
i,t-4,t
  -0.102*** 0.097*** 0.054*** 
CashFlowVolatility
i,t-4,t
  -0.156*** -0.161*** -0.191*** 
OperCycle
i,t-4,t
  0.028*** 0.006*** -0.002* 
Lossesi,t-4,t  -0.032*** 0.290*** 0.213*** 
MgrlAbility
it
  0.028*** -0.113*** -0.065*** 
NationalAuditorit  0.043*** 0.182*** 0.077*** 
LitigationInd
it
  0.032** -0.003 -0.078*** 
MBit  -0.000*** 6.81e-05*** 3.14e-05*** 
SalesGrowthrkit  -0.020*** -0.164*** -0.074*** 
Momentumit  -0.102*** -0.169*** -0.116*** 
IndRev%  0.441*** -0.264*** -0.207*** 
Segments
it
  0.126*** 0.026*** 0.006*** 
Foreign
it
  0.032** 0.137*** 0.069*** 
Hansen  1,790.650 1,823.270 1,879.210 
m1  -21.440 -10.550 -8.510 
m2  -2.170 -0.950 -1.360 
z1  990.610 3,791.370 11,269.540 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the effect of 
market concentration on information asymmetry. The sample includes 25,119 firm-year observations obtained from 
Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Market concentration is measured using the Hall Tideman Index (HTI) and each 
column represents an estimate from examining its effect on information asymmetry measures in the following order: 
(1) The inverse of analysts’ coverage, (2) earnings forecast error, and (3) earnings forecast dispersion. Each 
coefficient represents the change in information asymmetry based on a one unit change in the determinant. Variables 
are defined in the (Variable Definitions) section above. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  is the Hall Tideman Index and 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 is its square. Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions takes the shape of χ2 distribution and 
checks for the orthogonality between the instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991) examines the serial correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and 
takes the shape of a normal distribution with N(0,1). m1 values represent the results of the 1st order serial correlation 
test, while m2 values represent the results of the 2nd order serial correlation test. The Wald test (z1) checks for the 
joint significance of the reported coefficients in the model. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes 
significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
I then examine the effect of market concentration, represented by the Hall Tideman 
index ( HTI ), on information asymmetry measured by earnings forecast error and 
earnings forecast dispersion. Column (2) and (3) of Table 7.6 present the results of the 
system GMM estimation of the related model. The results show that ∝1 is significantly 
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negative while ∝2 is significantly positive; which support hypothesis H2b and confirm 
the quadratic relationship between market concentration and earnings forecast error and 
dispersion. By calculating the breakpoints, I find that earnings forecast error and 
dispersion decrease up to market concentration levels of 58% and 53% respectively but 
start increasing afterwards. Similar results are obtained by using the OLS estimator as 
shown in Appendix B Table III. In this sense, I evidence an increase in the quality of 
information provided by analysts at lower levels of market concentration because of the 
lower errors and dispersion in their forecasts, followed by a decrease in that quality at 
higher levels of market concentration. These results suggest that with the increase in 
market concentration, analysts are able to produce better forecasts based on firms’ 
higher motivation to signal quality information under the lower probability of 
competitors to threaten their competitive advantages. However, after a certain point, the 
few remaining competitors are more likely to collude and ultimately provide low quality 
information and, therefore, make it more difficult for the analysts to compare the 
performance between the few existing firms.  
The results provide another piece of evidence on the effect of market 
concentration on information asymmetry. While Ali et al. (2014) and Dalia and Park 
(2009) emphasize a linear positive effect, I document a non-linear relationship. 
However, the results are more supportive to those of Bhattacharya et al. (2013) who 
document a non-linear relationship between earnings quality and information 
asymmetry.   
 
7.6 Additional Analysis: Governance Controls 
Many studies have documented that corporate governance influences earnings 
management (García Lara et al., 2007; Duh et al., 2009; Feng et al., 2009; Jaggi et al., 
2009; Prencipe and Bar-Yosef, 2011; Demerjian et al., 2013a). Better governance 
quality contributes in aligning information between management and shareholders and, 
therefore, mitigates the information asymmetry and contributes to decreasing the 
uncertainty in the market (Elbadry et al., 2013). As a result, I perform all the previous 
regressions once more using additional controls for corporate governance. I add three 
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control variables which I obtain form Execuocomp database. 37  I use a dummy for 
executives who serve as directors (ExecDir) which equals 1 if the executive served as 
director during the year. I also use the executive tenure (Tenure) calculated as the log of 
the executive tenure measured in days. Finally, I add the number of board meeting 
(BoardMtgs) held during the year (Adut et al., 2013). The previous variables, however, 
are only available from 1992 to 2006 and, therefore, I cover only this period in the 
additional analysis. As a result, I end up with 18,505 observations. The results 
emphasize the previous findings related to the relationship between market 
concentration, information asymmetry and earnings management. The results, however, 
are not tabulated here. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examine the effect of market concentration on earnings management 
that has been widely debated in the literature. For this purpose, I explain the relationship 
based on the asymmetry of information in concentrated markets and provide some new 
insights. First, while the previous studies have examined the linear effect of market 
concentration on earnings management, I document a significant non-linear effect 
where accrual earnings management increases up to a certain level of market 
concentration then real earnings management starts to dominate.  
Second, I explain the previous trend of earnings management based on the 
quantity and quality of information in the market. As the quantity of information 
decreases in concentrated markets, managers get motivated to use discretionary accruals 
due to the weak monitoring. However, when the quality of information starts to decline, 
managers tend to use more of the sophisticated real earnings management as it is more 
difficult to detect and understand.  
Third, the results emphasize the substitutability of earnings management 
activities based on their relative costs to the firms. While, firms consider accrual 
earnings management less costly at lower levels of market concentration, they find real 
earnings management a better choice at higher levels of market concentration. However, 
                                            
37 Data generously provided by Francesco Vallascas and Paula Castro. 
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an optimal level of market concentration exists between the levels of 55% and 60% 
where both accrual and real earnings management are falling and, therefore, regulatory 
intervention is required to emphasize that level. For future research, I recommend 
examining the non-linear relationship between the other measures of market 
competition and earnings management as it may provide a new understanding of this 
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Appendix B Table I The effect of market concentration on earnings management 
Variables (1) AccrualEMit (2) RealEMit 
Concentrationit 0.270*** -0.039*** 
Concentration
2
it    -0.240*** 0.032*** 
AccrualEMi,t-1 0.055*** - 
RealEMi,t-1 - 0.597*** 
FirmSizeit  -0.015*** 0.163*** 
SalesVolatility
i,t-4,t
  0.044*** 0.318*** 
CashFlowVolatility
i,t-4,t
  0.061*** 0.104*** 
OperCycle
i,t-4,t
  0.086*** 0.091*** 
Lossesi,t-4,t  -0.269*** 0.195*** 
MgrlAbility
it
  0.935*** -0.235*** 
NationalAuditorit  -0.010*** 0.014*** 
LitigationInd
it
  0.299*** 0.040*** 
MBit  0.000*** 0.000*** 
SalesGrowthrkit  -0.336*** 0.217*** 
Momentumit  0.191*** 0.327*** 
LnNumAnalyst
it
  0.030*** 0.053*** 
IndRev%  -0.158*** -0.902*** 
Segments
it
  -0.033*** -0.104*** 
Foreign
it
  -0.056*** -0.148*** 
GFCit  0.073*** -0.422*** 
Dot-Com
it
  0.065*** -0.354*** 
SOXit  0.078*** -0.387*** 
Hansen  1,788.330 1,757.050 
m1  -17.000 -6.760 
m2  0.190 1.220 
z1  20,035.810 4.5e+05 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the effect of 
market concentration on earnings management. The sample includes 25,119 firm-year observations obtained from 
Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Market concentration (Concentration) is measured using the Hall Tideman Index 
(HTI) and each column represents the estimate from examining its effect on earnings management activities in the 
following order: (1) accrual earnings management measured by Modified Jones’ Model (1995), and (2) real earnings 
management measured by Roychowdhury’s Model (2006). Each coefficient represents the change in earnings 
management based on a one unit change in the determinant. Variables are defined in the (Variable Definitions) 
section above. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is the Hall Tideman Index and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 is its square. Hansen test for over-
identifying restrictions takes the shape of χ2 distribution and checks for the orthogonality between the instrumental 
variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test (Arellano and Bond, 1991) examines the serial correlation in the 
first difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and takes the shape of a normal distribution with N(0,1). m1 
values represent the results of the 1st order serial correlation test, while m2 values represent the results of the 2nd 
order serial correlation test. The Wald test (z1) checks for the joint significance of the reported coefficients in the 
model. The table also displays evidence about the dynamic behaviour of earnings management in the third and fourth 
rows. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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Concentrationit 0.255* -0.286*** 
Concentration
2
it    -0.229* 0.242** 
AccrualEMi,t-1 -0.104** - 
RealEMi,t-1 - 0.652*** 
FirmSizeit  0.011 0.005 
SalesVolatility
i,t-4,t
  0.011 0.076** 
CashFlowVolatility
i,t-4,t
  0.026 -0.029 
OperCycle
i,t-4,t
  0.015 0.008 
Lossesi,t-4,t  -0.003 -0.000 
MgrlAbility
it
  0.385*** -0.102*** 
NationalAuditorit  0.000 0.062*** 
LitigationInd
it
  0.041 0.092*** 
MBit  0.000 5.77e-05 
SalesGrowthrkit  -0.730*** 0.047* 
Momentumit  0.129** -0.013 
LnNumAnalyst
it
  0.055** -0.004 
IndRev%  -0.223*** 0.042 
Segments
it
  0.003 -0.005 
Foreign
it
  0.046 0.032 
GFCit  0.012 0.066 
Dot-Com
it
  0.000 0.121 
SOXit  -0.011 0.166 
R2 0.255 0.452 
F-statistic 15.300 22.580 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table presents the results from the ordinary least square regressions for the effect of market concentration 
on earnings management. The sample includes 25,119 firm-year observations obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 
2011. Market concentration (Concentration) is measured using the Hall Tideman Index (HTI) and each column 
represents the estimate from examining its effect on earnings management activities in the following order: (1) 
accrual earnings management measured by Stubben’s Model (2010), and (2) real earnings management measured by 
Gunny’s Model (2010). Each coefficient represents the change in earnings management based on a one unit change in 
the determinant. Variables are defined in the (Variable Definitions) section above. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  is the Hall 
Tideman Index and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2  is its square. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes 
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Appendix B Table III The effect of market concentration on information asymmetry 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables InvAnalystsCoverage
it
 ForecastErrorit  ForecastDispersionit 
Concentrationit  0.156*** -0.181* -0.056 
Concentration
2
it    - 0.169* 0.045 
FirmSizeit  -0.108*** -0.019*** -0.003 
SalesVolatility
i,t-4,t
  -0.017 0.161*** 0.078*** 
CashFlowVolatility
i,t-4,t
  -0.166*** -0.009 0.011 
OperCycle
i,t-4,t
  0.007* 0.010 -0.005 
Lossesi,t-4,t  -0.110*** 0.196*** 0.156*** 
MgrlAbility
it
  -0.002 -0.075*** -0.046** 
NationalAuditorit  0.093*** 0.046** 0.006 
LitigationInd
it
  -0.034*** 0.038* -0.006 
MBit  -0.000** -3.50e-05 -1.60e-05 
SalesGrowthrkit  -0.083*** -0.087*** -0.058*** 
Momentumit  -0.155*** -0.183*** -0.104*** 
IndRev%  0.041 -0.175*** -0.111*** 
Segments
it
  0.092*** 0.078*** 0.042*** 
Foreign
it
  0.052*** 0.027 0.017 
R2 0.254 0.137 0.122 
F-statistic 137.540 14.80 8.49 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table presents the results from the ordinary least square regressions for the effect of market concentration 
on information asymmetry. The sample includes 25,119 firm-year observations obtained from Compustat from 1989 
to 2011. Market concentration is measured using the Hall Tideman Index (HTI) and each column represents an 
estimate from examining its effect on information asymmetry measures in the following order: (1) The inverse of 
analysts’ coverage, (2) earnings forecast error, and (3) earnings forecast dispersion. Each coefficient represents the 
change in information asymmetry based on a one unit change in the determinant. Variables are defined in the 
(Variable Definitions) section above. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is the Hall Tideman Index and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 is its square. 
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8 Chapter 8  
Earnings Management, Managerial Ability and the 




While chapter 6 and 7 have focused on examining factors from the contractual or third-
party motives of earnings management individually, this chapter examines how both 
groups interact in determining earnings management behaviour. High quality managers 
possess the abilities to manage earnings and achieve private benefits, but they may 
avoid earnings management because they are aware of its unfavourable consequences 
on their firms (Francis et al., 2008; Demerjian et al., 2013b). Meanwhile, the behaviour 
of superior managers is unlikely to be independent of the external factors that influence 
the firm. Some managers with high levels of ability, for example, will operate in 
business environments that are highly competitive, while others will operate in 
environments with significantly lower levels of competition.38 Therefore, in this chapter 
I examine whether the influence of a third-party like competitors disciplines more able 
managers or drives their opportunistic behaviour.   
Earnings management behaviour within a firm is determined by different sets of 
motives that can be related to contracting, capital market structure, or other external 
factors (Walker, 2013). Some of the contractual drivers of earnings management are the 
abilities and competencies of the managers of the firm, which affect the cost of 
managerial contracts with shareholders (Francis et al., 2008; Demerjian et al., 2013b). 
In the presence of high quality managers, shareholders may have to continuously 
consider, write, negotiate, and renegotiate the employment contracts of skilled 
managerial labour (Hart, 1983; Walker, 2013). Therefore, contracts with highly skilled 
managers may be insufficient to monitor their performance effectively, thereby giving 
them more space to manage earnings. Conversely, superior managers possess the 
requisite skills to manage their firms successfully. As such, highly skilled managers 
                                            
38 The converse is also true in the case of managers with lower levels of ability. 
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may be more able to realize the long-term gains associated with creating sustainable 
value, both through current and future remuneration and via increased labour market 
capital. In this situation, shareholders are more likely to trust the signals produced by 
these managers (e.g. earnings); and these managers’ incentives are better aligned with 
shareholders who consequently feel less need to monitor their behaviour (Hart, 1983; 
Walker, 2013).  
A key external driver of earnings management that has been widely examined in 
the literature is the level of market competition present in an industry (Dalia and Park, 
2009; Markarian and Santalo, 2010; Karuna et al., 2012; Datta et al., 2013). 
Competition increases the level of transparency in an industry, and as a result, it 
decreases the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Dalia and 
Park, 2009). However, while the presence of increased information in highly 
competitive environments allows shareholders to more effectively compare firm 
performance, it may motivate managers to undertake increased levels of earnings 
management.  
Based on the previous arguments concerning managerial ability and market 
competition, and the expectation that these two factors interact in explaining earnings 
management, I examine the influence of managerial ability on the earnings management 
behaviour in the presence of differential levels of market competition. In measuring 
managerial ability, I follow the model developed by Demerjian et al. (2012) that 
measures ability as the capacity of management to generate revenues from firm 
resources. For market competition I use three of the most commonly used measures, 
namely, market concentration, product substitutability, and market pricing power (Dalia 
and Park, 2009; Markarian and Santalo, 2010; Karuna et al., 2012; Datta et al., 2013). 
Finally, for the measures of earnings management I apply the Stubben (2010) and the 
Modified Jones (1995) models to measure accrual earnings management, and the Gunny 
(2010) and Roychowdhury (2006) models to measure real earnings management.  
I find that high quality managers respond to market competition by using more 
discretionary accruals while avoiding real earnings management. The results extend the 
work of Karuna et al. (2012) who document an overall positive effect of market 
competition on both accrual and real earnings management. However, I particularly 
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show that superior managers are not likely to use the later activity because of its higher 
subsequent costs to their firms.   
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section I review 
the related studies from the literature and build the hypotheses of the chapter. In section 
8.3 I explain the process of data collection, variable definitions, and the descriptive 
statistics. In section 8.4 I explain the methodology I use in this chapter. In section 8.5 I 
present and explain the results.  In section 8.6 I add some empirical analysis. Finally, in 
section 8.7 I offer conclusions. 
 
8.2 Literature and Hypotheses Development 
8.2.1 Earnings Management Behaviour  
According to the theory of the firm, the separation of ownership from control in public 
companies creates an agency problem (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). In this conflict of 
interest, shareholders and managers act rationally to maximize their own welfare. 
However, earnings serve as a performance measure that enables shareholders to monitor 
managers and hence alleviate the previous tension. That is, earnings have potential 
value to the shareholders in making their decisions – namely providing them with 
relevant information to establish or adjust their contracts with the management (Walker, 
2013).   
However, earnings need not always deliver their expected value as management 
prepares the financial statements that shareholders rely on. The information asymmetry 
gives management the opportunity to obfuscate its failures or signal specific messages 
to outsiders. Under such uncertainty, shareholders will not be able to completely 
understand management actions (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). In response to this 
weak form of market efficiency, managers may take advantage of the imperfect 
contracts with shareholders and use their judgement to alter the financial statements and 
report earnings in a different way from what is already known to them (Ronen and 
Yaari, 2008). 
In light of the previous discussion, the motives of earnings management 
behaviour can be explained using the revelation principle and the conditions identified 
Chapter 8  





by Walker (2013). According to Walker (2013), at least one of the following four 
conditions needs to be satisfied for earnings management to occur. First, there are high 
contracting costs, especially under the impossibility of establishing perfect contracts to 
cover all potential terms required to co-ordinate between management and the large 
number of shareholders. Second, shareholders are ‘imperfect rational’ and are unable to 
make wealth maximizing decisions all of the time. Third, there is a lack of common 
shared knowledge (in the form of a management information systems), which precludes 
shareholders from fully understanding management actions. Finally, there are high 
relative communication costs due to the presence of third parties such as regulators, 
competitors, and tax authorities – essentially, the performance of a firm that is relevant 
to shareholders is conditioned by the performance of immediate competitors, how far 
the regulatory environment affects the specific behaviour of the firm and how able the 
firm is to manage the tax regime.  However, as Walker (2013) has not distinguished 
between accrual and real earnings management, I incorporate the costs of both activities 
into the previous model when explaining the selected motives of earnings management, 
as discussed in the next sections.  
 
8.2.2 Managerial Ability, Market Competition and Accrual Earnings 
Management 
To the extent that perfect contracts do not exist in terms of accommodating all current 
and potential terms, more simplified general formats are likely to be used. Within this 
context, more able managers are more likely to emphasize aspects of their firms’ 
performance that allow them to achieve better personal benefits. This conjecture is in 
line with the rent extraction hypothesis and leads to aggravating moral hazard problem 
between shareholders and superior managers. Consistent with the previous argument, 
Francis et al. (2008) provide evidence that superior managers do not necessarily 
produce better quality disclosures. They point out that managerial ability leads to a 
decrease in earnings quality because better managers are more able to manage earnings 
to obtain higher stock compensation, etc. Likewise, Demerjian et al. (2013b) examine 
the effect of managerial ability on accrual earnings management and document a 
positive relationship. 
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At a more macro-level, I expect earnings management behaviour to depend on 
market competition. To the extent that third parties like competitors influence 
managerial communication with shareholders, the effect of market competition can be 
best explained by violating the fourth condition of the revelation principle mentioned 
above and hence changing the motivation of managers to manage earnings (Walker, 
2013). Communicating more information in competitive markets allows shareholders 
and managers to make more comparisons between firms in the same industry which 
potentially drives managers to imitate the aggressive activities of other managers 
(Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). Put differently, market competition drives more adverse 
selection by triggering management herding behaviour in order to meet market 
expectations. Consistent with this argument, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) analyse a case 
study in the savings and loans industry in the United States in the 1980s where 
conservative managers imitated the aggressive behaviour in the industry by offering 
high interest rates to depositors in order to collect more money for their projects and 
stay in the business. Other studies particularly study the effect of market competition on 
accrual earnings management. Karuna et al. (2012) and Datta et al. (2013) find a 
positive impact because of the comparisons that create pressure to meet competitors’ 
performance. Moreover, the herding behaviour is very likely in this setting because 
managers can easily understand each other’s incentives in the same industry (Kallunki 
and Martikainen, 1999; Bagnoli and Watts, 2000). In contrast, Dalia and Park (2009) 
provide evidence that competition discourages discretionary accruals in the 
manufacturing sector in the United States because information spreads more easily and 
hence the stock market promptly punishes earnings management behaviour. Following a 
similar line of argument, Markarian and Santalo (2010) document that when 
shareholders have access to more information about the firm and its competitors, 
earnings management activities become more costly as they are difficult to be justified 
by management. 
Given the abilities of superior managers to trade-off between the short and long 
horizons after evaluating the costs of earnings management activities as explained 
earlier, I expect them to react carefully to the pressure of market competition. To the 
extent that the high communication costs can drive managers to act more aggressively 
in order to survive in the market, high quality managers are more likely to use the less 
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costly accrual earnings management to achieve this target. Consistent with this 
argument, I develop the following hypothesis: 
H1a: The positive relationship between managerial ability and accrual earnings 
management will be enhanced with the extent of market competition in the industry 
where the firm operates. 
 
8.2.3 Managerial Ability, Market Competition and Real Earnings Management 
In contrast to the previous argument, more able managers provide higher quality 
performance and are obviously aware of the consequences of their behaviour on their 
reputations and future benefits. Therefore, shareholders expect superior managers to 
emphasize the long horizons of their firms. The assumption is in line with the efficient 
contracting hypothesis and implies a decrease in moral hazard problem between more 
able managers and shareholders in the long-run. The above idea has some foundation in 
the prior research that examines the effect of managerial ability on earnings 
management. Demerjian et al. (2013b) find that superior managers are less inclined to 
use earnings management by particularly avoiding real earnings management activities 
because of the negative consequences for their firms. To the extent that real earnings 
management involves activities like delaying expenses, asset sales, increasing 
production, sales discounts, or R&D cuts, it results in giving up positive net present 
value (NPV) projects and burning cash flows and, therefore, achieving short-term 
earnings’ targets at the expense of firm value. Because superior managers can anticipate 
the negative long-term consequences of real earning management, they are less likely to 
use such costly activities. 
At the same time, superior managers are not independent of the external motives 
and thus market competition may also influence their real earnings management 
behaviour. Some studies provide evidence on the disciplinary function of market 
competition.  Holmstrom (1982) finds that the performance evaluation of a manager 
relative to others in the same industry results in more information about the common 
uncertainties in the market and, thus, helps to mitigate the conflict of interest between 
management and shareholders. Similarly, Hart (1983) provides evidence that there is 
less space for discretionary behaviour under competition as firms within the same 
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industry share a business environment that allows performance comparisons and 
ultimately rules out any supernormal profits. Furthermore, Chhaochharia et al. (2012) 
specifically find that market competition is associated with better operational efficiency 
that makes it a potential substitute for internal governance mechanisms. In contrast, 
Karuna et al. (2012) examines the effect of market competition on real earnings 
management. Their results show managers use more real earnings management under 
the intensive comparisons between firms and the tendency to imitate the opportunistic 
behaviour of other managers in the same industry. Because superior managers possess 
the abilities to extract private benefits without sacrificing long-term gains (Demerjian et 
al., 2013b), I expect them to pursue improving shareholder value even under the 
pressure of the high communication costs and adverse selection driven by market 
competition. Top managers are therefore more likely to avoid real earnings management 
because of the associated costs. Drawing on the previous discussion I develop the 
following hypothesis: 
H1b: The negative relationship between managerial ability and real earnings 
management will be enhanced with the extent of market competition in the industry 
where the firm operates. 
 
8.3 Data, Variable Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics 
8.3.1 Data 
To undertake the analysis, I include all firms in the United States from the Annual 
Compustat, Quarterly Compustat, Historical Segments Compustat, and IBES databases. 
I start with all firms that have the required data for calculating the measures of earnings 
management, competition, and managerial ability.39 Following Cheng et al. (2011), I 
exclude regulated industries such as banks, credit institutions, brokers, insurance, real 
estate, holding companies, and investment firms. These industries have their unique 
accounting and financial practices and are subject to distinct regulations. Therefore, 
managers in these industries have different motivations to manipulate earnings than 
                                            
39 For estimates of managerial ability, I use the dataset of Demerjian et al. (2012) which is available 
at https://community.bus.emory.edu/personal/PDEMERJ/Pages/Home.aspx 
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those of managers in other industry sectors.40 In addition, I exclude firm-years where 
accounting changes, merger and acquisition activities, or discontinued operations 
occur.41  
Following prior literature, I exclude any industry with fewer than six 
observations for each SIC code in a specific year to ensure sufficient data exists to 
calculate earnings management measures and make sure that OLS assumption regarding 
the normality of the error term holds (e.g., Rosner, 2003; García Lara et al., 2005; 
Kothari et al., 2005; Athanasakou et al., 2009; Iqbal et al., 2009). For that purpose, I 
follow the SIC classification of Fama-French (1997). As the model is dynamic, I ensure 
that information is available for at least five consecutive years for each firm over the 
study period (Miguel et al., 2004). When I combine the cross-sectional and time-series 
dimensions of the data, I obtain 66,695 observations in an unbalanced panel.42 
 
8.3.2 Earnings Management Measures 
Based on the discussion in Chapter 5, I use Stubben’s Model (2010) for measuring 
accrual earnings management because it focuses on discretionary revenues which 
represent the largest component of earnings in most firms (Stubben, 2010). I also use 
Gunny’s Model (2010) for real earnings management because it covers more types of 
this activity compared to other models (Gunny, 2010). In addition, I use two other 
widespread models as corroborating measures that include the Modified Jones’ Model 
(1995) for measuring accrual earnings management and Roychowdhury’s Model (2006) 
for measuring real earnings management. Again, for each of these measures I use a 
cross sectional model in the calculations for each year and each industry classified by its 
four-digit SIC code with at least 6 observations. I also take the decile ranks for better 
comparability and to avoid the effect of the outliers. For the purpose of calculating an 
overall measure of real earnings management using Gunny’s Model (2010) and 
Roychowdhury’s Model (2006), a principal component analysis with varimax rotation is 
                                            
40 I exclude firms with the following SIC codes: 4000 ≤ SIC ≥ 4900 and 6000 ≤ SIC ≥ 6300. 
41 According to McNichols (2002), I specifically exclude firm quarters or years with non-blank 
values for accounting changes cumulative effects (ACCCHGQ_FN), or merger and acquisition 
activities (ACQMETH_FN), or discontinued operations (DOQ_FN) in the Compustat database. 
42 By having an unbalanced panel I avoid any issues regarding survivorship bias. 
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performed to avoid the inclusion of highly correlated variables in the overall measure 
(Demerjian et al., 2013b).43 
 
8.3.3 Managerial Ability Measure 
To calculate the managerial ability variable, I adopt the approach of Demerjian et al. 
(2012) as discussed in section 4.3.3. The measure represents managerial potential of 
generating revenues from the available firm resources. It uses Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) to calculate firm efficiency then excludes some firm specific 
characteristics that may influence the performance of managers. The remaining residual 
(εi) is the ultimate measure of managerial ability (MgrlAbility). Finally, I take the decile 
ranks of these measures by industry-year to obtain better comparability and to avoid the 
effects of outliers. 
 
8.3.4 Competition Measures 
As market competition has various dimensions, I use three of the most commonly used 
measures in the literature for this variable. These measures include market concentration, 
product substitutability, and market pricing power. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) is the most commonly expressed measure in the literature to proxy for market 
concentration. I calculate it using the following equation: 





In equation (8.1), ω is market share; and N is the number of firms per year-industry. 
Following Karuna et al. (2012) I use product substitutability (ProdSubstitutability) to 
represent the gross margin in the industry; and I measure it by the average operating 
profit divided by the sales in the industry. Finally, I measure firm-specific product 
market pricing power (PricPower) by the industry adjusted Lerner Index (LI). As in 
                                            
43  The principal component analysis step turns the set of correlated variables to be linearly 
uncorrelated according to the weights of their variances, thus reducing the number of variables to 
their principal components.   
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Datta et al. (2013) I adjust the Lerner Index by excluding industry specific 









In equations (8.2) and (8.3), LIi is the Lerner index for firm i, also referred to as the 
price cost margin (PCM); and ωi is market share for firm i measured by its sales divided 
by total industry sales. 
 
8.3.5 Control Variables  
Following Dechow and Dichev (2002), the first set of controls consider firm specific 
determinants and account for firm size (TotalAssets), sales volatility (SalesVolatility), 
cash flow volatility (CashFlowVolatility), operating cycle (OperCycle), and historical 
losses ( Losses ). Larger firms have operations that are more predictable and more 
diversified businesses and thus earnings should be of higher quality. Managers in these 
firms, however, have more opportunities to manipulate earnings because of the large 
number of transactions they undertake and their complicated operations (Demerjian et 
al., 2013b). Sales volatility reflects uncertainty in operations and, therefore, implies a 
higher likelihood of earnings management. Cash flow volatility also reflects increased 
volatility in the operations of the firm creating more opportunities for earnings 
management. Similarly, longer operating cycles increase uncertainty and therefore, the 
potential for earnings management. Prior losses are likely to result in more earnings 
management to meet investors’ expectations in making profit but equally, they may 
drive managers to avoid earnings management as they will be facing more scrutiny by 
the market.  
I use a national auditor indicator (NationalAuditor) to control for any auditor 
effects as firms audited by national auditors use more earnings management than those 
audited by international audit firms (Becker et al., 1998). I add another indicator 
variable to control for litigious industries (LitigationInd) following Francis et al. (1994). 
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Firms in such industries are expected to use more real activities as accrual earnings 
management is more likely to be detected. However, the opposite may occur as real 
earnings management has serious economic consequences to the firm. I also add the 
market to book ratio (MB), the one year sales growth (SalesGrowth ), and returns 
momentum (Momentum) as they have been found to influence earnings management 
(Hribar and Nichols, 2007). As firms with higher market to book ratios have more 
growth prospects, they may be involved in more earnings management to meet market 
expectations (Hribar and Nichols, 2007). Firms with growing sales and high returns 
momentum also have high growth prospects but the increase in sales and returns 
reduces the pressure on management to manipulate earnings (Dechow et al., 2011).  
I also control for analyst coverage (NumAnalyst). Although the presence of more 
analysts may discipline managers, it can increase the burden to present better earnings 
and, therefore, may lead to more of the sophisticated earnings management activities. I 
also include an industry revenue leadership variable (IndRev%) (Dechow et al., 2011; 
Zang, 2012). Although Zang (2012) could not specify the influence of industry revenue 
leadership, I expect a negative effect because industry leaders are under more scrutiny 
from investors and the SEC. I use the number of segments (Segments) and the frequency 
of foreign transactions (Foreign) to control for businesses complexity (Karuna et al., 
2012).  With more complex transactions managers use more real earnings management 
because they are less likely to be detected than discretionary revenue manipulation 
(Karuna et al., 2012).  
Finally, I use dummies for the global financial crisis (GFC) (Badertscher et al., 
2014; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014; Magnan et al., 2015), the dot-com bubble (DotCom) 
(Lieberman and Asaba, 2006), and the post-Sarbanes Oxley period (SOX) (Cohen et al., 
2008) to control for some macro-economic events over the study period. The possibility 
of trade-off between accrual and real earnings management has to be always taken into 
consideration when examining the previous factors. I present the detailed calculations 
for each of the previous variables in Table 8.1 and summarize the expected and actual 
signs of all control variables in Table 8.2.  
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Table 8.1 Calculation of control variables 
Variable Calculation 
FirmSize  The natural log of the firm’s assets as of the end of year t. 
 
SalesVolatility  The standard deviation of (sales / average assets) over at least three of the last five years 
(t–4, t). 
 
CashFlowVolatility  The standard deviation of (cash from operations / average assets) over at least three of 
the last five years (t–4, t). 
 
OperCycle  The operating cycle is the natural log of average sales turnover plus days in inventory 
over at least three of the last five years (t–4, t). 
 
Losses  Loss history is the percentage of years reporting losses in net income before 
extraordinary items over at least three of the last five years (t–4, t). 
 
NationalAuditor  An indicator variable equals one for firms audited by national audit firms in year t; zero 
otherwise. 
 
LitigationInd  Litigious industry indicator that equals one for firms in industries with SIC Codes: 2833-
2836 (biotechnology), 3570-3577 and 7370-7374 (computers), 3600-3674 (electronics), 
and 52(X)-5961 (retailing). 
 
MB  The market to book ratio that equals the firm’s market capitalization divided by book 
value for year t. 
 
SalesGrowth  Current year’s sales less prior year’s sales less the increase in receivables all scaled by 
prior year’s sales and decile ranked by industry and year. 
 
NumAnalyst  The log of 1+ the number of analysts covering the firm in year t. 
 
IndRev%  Industry revenue leadership measured by the firm’s sales in year t-1 divided by the total 
sales for the firm’s industry in year t-1. 
 
Momentum  Returns momentum calculated by the decile rank (by industry and year) of asset returns 
during the two years preceding the start of year t. 
 
Segments  The natural log of 1+ the number of firm’s business segments in year t. 
 
Foreign  The frequency with which the firm has a non-zero foreign currency transactions during 
the sample period. 
 
GFC  An indicator variable equals one for the years of the global financial crisis (2007-2009); 
zero otherwise. 
 
Dot-Com  An indicator variable equals one for the years of the Dot-Com bubble (1997-2000); zero 
otherwise. 
 
SOX An indicator variable equals one for the years after the release of the Sarbanes Oxley act 
(2002-2005); zero otherwise. 
 
Notes: This table presents the detailed calculations for each of the control variables identified in the model as 
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Table 8.2 Expected and actual signs of the control variables 
Variables AccrualEM RealEM 
 Predicted sign Actual sign Predicted sign Actual sign 
FirmSize  +/- + +/- + 
SalesVolatility  + + + + 
CashFlowVolatility  + + + + 
OperCycle  + + + + 
Losses  +/- + +/- - 
NationalAuditor  + + + + 
LitigationInd  +/- - +/- + 
MB  + + + +  
SalesGrowth  +/- - +/- + 
NumAnalyst  +/- + +/- + 
IndRev%  - - - - 
Momentum  +/- + +/- - 
Segments  +/- - +/- -  
Foreign  +/- - +/- + 
GFC  +/- - +/- - 
Dot-Com  +/- - +/- - 
SOX +/- - +/- - 
Notes: This table presents the signs I expect and actually get for all control variables identified in the model and 
discussed in the (Variable Definitions) section above.  
 
8.3.6 Descriptive Statistics 
I present the descriptive statistics in Table 8.3. Consistent with Demerjian et al. (2013b), 
accrual earnings management and real earnings management have means and medians 
of zero as these variables are taken from the residuals of the models selected above. The 
measures of market competition are comparable to those calculated by prior studies (e.g., 
Karuna et al., 2012; Datta et al., 2013). Similarly, managerial ability measure is 
consistent with Demerjian et al. (2013b) and has a mean and median close to zero 
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Table 8.3 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Median Std Dev P25 P75 
      
AccrualEM  0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.02 0.02 
RealEM  0.00 0.00 1.00 -0.72 0.71 
HHI  0.28 0.22 0.18 0.14 0.37 
ProdSubstitutability  0.17 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.23 
PricPower  -3.60 -0.05 73.04 -0.22 0.02 
MgrlAbility  0.00 -0.01 0.15 -0.10 0.08 
TotalAssets  1,759.47 86.79 10,847.54 18.43 446.71 
SalesVolatility  0.29 0.17 0.46 0.09 0.34 
CashFlowVolatility  0.14 0.07 0.41 0.04 0.14 
OperCycle  134.37 120.05 81.96 76.79 176.29 
Losses  0.40 0.25 0.37 0.00 0.75 
NationalAuditor  0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 
LitigationInd  0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 
MB  3.50 1.98 58.04 1.05 3.70 
SalesGrowth  1.20 0.08 83.94 -0.04 0.25 
NumAnalyst  2.94 3.00 1.65 2.00 4.00 
IndRev%  0.06 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.04 
Momentum  -0.27 0.05 2.79 -0.22 0.16 
Segments  1.74 1.00 1.45 1.00 2.00 
Foreign  0.20 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.31 
GFC  0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 
Dot-Com  0.24 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 
SOX 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00 
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables identified in the model for 66,695 firm-year 
observations obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Variables are defined in the (Variable Definitions) section 
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The control variables are comparable to Karuna et al. (2012) and Demerjian et al. 
(2013b) with some differences appearing because of the variations in the samples. Cash 
flow volatility is lower than sales volatility and thus implies that firms consider it more 
costly as it is negatively valued by the market (Allayannis and Weston, 2007). 40% of 
the firms in the sample reported a history of losses in the last five years which has 
contributed to an overall negative returns momentum. The high standard deviations 
associated with firm size and operating cycle are due to presenting the untransformed 
variables.  
Table 8.4 presents the correlation matrix between the measures of earnings 
management, managerial ability, and competition. From the table it can be seen that 
managerial ability is positively correlated with accrual earnings management and 
negatively correlated with real earnings management, which suggests that high quality 
managers are more inclined to use accrual rather than real earnings management. 
However, there is no consistent direction for the measures of market competition and 
earnings management. As well as examining the correlation between the variables of 
interest, I also check the VIF between all the variables in the model and confirm they 
are less than 10. 
 
 
Chapter 8  





Table 8.4 Correlation table 
























      
Real  
EM  
0.00      
HHI 0.01** 0.02*** 
 















0.06*** -0.06*** 0.01** -0.01* 0.05*** 
 
Notes: This table presents the correlation matrix for 66,695 firm-year observations obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011 between the measures of accrual earnings management 
measured by Stubben’s Model (2010), real earnings management measured by Gunny’s Model (2010), managerial ability measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012), market 
concentration measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), product substitutability measured by the gross margin in the industry, and pricing power measured by the industry adjusted 
Lerner Index (LI). Variables are defined in detail in the (Variable Definitions) section above. Pearson correlation coefficients are presented. To control for the multicollinearity between the 
different variables I make sure that all VIF factors are less than 10. VIF factors, however, are not tabulated.  *, **, *** denotes a statistical coefficient at the 10, 5 and 1 percent alpha level, 
respectively.  
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I next perform univariate analysis where I examine earnings management, competition 
and managerial ability simultaneously. I first identify in Panel A of Table 8.5 earnings 
management observations under high competition i.e. less than the median of the three 
measures of market competition calculated by industry and year. Among the resulting 
observations, I create a group for the most able managers (highest quintile of managerial 
ability variable by industry and year) and another group for the least able managers 
(lowest quintile of managerial ability variable by industry and year). Next, I identify in 
Panel B of Table 8.5 earnings management observations under low competition i.e. 
more than the median of the three measures of market competition calculated by 
industry and year, and again I divide the results into a high managerial ability group and 
a low managerial ability group.   
When considering accrual earnings management, I find that under low and high 
levels of market concentration the means44 of accrual earnings managed by high quality 
managers (0.006 and 0.005 successively) are higher than those evidenced by low quality 
managers (-0.007 and -0.004 successively). Similar results are achieved for the 
measures of product substitutability and pricing power. In contrast, when considering 
real earnings management I find that under low and high levels of market concentration 
the means of real earnings managed by high quality managers (-0.086 and -0.084 
successively) are lower than those evidenced by low quality managers (0.081 and 0.104 
successively). Again, similar results are achieved for the measures of product 
substitutability and pricing power. Overall, the results imply that high quality managers 








                                            
44 The same applies when the median is used for comparisons. 
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Table 8.5 Earnings management variables partitioned by competition and managerial ability 
Panel A: High Market Competition  
 Market Competition below median HHI 
 Lowest Quintile of Managerial 
Ability 




Variable  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
AccrualEM  -0.007 -0.003 0.006 0.001 *** *** 
RealEM 0.081 0.088 -0.086 -0.086 *** *** 
 
 
 Market Competition below median ProdSubstitutability 
 Lowest Quintile of Managerial 
Ability 




Variable  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
AccrualEM  -0.006 -0.002 0.005 0.001 *** *** 
RealEM 0.046 0.056 -0.097 -0.089 *** *** 
 
 
 Market Competition below median PricPower 
 Lowest Quintile of Managerial 
Ability 




Variable  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
AccrualEM  -0.006 -0.002 0.002 0.002 *** *** 
RealEM 0.103 0.096 -0.149 -0.159 *** *** 
 
Panel B: Low Market Competition  
 Market Competition above median HHI 
 Lowest Quintile of Managerial 
Ability 




Variable  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
AccrualEM  -0.004 -0.001 0.005 0.001 *** *** 
RealEM 0.104 0.101 -0.084 -0.069 *** *** 
 
 
 Market Competition above median ProdSubstitutability 
 Lowest Quintile of Managerial 
Ability 




Variable  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
AccrualEM  -0.005 -0.002 0.004 0.001 *** *** 
RealEM 0.132 0.123 -0.071 -0.055 *** *** 
 
 
 Market Competition above median PricPower 
 Lowest Quintile of Managerial 
Ability 




Variable  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
AccrualEM  -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.001 *** *** 
RealEM 0.107 0.096 -0.113 -0.112 *** *** 
Notes: This table presents the univariate analysis of earnings management by competition and managerial ability for 
66,695 firm-year observations obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Accrual earnings management is 
measured by Stubben’s Model (2010), real earnings management is measured by Gunny’s Model (2010), managerial 
ability is measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012), market concentration is measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI), product substitutability is measured by the gross margin in the industry, and pricing power is 
measured by the industry adjusted Lerner Index (LI). Variables are defined in detail in the (Variable Definitions) 
section above.  Panel A and panel B use the three measures I identified for market competition. I present the 
untransformed variables for ease of interpretation. The significances of the two-tailed t-test for the differences 
between means and medians are displayed. *, **, *** denotes a statistical coefficient at the 10, 5 and 1 percent alpha 
level, respectively. 
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However, the intensity of such behaviour changes at different levels of market 
competition. When considering accrual earnings management, I find that under lower 
levels of market concentration (higher competition) the mean 45  of accrual earnings 
managed by high quality managers (0.006) is higher than that observed under higher 
levels of market concentration (0.005). Similar results are achieved for the measures of 
product substitutability and pricing power. When shifting the attention to real earnings 
management, I find that under lower levels of market concentration the mean of real 
earnings managed by high quality managers (-0.086) is lower than that observed under 
higher levels of market concentration (-0.084). Similar results are achieved for the 
measures of product substitutability and pricing power.  Overall, the results suggest that 
high quality managers use more accrual and less real earnings management under higher 
levels of market competition. 
 
8.4 Methodology 
I derive a model that identifies earnings management as the dependent variable (Yit). I 
also use the lagged values (Yi,t-1) of earnings management (EarningsManagementi,t-1) to 
explain its current levels. I control for the dynamic effect of earnings management 
because earnings performance in the past year will influence earnings management 
behaviour during the current year (Kim et al., 2003). In addition, earnings management 
levels are associated with meeting prior earnings’ benchmarks (Graham et al., 2005; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Gunny, 2010).  As a result, managers have to be aware of the prior 






                                            
45 The same applies when the median is used for comparisons. 
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I introduce managerial ability ( MgrlAbility
it
) and a dummy for market 
competition dummy (Competition
it
) as an the explanatory variables (Xit) and (Zi,t). I also 
use competition dummy as a moderating variable.46 To complete the model, I add the 
previously identified control variables (Controlsit) and an error term (εit).  I express the 
model in general terms in equation (8.4) and in more specific terms in equation (8.5). 






                                 +β
1
Competitionit ∗ MgrlAbilityit  
                                 +∝4EarningsManagementi,t-1+∝5FirmSizeit  
                                 +∝6SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t +∝7CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t   
                                 +∝8OperCyclei,t-4,t +∝9Lossesi,t-4,t+∝10NationalAuditorit  
                                 +∝11SalesGrowthrkit+∝12MBit+∝13LitigationIndit  
                                 +∝14LnNumAnalystit+∝15IndRev%+∝16Momentumit  
                                 +∝17Segmentsit+∝18Foreignit+∝19GFCit  
                                 +∝20Dot-Comit+∝21SOXit+εit  
(8.5) 
The model suffers from the problem of unobservable individual heterogeneity attributed 
to time-invariant firm and managerial effects. Firm strategies and corporate cultures 
may result in firms with specific levels of earnings quality selecting managers with 
specific abilities. Similarly, managers’ characteristics e.g., inborn capabilities, 
personalities, or tendencies to take risk, may drive them to target firms with specific 
levels of earnings quality. Consequently, the sample is expected to be heterogeneous, as 
some companies are more predisposed to earnings management than others (Graham et 
al., 2012; Demerjian et al., 2013b). 
In addition, the model suffers from an endogeneity problem because of the 
mutual causality between managerial ability and earnings management. While more 
                                            
46 The dummy takes a value of one when competition is high in the market and zero otherwise. 
Therefore, ∝1  is the coefficient of ( MgrlAbilityit ) when competition is low; ( ∝1+β1 ) is the 
coefficient when competition is high. I introduce a dummy for each of the three measures of market 
competition I identified earlier. HHI is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in an industry 
where market concentration is lower than the median and zero otherwise. ProdSubstitutability is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where product substitutability is lower than 
the median and zero otherwise. Finally, PricPower is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has 
lower pricing power than the median and zero otherwise. 
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able managers are expected to be more selective in using the different earnings 
management activities, higher levels of earnings management may require hiring 
managers with specific abilities to successfully run the business. This effect would be 
captured in the error term and ultimately results in a correlation between the explanatory 
variable and the error term (Pindado and Requejo, 2014).  
Therefore, the OLS estimator will not be able to solve the model as it ignores the 
impact of the unobservable individual heterogeneity or endogeneity problems. 
Furthermore, while the fixed effects estimator tackles the unobservable heterogeneity by 
demeaning the variables in the model it does not solve for the endogeneity problem as it 
assumes strict exogeneity. Therefore, I solve the model using a system generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator that demeans the variables in the model to solve 
for the heterogeneity and introduces instrumental variables to solve for the endogeneity 
problem as explained earlier in the methodology section of Chapter 5.47 In addition, I 
present the results of the OLS regressions as a robustness test in Appendix C Table III 
and IV. 
Therefore, I split the error term (εit) into three components. First, I introduce (ɳi) 
to control for the impact of the unobserved effects in the model.48 Second, I add a time 
specific effect (dt) to control for the macroeconomic variables that may interfere with 
the results over the period of the study. Finally, I consider the remaining part of the 





                                 +β
1
Competitionit ∗ MgrlAbilityit  
                                 +∝4EarningsManagementi,t-1+∝5FirmSizeit  
                                 +∝6SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t +∝7CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t   
                                 +∝8OperCyclei,t-4,t +∝9Lossesi,t-4,t+∝10NationalAuditorit  
                                 +∝11SalesGrowthrkit+∝12MBit+∝13LitigationIndit  
                                 +∝14LnNumAnalystit+∝15IndRev%+∝16Momentumit  
                                 +∝17Segmentsit+∝18Foreignit+∝19GFCit  
                                 +∝20Dot-Comit+∝21SOXit+ɳi+dt+ʋit  
(8.6) 
                                            
47 Solving for these two problems using a system GMM estimator allows us to obtain less biased and 
more significant results compared to the previous studies.   
48 ɳi controls for both firm specific effects and manager specific effects. 
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After examining the individual effect of the moderating variable (Competition
it
) and the 
independent variable ( MgrlAbility
it
), I test for their combined influence. For this 
purpose, I use a linear restriction test (LRT) that examines the significance of (∝1+β1). I 
use the different measures identified earlier for market competition (Competition
it
) as 
moderating factors. Therefore, I repeat the test for each measure separately as shown in 
the next section.  
After the completion of the empirical work, I ensure that the assumptions of the 
estimator hold and that the model is valid. I initially test whether the GMM estimator 
properly addresses the problem of endogeneity. For this purpose, I use the Hansen test 
for over-identifying restrictions. It takes a χ2  distribution and checks for the 
orthogonality between the instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The 
model uses multiple lags of the right-hand side variables as instruments, which make it 
over-identified. Consequently, if I accept Hansen’s null hypothesis that the instrumental 
variables (IVit) and the error term (εit) are uncorrelated, I guarantee that the instruments 
are valid and the estimator is appropriate. I present the results of Hansen test in tables 
8.6 and 8.7, which show that the instruments are valid. 
Additionally, I implement Arellano and Bond (1991) to check for the validity of 
the model. It takes the shape of a normal distribution with N(0,1). It mainly examines 
the serial correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) over different periods (s) by 
using the (mj) statistic [E(ʋit ʋis)=0, while t≠s]. I accept first order serial correlation in 
the model because the estimator takes the first difference to eliminate the individual 
specific effects (ɳ
i
). However, I reject second order serial correlation ( m2 ) in the 
residual because it indicates a problem in the model. I present the results of the AB test 
in tables 8.6 and 8.7, which confirm that no second order serial correlations exist in the 
model. 
Finally, I use the Wald test (z1) to check for the joint significance of the reported 
coefficients in the model. If I reject the null hypothesis that states no relationship 
between the dependent and explanatory variables, I make sure that the model is jointly 
significant. I present the results of the Wald test in tables 8.6 and 8.7. They all support 
the joint significance of the reported coefficients. 
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8.5.1 Managerial Ability, Market Competition and Accrual Earnings 
Management 
The results show that increased competition has a positive effect on the relation between 
managerial ability and accrual earnings management - higher levels of competition 
drive more able managers to use more discretionary accruals. From Table 8.6, column 
(1) shows that the coefficient of superior managers who use accrual earnings 
management in less concentrated markets (∝1+β1=1.474+0.103=1.577) is higher than 
that in more concentrated markets ( ∝1 =1.474). Column (2) shows that the same 
coefficient in industries with higher product substitutability (∝1+β1=1.507+0.202=1.709) 
is more than that in industries with fewer substitutes (∝1=1.507). Column (3) shows that 
the coefficient in firms with less pricing power (∝1+β1=1.223+0.646=1.869) is higher 
than that in other firms (∝1=1.223). Finally, the t values of the linear restriction test 
(LRT) in Table 8.6 show that the combined effects of market competition and 
managerial ability on accrual earnings management are significantly different from zero. 
These results support hypothesis H1a of this chapter. Similar results are obtained by 
using the Modified Jones’ Model (1995) as shown in Appendix C Table I and the OLS 
estimator as shown in Appendix C Table III.  
The individual average effects of managerial ability and market competition on 
accrual earnings management appear in Appendix C Table V and VII as Table 8.6 
presents the conditional effects only. The results in Appendix C Table V confirm that 
high quality managers manage earnings by exploiting their incomplete contracts with 
the shareholders. The high costs of writing, negotiating, and renegotiating contracts 
with high quality managers allow them to exercise more discretion in financial reporting. 
In this case, they use accrual earnings management to improve the perception about 
their abilities and earn high imminent rewards without influencing the long-term 
performance of their firms (Narayanan, 1985; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Graham et 
al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008; Ronen and Yaari, 2008; Demerjian et al., 2013b). 
Meanwhile, the results in Appendix C Table VII show that market competition plays a 
role in changing the behaviour of managers in utilising earnings management as 
evidenced in the coefficients of its three proxies. Information-driven comparisons  
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Table 8.6 The moderating role of market competition in the relation between managerial ability and accrual 
earnings management (AccrualEM) 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Accrual earnings management 
    
MgrlAbilityit  1.474*** 1.507*** 1.223*** 
HHIit -0.041*** - - 
ProdSubstitutabilityit - 0.069*** - 
PricPowerit - - -0.134*** 
EarningsManagementi,t-1  -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.108*** 
FirmSizeit  0.105*** 0.094*** 0.089*** 
SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t  0.225*** 0.256*** 0.230*** 
CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t  0.090*** 0.084*** 0.058*** 
OperCyclei,t-4,t 0.039*** 0.012** 0.020*** 
Lossesi,t-4,t  0.093*** 0.055*** 0.153*** 
NationalAuditorit  0.056*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
LitigationIndit  -0.169*** -0.094*** -0.095*** 
MBit  2.65e-05*** 5.88e-05*** 5.26e-05*** 
SalesGrowthrkit  -0.610*** -0.621*** -0.672*** 
LnNumAnalystit  0.047*** 0.057*** 0.089*** 
IndRev%  -0.390*** -0.484*** -0.504*** 
Momentumit  0.409*** 0.396*** 0.331*** 
Segmentsit  -0.107*** -0.085*** -0.093*** 
Foreignit  -0.213*** -0.065*** -0.020 
GFCit  -0.272*** -0.270*** -0.564*** 
Dot-Comit  -0.108*** -0.172*** -0.420*** 
SOXit  -0.153*** -0.061** -0.460*** 
(HHIit)MgrlAbilityit  0.103*** - - 
(ProdSubstitutabilityit)MgrlAbilityit  - 0.202*** - 
(PricPowerit)MgrlAbilityit  - - 0.646*** 
t  52.426 51.892 49.607 
Hansen  1,696.560 1,672.400 1,698.560 
m1  -17.840 -18.040 -17.850 
m2  -1.200 -0.970 -1.050 
z1 3,417.130 13,936.510 8,792.840 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the effect of 
market competition on the relation between managerial ability and accrual earnings management. The sample 
includes 66,695 firm-year observations obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Accrual earnings management 
is measured by Stubben’s Model (2010). Managerial ability is measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012). 
Each column represents the estimates from examining a dummy measure of market competition in the following 
order: (1) market concentration measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), (2) product substitutability 
measured by the gross margin in the industry, and (3) pricing power measured by the industry adjusted Lerner Index 
(LI). HHI is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where market concentration is lower than the 
median and zero otherwise. ProdSubstitutability is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where 
product substitutability is lower than the median and zero otherwise. PricPower is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the firm has lower pricing power than the median and zero otherwise. Variables are defined in detail in the (Variable 
Definitions) section above. Each coefficient represents the change in accrual earnings management based on a one 
unit change in the determinant. The t values of the linear restriction tests (LRT) reflect the joint significance of the 
explanatory and moderating variables. The test is performed under the null hypothesis Ho:∝1+β1=0. Hansen test for 
over-identifying restrictions takes the shape of χ2  distribution and checks for the orthogonality between the 
instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test (Arellano and Bond, 1991) examines the serial 
correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and takes the shape of a normal distribution 
with N(0,1). m1 values represent the results of the 1st order serial correlation test, while m2 values represent the 
results of the 2nd order serial correlation test. The Wald test (z1) checks for the joint significance of the reported 
coefficients in the model. The table also shows evidence about the dynamic behaviour of accrual earnings 
management in the fifth row. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01, respectively. 
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impose higher expectations on managers to beat rivals’ earnings and, therefore, make 
communications more costly between managers and shareholders. In this setting, 
managers tend to accept more risk to keep pace with the behaviour of other aggressive 
competitors. The results imply that competition drives adverse selection and encourages 
opportunistic managerial behaviour. 
The fact that superior managers use accrual earnings management in the face of 
increased competition as presented in Table 8.6 is telling. Accrual earnings management 
is less costly to shareholders as it does not affect the underlying business and its future 
cash flows. Moreover, it is less costly for managers as it will allow short-term targets to 
be met in the current period i.e. bonuses, but also lowers the risk of missing targets in 
future periods. The results extend the previous work of Dalia and Park (2009), 
Markarian and Santalo (2010), Karuna et al. (2012), and Datta et al. (2013) by showing 
that all managers, including high quality ones, tend to manage more accruals under the 
pressure of competition. 
 
8.5.2 Managerial Ability, Market Competition and Real Earnings Management 
The results show that competition plays a moderating role in the relation between 
managerial ability and real earnings management. Table 8.7, column (1) shows that the 
coefficient of superior managers who use real earnings management in less concentrated 
markets (∝1+β1=-0.123-0.163=-0.286) is lower than that in more concentrated markets 
(∝1=-0.123). Column (2) shows that the coefficient in industries with higher product 
substitutability (∝1+β1=-0.145-0.308=-0.453) is lower than that in industries with fewer 
substitutes (∝1=-0.145). Column (3) shows that the coefficient in firms with less pricing 
power (∝1+β1 =-0.136-0.167=-0.303) is lower than that in other firms (∝1 =-0.136). 
Finally, the t  values of the linear restriction test (LRT) in Table 8.7 show that the 
combined effects of market competition and managerial ability on real earnings 
management are significantly different from zero. Once more, the previous results 
support hypothesis H1b of this chapter. Similar results are obtained by using the 
Roychowdhury’s Model (2006) as shown in Appendix C Table II and the OLS 
estimator as shown in Appendix C Table IV. 
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Table 8.7 The moderating role of market competition in the relation between managerial ability and real 
earnings management (RealEM) 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Real earnings management  
    
MgrlAbilityit -0.123*** -0.145*** -0.136*** 
HHIit -0.070*** - - 
ProdSubstitutabilityit - -0.031*** - 
PricPowerit - - 0.082*** 
EarningsManagementi,t-1 0.295*** 0.290*** 0.291*** 
FirmSizeit 0.064*** 0.052*** 0.076*** 
SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t 0.302*** 0.249*** 0.257*** 
CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t 0.036*** 0.052*** 0.039*** 
OperCyclei,t-4,t 0.011*** 0.005** 0.003 
Lossesi,t-4,t -0.093*** -0.007 -0.077*** 
NationalAuditorit 0.187*** 0.181*** 0.201*** 
LitigationIndit 0.218*** 0.188*** 0.175*** 
MBit 2.97e-05*** 1.51e-05*** 2.33e-05*** 
SalesGrowthrkit 0.011** 0.029*** 0.038*** 
LnNumAnalystit 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.041*** 
IndRev% -0.127*** -0.124*** -0.026* 
Momentumit -0.178*** -0.100*** -0.133*** 
Segmentsit -0.027*** -0.018** -0.028*** 
Foreignit 0.177*** 0.228*** 0.152*** 
GFCit -0.179*** -0.169*** -0.493*** 
Dot-Comit -0.117*** -0.076*** -0.370*** 
SOXit -0.111*** -0.093*** -0.395*** 
(HHIit)MgrlAbilityit -0.163*** - - 
(ProdSubstitutabilityit)MgrlAbilityit - -0.308*** - 
(PricPowerit)MgrlAbilityit - - -0.167*** 
t  -12.205 -10.987 -3.139 
Hansen  1,723.230 1,736.200 1,731.640 
m1  -14.250 -14.220 -14.300 
m2 1.030 0.990 1.080 
z1 8,414.850 10,021.850 9,691.780 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the effect of 
market competition on the relation between managerial ability and real earnings management. The sample includes 
66,695 firm-year observations obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Real earnings management is measured 
by Gunny’s Model (2010). Managerial ability is measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012). Each column 
represents the estimates from examining a dummy measure of market competition in the following order: (1) market 
concentration measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), (2) product substitutability measured by the gross 
margin in the industry, and (3) pricing power measured by the industry adjusted Lerner Index (LI). HHI is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where market concentration is lower than the median and zero 
otherwise. ProdSubstitutability  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where product 
substitutability is lower than the median and zero otherwise. PricPower is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm 
has lower pricing power than the median and zero otherwise. Variables are defined in detail in the (Variable 
Definitions) section above. Each coefficient represents the change in real earnings management based on a one unit 
change in the determinant. The t values of the linear restriction tests (LRT) reflect the joint significance of the 
explanatory and moderating variables. The test is performed under the null hypothesis Ho:∝1+β1=0. Hansen test for 
over-identifying restrictions takes the shape of χ2  distribution and checks for the orthogonality between the 
instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test (Arellano and Bond, 1991) examines the serial 
correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and takes the shape of a normal distribution 
with N(0,1). m1 values represent the results of the 1st order serial correlation test, while m2 values represent the 
results of the 2nd order serial correlation test. The Wald test (z1) checks for the joint significance of the reported 
coefficients in the model. The table also displays evidence about the dynamic behaviour of real earnings management 
in the fifth row. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively. 
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The individual average effect of managerial ability on real earnings management 
appears in Appendix C Table VI as Table 8.7 presents the conditional effects only. 
Lower levels of monitoring by shareholders allow managers greater flexibility. 
However, real earnings management activities, while harder to detect in the short-run, 
are detrimental to the sustainability and performance of the firm as they have long-run 
economic consequences for the business (Graham et al., 2005; Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2007; Cohen et al., 2008). Therefore, managers with higher levels of ability do 
not undertake such activities, as they are detrimental to their long-term compensation 
and labour market value. The results show how high quality managers link their own 
interests and shareholder wealth in the long-run. Similar to Karuna et al. (2012), 
Appendix C Table VIII confirm the role market competition plays in imposing higher 
pressure on managers to beat rivals’ earnings and driving adverse selection. 
Given the influence of competition as appears in Table 8.6 and Table 8.7, the 
results provide evidence that while high quality managers respond to increased market 
competition by relying on accrual earnings management, they avoid costly real earnings 
management. In this sense, they balance the short-term and long-term benefits of their 
earnings management decisions based on their insight and superior competencies. The 
results extend those of Karuna et al. (2012) by excluding high quality managers from 
using real earning management as a response to competition pressure.  
 
8.5.3 Comparison of Competition Measures 
To compare the explanatory power of the competition measures I calculate their 
individual elasticity indices (EI). As Tables 8.6 and 8.7 show, all the competition 
measures have significant coefficients. This test, however, helps to identify which 
measure is the most restrictive with regards to earnings management. I present the 






Where, EICompetition is the elasticity index of a specific competition measure, hMgrlAbility  
is the elasticity of managerial ability variable, hCompetition is the elasticity of a specific 
competition measure, and ∑ h  is the sum of all explanatory variables’ elasticities. I 
Chapter 8  





calculate elasticity (h) as hk=bk
xk
b̀x
 , where k is the variable of interest, bkis its coefficient, 
xk  is its mean, and b̀x  is the expected value of the dependent variable obtained by 
multiplying the coefficient of each explanatory variable by its mean. 
The results show that product substitutability has the highest elasticity index for 
its moderating effect on both accrual and real earnings management. Among the three 
competition measures I cover, product substitutability is the strongest driver of superior 
managers in manipulating accruals [Highest index EI= 0.577 in Table 8.8] and has the 
strongest mitigating effect on real earnings management by more able managers 
[Highest index EI= 0.395 in Table 8.8]. 
 
Table 8.8 Elasticity Indices 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
AccrualEM 0.490 0.577 0.426 
RealEM 0.215 0.395 0.343 
Notes: This table presents the individual elasticity indices (EI) of the competition measures identified in this chapter. 
The sample includes 66,695 firm-year observations obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. EI is calculated as 
the sum of the elasticities of the main explanatory variable (managerial ability) and the moderating variable (market 
competition) divided by the total elasticities of all the variables identified in the model, as explained in the 
(Comparison of competition measures) section above. EIs assist in comparing the explanatory power of competition 
measures. Each column represents the estimates from examining one measure of market competition in the following 
order: (1) market concentration measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), (2) product substitutability 
measured by the gross margin in the industry, and (3) pricing power measured by the industry adjusted Lerner Index 
(LI). 
 
8.6 Additional Analysis 
8.6.1 Comparing the Effect of Managerial Ability on Earnings Management 
between High and Low Competition Settings 
Although the GMM estimator used earlier in the methodology section solves for the 
problem of heterogeneity, in this section I control for the correlation between market 
competition and managerial ability that may influence the results. As more competitive 
markets are more likely to attract high quality managers and vice versa, I divide the 
sample into a subsample of high competition and another of low competition. Based on 
the first proxy of market competition, observations with "HHI" lower than the median 
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are considered in the high competition subsample, and in the low competition 
subsample otherwise. Under the second proxy of market competition, observations with 
"ProdSubstitutability" lower than the median are considered in the high competition 
subsample, and in the low competition subsample otherwise. Under the third proxy of 
market competition, observations with "PricPower" lower than the median are 
considered in the high competition subsample, and in the low competition subsample 
otherwise. 
To generate two comparable subsamples under each of the previous proxies, I 
exclude the extreme values of managerial ability that exist under the normal distribution 
of high or low levels of competition by trimming at 1%. To make sure that the 
subsamples are comparable, I perform the t-test for the differences between means and 
confirm that the results are not significant. When combining the high and low 
competition subsamples, the sample size for each of the previous three proxies of 
competition include 57,040, 56,886, and 59,516 firm-year observations respectively. 
Finally, I perform the system generalized method of moments regressions for the 
effect of managerial ability on accrual earnings management and real earnings 





                                        +∝3FirmSizeit+∝4SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t   
                                 +∝5CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t +∝6OperCyclei,t-4,t  
                                        +∝7Lossesi,t-4,t+∝8NationalAuditorit  
                                        +∝9SalesGrowthrkit+∝10MBit+∝11LitigationIndit  
                                        +∝12LnNumAnalystit+∝13IndRev%+∝14Momentumit  
                                        +∝15Segmentsit+∝16Foreignit+∝17GFCit  
                                        +∝18Dot-Comit+∝19SOXit+ɳi+dt+ʋit  
(8.8) 
The results appear in tables 8.9 and 8.10 and confirm the previous findings. Superior 
managers use more accrual earnings management in more competitive markets as the 
coefficients of managerial ability variable are higher than those under less competition 
in table 8.9. The results also show that while high quality managers avoid real earnings 
management under high levels of competition, they tend to use more of this costly 
activity in less competitive markets as appears in the coefficients of managerial ability 
variable in table 8.10. The results again support the two hypotheses of this chapter. 
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Table 8.9 The effect of managerial ability on accrual earnings management (AccrualEM) conditional on 
competition 














       
MgrlAbilityit 0.870*** 0.660*** 0.714*** 0.654*** 0.868*** 0.565*** 
AccrualEMi,t-1 -0.170*** -0.142*** -0.140*** -0.162*** -0.191*** -0.094*** 
FirmSizeit  0.098*** 0.086*** 0.068*** 0.116*** 0.182*** -0.048*** 
SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t  0.157*** 0.282*** 0.161*** 0.009*** 0.112*** 0.103*** 
CFVolatilityi,t-4,t  0.096*** 0.121*** 0.004*** 1.522*** 1.338*** 0.037*** 
OperCyclei,t-4,t 0.035*** 0.140*** 0.086*** 0.008*** 0.021*** 0.108*** 
Lossesi,t-4,t  -0.055*** -0.032*** 0.001 -0.113*** 0.359*** -0.116*** 
NationalAuditorit  -0.088*** 0.167*** -0.005** 0.114*** 0.248*** -0.254*** 
LitigationIndit  0.071*** -0.115*** 0.113*** -0.159*** -0.014 0.107*** 
MBit  0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.002*** 
SalesGrowthrkit  -0.606*** -0.555*** -0.592*** -0.639*** -0.615*** -0.642*** 
LnNumAnalystit  0.094*** 0.084*** 0.080*** 0.048*** -0.002** 0.160*** 
IndRev%  -1.557*** -0.524*** -0.545*** -0.986*** 0.170*** -0.624*** 
Momentumit  0.186*** 0.445*** 0.437*** 0.108*** 0.496*** 0.195*** 
Segmentsit  -0.099*** -0.084*** -0.094*** -0.183*** -0.136*** 0.075*** 
Foreignit  -0.217*** -0.195*** -0.155*** 0.045*** -0.011** -0.192*** 
GFCit  0.052*** 0.177*** 0.039*** -0.488*** -0.377*** 0.042*** 
Dot-Comit  0.190*** 0.166*** -0.070*** -0.460*** -0.141*** -0.103*** 
SOXit  0.103*** 0.133*** 0.017*** -0.406*** -0.266*** -0.021*** 
Observations 27,538 29,502 28,959 27,927 29,904 29,612 
Hansen 1,145.730 1,005.340 958.550 1,099.750 1,026.620 1,118.230 
m1 -12.570 -11.880 -11.960 -11.760 -10.120 -14.200 
m2 -1.690 -0.910 0.210 -1.630 -1.230 -1.140 
z1 2.2e+06 65,008.940 2.1e+05 3.5e+05 1.1e+06 1.1e+06 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the effect of 
managerial ability on accrual earnings management based on the level of different proxies of market competition in 
the following order: (1) market concentration measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), (2) product 
substitutability measured by the gross margin in the industry, and (3) pricing power measured by the industry 
adjusted Lerner Index (LI). Under each of the previous three proxies of competition, I divide the sample into a 
subsample of high competition and another of low competition. Based on the first proxy of market competition, 
observations with HHI lower than the median are considered in the high competition subsample, and in the low 
competition subsample otherwise. Under the second proxy of market competition, observations with 
ProdSubstitutability  lower than the median are considered in the high competition subsample, and in the low 
competition subsample otherwise. Under the third proxy of market competition, observations with PricPower lower 
than the median are considered in the high competition subsample, and in the low competition subsample otherwise. I 
trim each subsample at 1% level to exclude the extreme values of managerial ability that might exist under high or 
low levels of competition. When combining the high and low competition subsamples, the sample size for each of the 
previous three proxies of competition include 57,040, 56,886, and 59,516 firm-year observations respectively, 
obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. To make sure that the subsamples are comparable, I perform the t-test 
for the differences between means and make sure that the results are not significant. Accrual earnings management is 
measured by Stubben’s Model (2010). Managerial ability is measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012). 
Variables are defined in detail in the (Variable Definitions) section above. Each coefficient represents the change in 
accrual earnings management based on a one unit change in the determinant. Hansen test for over-identifying 
restrictions takes the shape of χ2 distribution and checks for the orthogonality between the instrumental variables 
(IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test (Arellano and Bond, 1991) examines the serial correlation in the first 
difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and takes the shape of a normal distribution with N(0,1). m1 values 
represent the results of the 1st order serial correlation test, while m2 values represent the results of the 2nd order 
serial correlation test. The Wald test (z1) checks for the joint significance of the reported coefficients in the model. 
The table also displays evidence about the dynamic behaviour of accrual earnings management in the second row. 
Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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Table 8.10 The effect of managerial ability on real earnings management (RealEM) conditional on competition 














       
MgrlAbilityit -0.226*** 0.048*** -0.263*** 0.123*** -0.312*** 0.078*** 
RealEMi,t-1 0.364*** 0.160*** 0.296*** 0.239*** 0.304*** 0.256*** 
FirmSizeit  0.045*** 0.058*** 0.058*** -0.009*** 0.109*** 0.009*** 
SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t  0.124*** 0.134*** 0.372*** 0.079*** 0.203*** 0.133*** 
CFVolatilityi,t-4,t  0.055*** 0.223*** 0.074*** 0.066*** 0.290*** 0.033*** 
OperCyclei,t-4,t -0.005*** 0.088*** -0.030*** 0.184*** -0.006*** 0.074*** 
Lossesi,t-4,t  -0.182*** -0.062*** -0.051*** -0.115*** -0.091*** -0.096*** 
NationalAuditorit  0.117*** 0.010*** 0.224*** 0.019*** 0.138*** 0.072*** 
LitigationIndit  0.096*** 0.239*** 0.031*** 0.265*** 0.041** 0.172*** 
MBit  0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SalesGrowthrkit  0.049*** 0.041*** 0.071*** 0.083*** 0.009*** 0.118*** 
LnNumAnalystit  0.049*** 0.027*** 0.012*** 0.142*** -0.095*** 0.074*** 
IndRev%  -0.431*** -0.026*** 0.132*** 0.139*** -0.526*** 0.193*** 
Momentumit  -0.046*** 0.024*** 0.007*** -0.074*** -0.219*** -0.003*** 
Segmentsit  -0.010*** 0.000 -0.021*** 0.021*** 0.197*** -0.092*** 
Foreignit  0.194*** -0.049*** 0.103*** 0.071*** 0.098*** 0.031*** 
GFCit  -0.011*** -0.084*** 0.023*** -0.010*** -0.168*** 0.053*** 
Dot-Comit  0.026*** 0.007*** 0.082*** -0.075*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 
SOXit  0.134*** 0.025*** 0.205*** -0.005*** 0.095*** 0.049*** 
Observations 27,538 29,502 28,959 27,927 29,904 29,612 
Hansen 1,168.640 1,027.720 1,120.570 976.190 1,074.200 1,168.160 
m1 -12.300 -9.940 -11.570 -10.670 -10.180 -12.210 
m2 1.150 1.540 1.590 0.040 1.220 0.720 
z1 2.9e+06 1.1e+05 1.4e+06 4.8e+05 5.3e+05 2.4e+06 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the effect of 
managerial ability on real earnings management based on the level of different proxies of market competition in the 
following order: (1) market concentration measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), (2) product 
substitutability measured by the gross margin in the industry, and (3) pricing power measured by the industry 
adjusted Lerner Index (LI). Under each of the previous three proxies of competition, I divide the sample into a 
subsample of high competition and another of low competition. Based on the first proxy of market competition, 
observations with HHI lower than the median are considered in the high competition subsample, and in the low 
competition subsample otherwise. Under the second proxy of market competition, observations with 
ProdSubstitutability  lower than the median are considered in the high competition subsample, and in the low 
competition subsample otherwise. Under the third proxy of market competition, observations with PricPower lower 
than the median are considered in the high competition subsample, and in the low competition subsample otherwise. I 
trim each subsample at 1% level to exclude the extreme values of managerial ability that might exist under high or 
low levels of competition. When combining the high and low competition subsamples, the sample size for each of the 
previous three proxies of competition include 57,040, 56,886, and 59,516 firm-year observations respectively, 
obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. To make sure that the subsamples are comparable, I perform the t-test 
for the differences between means and make sure that the results are not significant. Real earnings management is 
measured by Gunny’s Model (2010). Managerial ability is measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012). 
Variables are defined in detail in the (Variable Definitions) section above. Each coefficient represents the change in 
real earnings management based on a one unit change in the determinant. Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions 
takes the shape of χ2 distribution and checks for the orthogonality between the instrumental variables (IVit) and the 
error term (εit). The AB test (Arellano and Bond, 1991) examines the serial correlation in the first difference residual 
(ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and takes the shape of a normal distribution with N(0,1). m1 values represent the 
results of the 1st order serial correlation test, while m2 values represent the results of the 2nd order serial correlation 
test. The Wald test (z1) checks for the joint significance of the reported coefficients in the model. The table also 
displays evidence about the dynamic behaviour of real earnings management in the second row. Intercept is included, 
but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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8.6.2 Earnings Smoothing, Managerial Ability, and Market Competition 
Earnings smoothing is another way that management may seek to improve the earnings 
of the firm. I therefore examine the effect of market competition on earnings smoothed 
by high quality managers.  Earnings smoothing may improve the informativeness of 
earnings when managers try to reduce current high earnings numbers under the 
expectation of a decrease in future earnings, and vice versa. In this sense, earnings 
smoothing makes future earnings more predictable to shareholders. Nevertheless, 
managers may opportunistically smooth earnings in order to hide bad news in the 
current period, the result of which will be worse earnings numbers in the future when 
performance does not improve (Dalia and Park, 2009).    
Based on Hunt et al. (1997) and Pincus and Rajgopal (2002), I calculate the 
earnings smoothing ratio as the standard deviation of pre-managed earnings to the 
standard deviation of reported earnings over at least three of the last five years. Pre-
managed earnings are calculated as non-discretionary accruals from the Modified Jones 
Model (1995) added to the cash flows from operating activities minus extra-ordinary 
items and discontinued operations.  
I start by examining the effect of managerial ability on earnings smoothing 
under low market competition and find that managerial ability has a significant negative 
effect on earnings smoothing. The results appear in the first row of Table 8.11 and show 
managers with higher levels of ability avoid smoothing earnings when competition is 
low in the market. This is consistent with the lack of earnings management motive in 
the absence of competition especially that managers with higher abilities are aware of 
the reputational costs they would incur if the decline in earnings does not reverse in 
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Table 8.11 The moderating role of market competition in the relation between managerial ability and earnings 
smoothing  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Earnings smoothing 
    
MgrlAbilityit  -0. 138*** -0.265*** -0.175*** 
HHIit 0.057*** - - 
ProdSubstitutabilityit - 0.566*** - 
PricPowerit - - 0.000*** 
Smoothingi,t-5  0.389*** 0.391*** 0.393*** 
FirmSizeit  -0.072*** -0.083*** -0.061*** 
SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t  -0.762*** -0.832*** -0.831*** 
CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t  1.862*** 1.924*** 1.948*** 
OperCyclei,t-4,t -0.122*** -0.120*** -0.108*** 
Lossesi,t-4,t  -1.223*** -1.266*** -1.233*** 
NationalAuditorit  -0.133*** -0.090*** -0.111*** 
LitigationIndit  0.100*** 0.073*** -0.015*** 
MBit  6.16e-05*** 5.48e-05*** 2.93e-05*** 
SalesGrowthrkit  0.090*** 0.090*** 0.102*** 
LnNumAnalystit  -0.210*** -0.210*** -0.208*** 
IndRev%  1.413*** 1.550*** 1.261*** 
Momentumit  -0.100*** -0.114*** -0.136*** 
Segmentsit  -0.063*** -0.053*** -0.018*** 
Foreignit  -0.187*** -0.218*** -0.300*** 
GFCit  2.613*** 0.234*** 0.506*** 
Dot-Comit  2.414*** 0.000 0.047*** 
SOXit  2.470*** 0.114*** 0.047*** 
(HHIit)MgrlAbilityit  0.213*** - - 
(ProdSubstitutabilityit)MgrlAbilityit  - 0.434*** - 
(PricPowerit)MgrlAbilityit  - - 0.380*** 
t  85.185 111.261 111.638 
Hansen  1,705.400 1,701.510 1,716.710 
m1  -4.200 -4.190 -4.200 
m2  0.210 0.200 0.230 
z1 4.0e+07 5.9e+06 6.2e+06 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the effect of 
market competition on the relation between managerial ability and earnings smoothing. The sample includes 66,695 
firm-year observations obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Earnings smoothing is calculated as the standard 
deviation of pre-managed earnings to the standard deviation of reported earnings over at least three of the last five 
years, as described in the (Additional analysis) section above. Managerial ability is measured by the model of 
Demerjian et al. (2012). Each column represents the estimates from examining a dummy measure of market 
competition in the following order: (1) market concentration measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), (2) 
product substitutability measured by the gross margin in the industry, and (3) pricing power measured by the industry 
adjusted Lerner Index (LI). HHI is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where market 
concentration is lower than the median and zero otherwise. ProdSubstitutability is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the firm is in an industry where product substitutability is lower than the median and zero otherwise. PricPower is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has lower pricing power than the median and zero otherwise. Variables are 
defined in detail in the (Variable Definitions) section above. Each coefficient represents the change in earnings 
smoothing ratio based on a one unit change in the determinant. The t values of the linear restriction tests (LRT) 
reflect the joint significance of the explanatory and moderating variables. The test is performed under the null 
hypothesis Ho:∝1+β1=0. Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions takes the shape of χ
2 distribution and checks for 
the orthogonality between the instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test (Arellano and Bond, 
1991) examines the serial correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and takes the shape 
of a normal distribution with N(0,1). m1 values represent the results of the 1st order serial correlation test, while m2 
values represent the results of the 2nd order serial correlation test. The Wald test (z1) checks for the joint significance 
of the reported coefficients in the model. The table also displays evidence about the dynamic behaviour of earnings 
smoothing in the fifth row. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01, respectively. 
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Next, I incorporate the effect of high market competition into the relationship between 
managerial ability and earnings smoothing. The results here show a positive moderating 
role of market competition on the relation between managerial ability and earnings 
smoothing. Table 8.11, column (1) shows that the coefficient of superior managers who 
smooth earnings in less concentrated markets (∝1+β1=-0.138+0.213=0.075) is higher 
than that in more concentrated markets (∝1=-0.138). Column (2) shows that the same 
coefficient in industries with higher product substitutability ( ∝1+β1 =-
0.265+0.434=0.169) is more than that in industries with fewer substitutes (∝1=-0.265). 
Column (3) shows that the coefficient in firms with less pricing power ( ∝1+β1 =-
0.175+0.380=0.205) is higher than that in other firms (∝1=-0.175). Finally, the 𝑡 values 
of the linear restriction tests (LRT) in Table 8.11 show that the combined effects of 
market competition and managerial ability on earnings smoothing are overall 
significantly different from zero. These results confirm the major finding of this chapter 
that market competition changes the behaviour of high quality managers when 
undertaking earnings management by driving earnings smoothing in this case. 
 
8.6.3 Additional Control Variables 
As corporate governance influences earnings management (Duh et al., 2009; Feng et al., 
2009; Jaggi et al., 2009; Prencipe and Bar-Yosef, 2011; Demerjian et al., 2013a), I 
perform the previous regressions once more using additional controls for corporate 
governance. I add three control variables which I obtain form Execuocomp database.49 I 
use a dummy for executives who serve as directors (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑖𝑟) which equals 1 if the 
executive served as director during the year. I also use the executive tenure (𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒) 
calculated as the log of the executive tenure measured in days. Finally, I add the number 
of board meeting (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑀𝑡𝑔𝑠) held during the year (Adut et al., 2013). The previous 
variables, however, are only available from 1992 to 2006 and, therefore, I cover only 
this period in this additional test. As a result, I end up with 42,183 observations. The 
results emphasize the previous findings related to the moderating effect of market 
                                            
49 Data generously provided by Francesco Vallascas and Paula Castro. 
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competition on earnings management behaviour of superior managers. The results, 
however, are not tabulated in this thesis. 
 
8.7 Conclusions  
In this chapter, I examine the role of market competition in moderating the relation 
between managerial ability and earnings management. I build the core question of this 
chapter based on the expectation that the communication of information in more 
competitive markets contributes to further discipline the behaviour of high quality 
managers. Firstly, I find that superior managers use more of the less costly accrual 
earnings management and less of the more costly real earnings management in facing 
competition. The results provide another evidence on the substitutability of earnings 
management activities.  
Secondly, although market competition can individually drive both accrual and 
real earnings management activities, it contributes to mitigating real earnings 
management behaviour of high quality managers. In other words, high quality managers 
use their superior competencies to manage earnings more wisely under the pressure of 
competition. Therefore, high managerial skills and strong market competition may serve 
together as alternative forms of governance mechanisms by preventing the firms from 
costly activities in the future.  
Finally, this chapter emphasizes the importance of understanding the different 
motives of earnings management at a time to get a better vision of management 
decisions in reality. I particularly provide evidence on how industry level factors 
influence management decisions at the firm level and thus show the interaction between 
the external and contracting motives of earnings management.  For future research, 
further factors might be selected at different levels to examine how they interact in 
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Appendix C Table I The moderating role of market competition in the relation between managerial ability and 
accrual earnings management (AccrualEM) 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Accrual earnings management 
    
MgrlAbilityit  1.233*** 1.072*** 1.005*** 
HHIit -0.030*** - - 
ProdSubstitutabilityit - 0.039*** - 
PricPowerit - - -0.193*** 
EarningsManagementi,t-1  0.035*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
FirmSizeit  0.026*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t  0.056*** -0.010 0.057*** 
CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t  0.097*** 0.050*** 0.032*** 
OperCyclei,t-4,t 0.001 0.026*** -0.008 
Lossesi,t-4,t  -0.100*** -0.209*** -0.097*** 
NationalAuditorit  0.152*** 0.170*** 0.173*** 
LitigationIndit  0.069*** -0.010 -0.000 
MBit  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SalesGrowthrkit  -0.242*** -0.256*** -0.297*** 
LnNumAnalystit  -0.043*** -0.022*** -0.017*** 
IndRev%  -0.163*** -0.210*** -0.285*** 
Momentumit  0.349*** 0.299*** 0.274*** 
Segmentsit  -0.077*** -0.076*** -0.051*** 
Foreignit  -0.014 0.083*** -0.008 
GFCit  -0.120*** 0.082*** 0.060*** 
Dot-Comit  0.011 0.062*** 0.196*** 
SOXit  -0.087** 0.190*** 0.204*** 
(HHIit)MgrlAbilityit  0.127*** - - 
(ProdSubstitutabilityit)MgrlAbilityit  - 0.855*** - 
(PricPowerit)MgrlAbilityit  - - 0.457*** 
t  50.428 39.908 37.839 
Hansen  1,692.500 1,687.180 1,715.820 
m1  -20.850 -20.830 -20.920 
m2  -0.680 -0.580 -0.540 
z1 1,967.600 3,354.900 4,930.200 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the effect of 
market competition on the relation between managerial ability and accrual earnings management. The sample 
includes 66,695 firm-year observations obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Accrual earnings management 
is measured by Modified Jones’ Model (1995). Managerial ability is measured by the model of Demerjian et al. 
(2012). Each column represents the estimates from examining a dummy measure of market competition in the 
following order: (1) market concentration measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), (2) product 
substitutability measured by the gross margin in the industry, and (3) pricing power measured by the industry 
adjusted Lerner Index (LI). HHI is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where market 
concentration is lower than the median and zero otherwise. ProdSubstitutability is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the firm is in an industry where product substitutability is lower than the median and zero otherwise. PricPower is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has lower pricing power than the median and zero otherwise. Variables are 
defined in detail in the (Variable Definitions) section above. The t values of the linear restriction tests (LRT) reflect 
the joint significance of the explanatory and moderating variables. The test is performed under the null hypothesis 
Ho:∝1+β1=0. Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions takes the shape of χ
2  distribution and checks for the 
orthogonality between the instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test (Arellano and Bond, 
1991) examines the serial correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and takes the shape 
of a normal distribution with N(0,1). m1 values represent the results of the 1st order serial correlation test, while m2 
values represent the results of the 2nd order serial correlation test. The Wald test (z1) checks for the joint significance 
of the reported coefficients in the model. The table also displays evidence about the dynamic behaviour of accrual 
earnings management in the fifth row. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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Appendix C Table II The moderating role of market competition in the relation between managerial ability 
and real earnings management (RealEM) 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Real earnings management  
    
MgrlAbilityit -0.508*** -0.516*** -0.468*** 
HHIit -0.053*** - - 
ProdSubstitutabilityit - -0.007*** - 
PricPowerit - - -0.027*** 
EarningsManagementi,t-1 0.567*** 0.566*** 0.568*** 
FirmSizeit 0.178*** 0.174*** 0.184*** 
SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t 0.185*** 0.229*** 0.167*** 
CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t 0.104*** 0.119*** 0.101*** 
OperCyclei,t-4,t 0.046*** 0.061*** 0.059*** 
Lossesi,t-4,t 0.168*** 0.148*** 0.177*** 
NationalAuditorit 0.079*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
LitigationIndit -0.143*** -0.070*** -0.143*** 
MBit 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SalesGrowthrkit 0.195*** 0.197*** 0.190*** 
LnNumAnalystit 0.065*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 
IndRev% -0.924*** -0.923*** -0.943*** 
Momentumit 0.275*** 0.283*** 0.294*** 
Segmentsit -0.084*** -0.068*** -0.082*** 
Foreignit 0.029** 0.039*** 0.110*** 
GFCit 0.044*** -1.646*** -0.293*** 
Dot-Comit 0.170*** -1.604*** -0.230*** 
SOXit 0.157*** -1.549*** -0.189*** 
(HHIit)MgrlAbilityit -0.006 - - 
(ProdSubstitutabilityit)MgrlAbilityit - -0.089*** - 
(PricPowerit)MgrlAbilityit - - -0.125*** 
t  -49.469 -36.473 -42.602 
Hansen  1,731.660 1,755.180 1,727.840 
m1  -10.360 -10.350 -10.270 
m2 0.690 0.850 0.800 
z1 22,770.440 33,300.670 14,569.600 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the effect of 
market competition on the relation between managerial ability and real earnings management. The sample includes 
66,695 firm-year observations obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Real earnings management is measured 
by Roychowdhury’s Model (2006). Managerial ability is measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012). Each 
column represents the estimates from examining a dummy measure of market competition in the following order: (1) 
market concentration measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), (2) product substitutability measured by 
the gross margin in the industry, and (3) pricing power measured by the industry adjusted Lerner Index (LI). HHI is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where market concentration is lower than the median and 
zero otherwise. ProdSubstitutability is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where product 
substitutability is lower than the median and zero otherwise. PricPower is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm 
has lower pricing power than the median and zero otherwise. Variables are defined in detail in the (Variable 
Definitions) section above. Each coefficient represents the change in real earnings management based on a one unit 
change in the determinant. The t values of the linear restriction tests (LRT) reflect the joint significance of the 
explanatory and moderating variables. The test is performed under the null hypothesis Ho:∝1+β1=0. Hansen test for 
over-identifying restrictions takes the shape of χ2  distribution and checks for the orthogonality between the 
instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test (Arellano and Bond, 1991) examines the serial 
correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and takes the shape of a normal distribution 
with N(0,1). m1 values represent the results of the 1st order serial correlation test, while m2 values represent the 
results of the 2nd order serial correlation test. The Wald test (z1) checks for the joint significance of the reported 
coefficients in the model. The table also displays evidence about the dynamic behaviour of real earnings management 
in the fifth row. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively. 
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Appendix C Table III The moderating role of market competition in the relation between managerial ability 
and accrual earnings management (AccrualEM) 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Accrual earnings management 
    
MgrlAbilityit  0.498*** 0.387*** 0.236*** 
HHIit -0.025 - - 
ProdSubstitutabilityit - 0.044** - 
PricPowerit - - -0.131*** 
EarningsManagementi,t-1  -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.089*** 
FirmSizeit  0.004 0.005 -0.001 
SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t  -0.069 -0.081 -0.064 
CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t  0.091 0.093 0.084 
OperCyclei,t-4,t 0.019 0.019 0.024* 
Lossesi,t-4,t  -0.016 -0.007 0.070* 
NationalAuditorit  0.041 0.043 0.041 
LitigationIndit  0.028 0.004 0.009 
MBit  2.13e-05 3.83e-05 2.42e-05 
SalesGrowthrkit  -0.502*** -0.503*** -0.537*** 
LnNumAnalystit  0.067*** 0.069*** 0.075*** 
IndRev%  -0.196** -0.190** -0.208** 
Momentumit  0.178*** 0.183*** 0.167*** 
Segmentsit  0.006 0.000 0.003 
Foreignit  0.026 0.025 0.024 
GFCit  -0.017 -0.078 -0.074 
Dot-Comit  -0.056 -0.053 -0.051 
SOXit  -0.003 -0.079 -0.084 
(HHIit)MgrlAbilityit  0.078 - - 
(ProdSubstitutabilityit)MgrlAbilityit  - 0.222* - 
(PricPowerit)MgrlAbilityit  - - 0.469*** 
t  4.582 9.788 17.687 
R2 0.131 0.135 0.149 
F-statistic 11.060 11.160 12.280 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table presents the results from the ordinary least square regressions for the effect of market competition 
on the relation between managerial ability and accrual earnings management. The sample includes 66,695 firm-year 
observations obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Accrual earnings management is measured by Stubben’s 
Model (2010). Managerial ability is measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012). Each column represents the 
estimates from examining a dummy measure of market competition in the following order: (1) market concentration 
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), (2) product substitutability measured by the gross margin in the 
industry, and (3) pricing power measured by the industry adjusted Lerner Index (LI). HHI is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where market concentration is lower than the median and zero otherwise. 
ProdSubstitutability is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where product substitutability is 
lower than the median and zero otherwise. PricPower is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has lower pricing 
power than the median and zero otherwise. Variables are defined in detail in the (Variable Definitions) section above. 
Each coefficient represents the change in accrual earnings management based on a one unit change in the 
determinant. The t values of the linear restriction tests (LRT) reflect the joint significance of the explanatory and 
moderating variables. The test is performed under the null hypothesis Ho:∝1+β1=0. Intercept is included, but not 
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Appendix C Table IV The moderating role of market competition in the relation between managerial ability 
and real earnings management (RealEM) 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Real earnings management  
    
MgrlAbilityit -0.310* -0.305*** -0.172** 
HHIit -0.017 - - 
ProdSubstitutabilityit - 0.000 - 
PricPowerit - - 0.051*** 
EarningsManagementi,t-1 0.536*** 0.537*** 0.536*** 
FirmSizeit 0.010* 0.010* 0.012** 
SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t 0.107** 0.107** 0.107** 
CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t -0.082 -0.084 -0.084 
OperCyclei,t-4,t 0.011 0.013 0.011 
Lossesi,t-4,t -0.042 -0.042 -0.080** 
NationalAuditorit 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 
LitigationIndit 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.104*** 
MBit 3.00e-05 3.07e-05 2.92e-05 
SalesGrowthrkit 0.025 0.027 0.043 
LnNumAnalystit 0.016 0.014 0.010 
IndRev% -0.001 0.014 0.034 
Momentumit -0.039 -0.040 -0.036 
Segmentsit -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
Foreignit 0.022 0.020 0.020 
GFCit 0.102 0.076 0.069 
Dot-Comit 0.063 0.035 0.033 
SOXit 0.110* 0.076 0.075 
(HHIit)MgrlAbilityit -0.075* - - 
(ProdSubstitutabilityit)MgrlAbilityit - -0.106 - 
(PricPowerit)MgrlAbilityit - - -0.208* 
t  -4.914 -3.653 -5.232 
R2 0.312 0.311 0.313 
F-statistic 140.250 139.890 140.310 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table presents the results from the ordinary least square regressions for the effect of market competition 
on the relation between managerial ability and real earnings management. The sample includes 66,695 firm-year 
observations obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Real earnings management is measured by Gunny’s 
Model (2010). Managerial ability is measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012). Each column represents the 
estimates from examining a dummy measure of market competition in the following order: (1) market concentration 
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), (2) product substitutability measured by the gross margin in the 
industry, and (3) pricing power measured by the industry adjusted Lerner Index (LI). HHI is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where market concentration is lower than the median and zero otherwise. 
ProdSubstitutability is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where product substitutability is 
lower than the median and zero otherwise. PricPower is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has lower pricing 
power than the median and zero otherwise. Variables are defined in detail in the (Variable Definitions) section above. 
Each coefficient represents the change in real earnings management based on a one unit change in the determinant. 
The t values of the linear restriction tests (LRT) reflect the joint significance of the explanatory and moderating 
variables. The test is performed under the null hypothesis Ho:∝1+β1=0. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, 
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Appendix C Table V The individual effect of managerial ability on accrual earnings management (AccrualEM) 
Variables Accrual earnings management 
  
MgrlAbilityit  0.973*** 
EarningsManagementi,t-1  -0.109*** 
FirmSizeit  0.128*** 
SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t  0.323*** 
CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t  0.033*** 
OperCyclei,t-4,t 0.013 
Lossesi,t-4,t  0.024 
NationalAuditorit  0.082*** 
LitigationIndit  -0.176*** 
MBit  8.65e-05*** 
SalesGrowthrkit  -0.688*** 
LnNumAnalystit  0.044*** 
IndRev%  -0.572*** 
Momentumit  0.298*** 
Segmentsit  -0.117*** 
Foreignit  -0.091** 
GFCit  -1.122*** 
Dot-Comit  -1.080*** 
SOXit  -1.009*** 
Hansen  1,512.910 
m1  -17.950 
m2  -0.760 
z1 627.450 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the individual 
effect of managerial ability on accrual earnings management. The sample includes 66,695 firm-year observations 
obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Accrual earnings management is measured by Stubben’s Model (2010). 
Managerial ability is measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012). Variables are defined in detail in the 
(Variable Definitions) section above. Each coefficient represents the change in accrual earnings management based 
on a one unit change in the determinant. Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions takes the shape of χ2 distribution 
and checks for the orthogonality between the instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) examines the serial correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) 
statistic and takes the shape of a normal distribution with N(0,1). m1 values represent the results of the 1st order serial 
correlation test, while m2 values represent the results of the 2nd order serial correlation test. The Wald test (z1) 
checks for the joint significance of the reported coefficients in the model. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, 
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Appendix C Table VI The individual effect of managerial ability on real earnings management (RealEM) 





















Hansen  1,536.760 
m1  -14.340 
m2 1.030 
z1 1,022.200 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the individual 
effect of managerial ability on real earnings management. The sample includes 66,695 firm-year observations 
obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Real earnings management is measured by Gunny’s Model (2010). 
Managerial ability is measured by the model of Demerjian et al. (2012). Variables are defined in detail in the 
(Variable Definitions) section above. Each coefficient represents the change in real earnings management based on a 
one unit change in the determinant. Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions takes the shape of χ2 distribution and 
checks for the orthogonality between the instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991) examines the serial correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and 
takes the shape of a normal distribution with N(0,1). m1 values represent the results of the 1st order serial correlation 
test, while m2 values represent the results of the 2nd order serial correlation test. The Wald test (z1) checks for the 
joint significance of the reported coefficients in the model. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes 
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Appendix C Table VII The individual effect of market competition on accrual earnings management 
(AccrualEM) 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Accrual earnings management 
    
HHIit 0.135*** - - 
ProdSubstitutabilityit - 0.169*** - 
PricPowerit - - 0.000*** 
EarningsManagementi,t-1  -0.115*** -0.118*** -0.121*** 
FirmSizeit  0.109*** 0.129*** 0.134*** 
SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t  0.339*** 0.307*** 0.307*** 
CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t  0.093*** 0.124*** 0.134*** 
OperCyclei,t-4,t 0.001 0.002 0.005* 
Lossesi,t-4,t  -0.096*** -0.031 -0.076*** 
NationalAuditorit  0.104*** 0.098*** 0.129*** 
LitigationIndit  -0.210*** -0.167*** -0.285*** 
MBit  1.57e-05 1.61e-05 5.36e-06 
SalesGrowthrkit  -0.495*** -0.494*** -0.467*** 
LnNumAnalystit  0.089*** 0.059*** 0.075*** 
IndRev%  -0.342*** -0.416*** -0.418*** 
Momentumit  0.516*** 0.581*** 0.526*** 
Segmentsit  -0.080*** -0.097*** -0.105*** 
Foreignit  -0.144*** -0.173*** -0.254*** 
GFCit  0.056** -0.238*** -0.925*** 
Dot-Comit  0.232*** -0.169*** -0.790*** 
SOXit  0.220*** -0.138*** -0.777*** 
Hansen  1,515.950 1,502.270 1,509.870 
m1  -17.840 -17.790 -17.770 
m2  -0.830 -1.020 -1.000 
z1 369.110 351.160 1,331.950 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the individual 
effects of market competition on accrual earnings management. The sample includes 66,695 firm-year observations 
obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Accrual earnings management is measured by Stubben’s Model (2010). 
Each column represents the estimates from examining a dummy measure of market competition in the following 
order: (1) market concentration measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), (2) product substitutability 
measured by the gross margin in the industry, and (3) pricing power measured by the industry adjusted Lerner Index 
(LI). HHI is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where market concentration is lower than the 
median and zero otherwise. ProdSubstitutability is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where 
product substitutability is lower than the median and zero otherwise. PricPower is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the firm has lower pricing power than the median and zero otherwise. Variables are defined in detail in the (Variable 
Definitions) section above. Each coefficient represents the change in accrual earnings management based on a one 
unit change in the determinant. Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions takes the shape of χ2 distribution and 
checks for the orthogonality between the instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991) examines the serial correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and 
takes the shape of a normal distribution with N(0,1). m1 values represent the results of the 1st order serial correlation 
test, while m2 values represent the results of the 2nd order serial correlation test. The Wald test (z1) checks for the 
joint significance of the reported coefficients in the model. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes 
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Appendix C Table VIII The individual effect of market competition on real earnings management (RealEM) 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Real earnings management  
    
HHIit 0.176*** - - 
ProdSubstitutabilityit - 0.088** - 
PricPowerit - - 0.000*** 
EarningsManagementi,t-1 0.288*** 0.287*** 0.290*** 
FirmSizeit 0.072*** 0.080*** 0.070*** 
SalesVolatilityi,t-4,t 0.255*** 0.290*** 0.217*** 
CashFlowVolatilityi,t-4,t 0.041*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 
OperCyclei,t-4,t 0.009 0.002 0.002 
Lossesi,t-4,t 0.024 0.044*** 0.036*** 
NationalAuditorit 0.184*** 0.198*** 0.192*** 
LitigationIndit 0.298*** 0.193*** 0.252*** 
MBit 3.24e-05*** 2.95e-05*** 2.82e-05*** 
SalesGrowthrkit -0.015* -0.010 0.004 
LnNumAnalystit 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 
IndRev% -0.126*** -0.070* -0.074** 
Momentumit -0.163*** -0.157*** -0.138*** 
Segmentsit -0.010 -0.020 0.007 
Foreignit 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.201*** 
GFCit -0.230*** 0.130*** 0.110*** 
Dot-Comit -0.121*** 0.220*** 0.166*** 
SOXit -0.137*** 0.192*** 0.215*** 
Hansen  1,540.150 1,531.660 1,539.560 
m1  -14.390 -15.530 -14.310 
m2 1.030 1.570 0.97 
z1 1,086.850 879.310 1,932.970 
Notes: This table presents the results from the system generalized method of moments regressions for the individual 
effects of market competition on real earnings management. The sample includes 66,695 firm-year observations 
obtained from Compustat from 1989 to 2011. Real earnings management is measured by Gunny’s Model (2010). 
Each column represents the estimates from examining a dummy measure of market competition in the following 
order: (1) market concentration measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), (2) product substitutability 
measured by the gross margin in the industry, and (3) pricing power measured by the industry adjusted Lerner Index 
(LI). HHI is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where market concentration is lower than the 
median and zero otherwise. ProdSubstitutability is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in an industry where 
product substitutability is lower than the median and zero otherwise. PricPower is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the firm has lower pricing power than the median and zero otherwise. Variables are defined in detail in the (Variable 
Definitions) section above. Each coefficient represents the change in real earnings management based on a one unit 
change in the determinant. Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions takes the shape of χ2 distribution and checks 
for the orthogonality between the instrumental variables (IVit) and the error term (εit). The AB test (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991) examines the serial correlation in the first difference residual (ʋit) by using the (mj) statistic and takes 
the shape of a normal distribution with N(0,1). m1 values represent the results of the 1st order serial correlation test, 
while m2 values represent the results of the 2nd order serial correlation test. The Wald test (z1) checks for the joint 
significance of the reported coefficients in the model. Intercept is included, but not tabulated. *, **, *** denotes 
















Earnings management occurs as a result of the conflict in interests arising from the 
separation of ownership from control in public companies. Three groups of motives are 
expected to influence earnings management behaviour including contracting, capital 
market, and third-party motives. However, these three groups are not completely 
independent and may overlap in determining earnings management behaviour. In this 
thesis I have examined the effect of management compensation and managerial ability 
from the contracting group and market concentration and competition from the third-
party group. Finally, I have studied how factors from both groups jointly influence 
earnings management.  
While the prior research has considered management compensation as one of the 
contracting motives, this thesis views it as an outcome of earnings management 
behaviour because firms tend to reward/punish managers through their compensation. 
Accordingly, the information asymmetry and moral hazard drive managers to signal 
better performance, while shareholders screen these signals to determine management 
compensation. The thesis contributes to the literature by documenting that while firms 
reward/punish their managers for accrual/real earnings management because of its 
lower/higher subsequent adverse consequences, they react less intensively when high 
quality managers are involved in the manipulation because of the high contracting costs 
and the big knowledge gap that make their activities less likely to be detected or 
understood. Nevertheless, superior managers continue to prefer using/avoiding 
accrual/real earnings management because of the overall positive/negative effect on 
their future compensation.  
At the external motives level, this thesis expects a non-linear effect of market 
concentration on earnings management based on the role of market concentration in 
increasing information asymmetry and decreasing communication costs at the same 






time. The results show that while firms are more likely to use accrual earnings 
management as information quantity decreases in concentrated market, they prefer the 
sophisticated real earnings management as the information quality decreases. The thesis 
contributes to the literature by identifying an optimal level of market concentration 
where both accrual and real earnings management are declining at the same time.  
Finally, as the different motives of earnings management are unlikely to be 
independent, market competition at the external level may interact with managerial 
ability at the contractual level in determining earnings management behaviour. While 
market competition increases the costs of communicating information in the market and 
thus may stimulate earnings management, the response of high quality managers is 
sophisticated as they possess the abilities to provide better performance which is 
difficult to be monitored due to their high contracting costs with the firms. The thesis 
contributes to the literature by documenting a different response of more able managers 
who prefer using accrual earnings management under the pressure of competition 
compared to other managers who continue using both accrual and real earnings 
management.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.2 provides a 
summary of the objectives and results of the three empirical chapters of this thesis. 
Section 9.3 explains the implications of the thesis to the regulators, policy makers, 
shareholders, investors, gatekeepers, and academics. Finally, section 9.4 presents the 
research limitations and suggests some recommendations for the future studies to take 
into consideration based on the results of this thesis.  
 
9.2 Summary of Results 
This thesis has focused on management compensation, managerial ability, market 
concentration and market competition as some of the contractual and external motives 
of earnings management. Chapter 2 has discussed the definitions, activities, and 
measurement of earnings management. Chapter 3 has established the theoretical 
framework of this thesis. Chapter 4 has summarized the three main groups of motives of 
earnings management. Chapter 5 has explained the data and research methods used in 
the thesis. Chapter 6 represents the first empirical chapter of this thesis and has 






examined the impact of earnings management and managerial ability on management 
compensation. Chapter 7 is the second empirical chapter and has studied the non-linear 
relationship between market concentration and earnings management. Finally, chapter 8 
is the third empirical chapter and has examined the role of market competition in the 
relation between managerial ability and earnings management. In this section I 
summarize the main objectives and findings of the three empirical chapters of this thesis.   
 
9.2.1 Management Compensation: The Impact of Earnings Management and 
Managerial Ability 
Although compensation has been extensively examined as a contractual motive of 
earnings management, the impact of earnings management on executives’ compensation 
has not been considered in the literature to my knowledge. The objective of this 
empirical chapter is to examine the previous relation and use it to explain the behaviour 
of high quality managers in using more accrual and less real earnings management, 
taking into consideration the different economic consequences of each activity to the 
firm. To achieve this objective, I first examine the effect of managerial ability on 
management compensation. Second, I examine the impact of both accrual and real 
earnings management on management compensation. Finally, I examine whether the 
previous influence changes at the different levels of managerial ability. 
First, I find that firms tend to attract or retain managers with better abilities by 
rewarding them with higher compensation. Due to the sophisticated nature of their 
decisions, superior managers receive better compensation as the positive consequences 
of their decisions are realized over time. The optimal pay-performance structure 
motivates managers to share risk and thus mitigates the information asymmetry and 
moral hazard problems arising from the separation of ownership and control. 
Second, although accrual and real earnings management can be used by the 
managers to signal better performance, real earnings management is screened by the 
shareholders as a more costly activity when detected in the future. Accrual earnings 
management allows managers to extract better compensation because it enables them to 
improve their performance measures without influencing firms’ future cash flows. In 
contrast, real earnings management results in a reduction of managers’ future 






compensation because it has serious economic consequences on the firm’s future 
performance. As a result, while real earnings management is considered more costly 
than accrual earnings management from the firm’s perspective because it severely 
influences firms’ future performance, it is also considered more costly from 
management’s perspective because it drives a reduction in future compensation.  
Finally, high quality managers continue to prefer using accrual earnings 
management because it has an overall positive effect on their future compensation. In 
contrast, they avoid real earnings management due to its overall negative effect. In this 
sense, real earnings management is perceived more costly than accrual earnings 
management not only from the firm and management points of view, but also from the 
perspective of high quality executives.  
 
9.2.2 Market Concentration and Earnings Management: A Non-Linear 
Relationship 
The objective of this empirical chapter is to examine a non-linear relation between 
market concentration and earnings management based on two different perspectives in 
the agency theory and the revelation principle. While it is more difficult to monitor 
performance in concentrated markets because of the higher information asymmetry 
between the firms and the stakeholders, the presence of fewer competitors makes 
communicating information less costly. The literature supports the previous points of 
view and documents a positive linear effect of market concentration on earnings 
management in some instances (Dalia and Park, 2009; Markarian and Santalo, 2010; 
Karuna et al., 2012) and a negative linear effect in others (Datta et al., 2013). Therefore, 
I initially examine the non-linear effect of market concentration on earnings 
management. Then, I explain this effect through the asymmetry of information in the 
market.  
First, I find a non-linear effect of market concentration on earnings management 
that takes an inverted U shape when accrual earnings management is the regressand and 
U shape in the case of real earnings management. Accrual earnings management 
increases at market concentration levels between 0 and 55% but starts decreasing after 
that level, while real earnings management decreases at market concentration levels 






between 0 and 60% but starts increasing afterwards. The results are in line with the 
contrasting effects of market concentration that involve high information asymmetry 
and low communication costs at the same time.  
While the quantity of information decreases steadily in concentrated markets, 
the quality of information increases up to market concentration levels of 55% - 60% 
then starts decreasing. The reason is that firms get less threatened to lose their 
competitive advantages in concentrated markets and thus provide high quality 
information that allows analysts to make better forecasts. However, at high levels of 
market concentration, firms collude to hide information and thus make it difficult for 
the analysts to produce quality forecasts. These findings explain the increase in accrual 
earnings management at lower levels of market concentration because of the decrease in 
information quantity in the market, and the use of real earnings management at higher 
levels of market concentration due to the lack of quality information to monitor firms’ 
sophisticated activities. 
 
9.2.3 Earnings Management, Managerial Ability and the Role of Competition 
Managerial ability and market competition are not independent and thus they are likely 
to interact in determining the levels of earnings management. While managerial ability 
influences the contracting costs between managers and shareholders, competition 
changes the costs of communicating information to those shareholders. In this sense, the 
previously documented behaviour of superior managers using more accrual and less real 
earnings management may change under the pressure of market competition. Therefore, 
the objective of this empirical chapter is to examine the influence of market competition 
on accrual and real earnings managed by high quality managers.  
I initially find that market competition has a positive effect on the relation 
between managerial ability and accrual earnings management. While market 
competition drives more adverse selection by increasing the cost of communicating 
information in the market, superior managers become more selective in their behaviour. 
Therefore, they choose more accrual earnings management because it is perceived less 
costly from the firm and management perspectives at the same time. 






Finally, I find that managers use more real earnings management under the 
pressure of the high communication costs in competitive markets. However, superior 
managers select to avoid using real earnings management because they are able to 
realize its severe consequences to the firm and its management in the future. Therefore, 
I find that market competition decreases the amount of real earnings managed by high 
quality managers. The results imply that market competition and managerial ability 
together contribute to the welfare of the firm in the long run.  
 
9.3 Implications 
The previous findings have implications to be considered by regulators, policy makers, 
shareholders, investors, academics, and some of the gatekeepers e.g., auditors and 
analysts. First, while real earnings management involves some economic consequences 
to the firm because it contributes to decreasing future cash flows and sacrificing the 
long term projects, it results in lower compensation to managers at different levels of 
abilities. Therefore, real earnings management is considered a costly activity to the 
firms, managers, and even to the top quality executives. However, more effort should be 
invested by regulators in communicating the previous consequences of real earnings 
management to the different stakeholders e.g., shareholders, investors, and managers, in 
addition to emphasizing the role of the gatekeepers, e.g., auditors, in reporting such 
activities.  
 Second, market concentration cannot be considered absolutely good or bad to 
the economy. An optimal level has been identified in Chapter 7 at intermediate levels of 
market concentration where both accrual and real earnings management are decreasing. 
Therefore, while anti-competition laws attempt to mitigate the high levels of market 
concentration, the previous findings of this thesis suggest that both high and low levels 
of market concentration increase the likelihood of different types of earnings 
management activities. Therefore, it is more recommended that such laws emphasize 
the optimal level of market concentration that allows for optimal information and thus 
contributes to mitigating the agency conflict and avoiding more concentrated markets in 
the future.  The optimal market concentration assists industry regulators to keep a 
balance between firms entering and exiting the market. Furthermore, it emphasizes the 






role of analysts as gatekeepers that may contribute to enlarging the optimal level of 
market concentration by providing higher quality forecasts.  
Finally, earnings management motives at the firm level cannot be considered 
independently from those at the industry level when explaining management decisions. 
Therefore, any regulation that attempts to mitigate one motive at a specific level has to 
consider it with respect to the other motives at a different level. For example, while 
market competition drives more real earnings management when examined individually, 
this thesis documents that it results in less real earnings management when considered 
together with managerial ability. In this sense, both factors serve as strong governance 
mechanisms in preventing the costly real earnings management. Explaining the 
interaction between earnings management motives at different levels assists regulators 
in identifying firms at higher risk of earnings management and ultimately helps 
investors and shareholders in making better decisions. 
 
9.4 Limitations and Future Research 
While the thesis has examined the costs of accrual and real earnings management from 
the perspective of managers with different abilities, the previous costs should be also 
considered at other contracting levels e.g., position in the executive team, tenure in the 
firm, years remaining to retirement, and the mobility of a manager to other firms. 
Distinguishing between the costs of earnings management strategies for the different 
types of managers would assist in further mitigating the costly earnings management 
activities. In addition, although the time period covered in chapter 6 of this thesis is still 
long enough to run a panel data methodology (15 years from 1992 to 2006), up to date 
data from new sources can be obtained to confirm the previous results or perform the 
suggested new ideas.   
Although the literature has focused on market concentration measures when 
studying competition, the contradicting theoretical points of view regarding the impact 
of market concentration on earnings management can be also extended when 
considering the other measures of market competition. In this sense, competition is 
expected to play a double-edged role because of the increased communication costs and 
the decrease in information asymmetry at the same time. For future research, I 






recommend examining a non-linear impact of the other measures of market competition 
e.g., product substitutability and market pricing power, on earnings management as it 
may provide a new understanding of this area of research.  
Finally, the contracting motives, capital market motives, and third-party motives 
of earnings management are unlikely to be independent in reality. While this thesis has 
examined the interaction of managerial ability as a contracting motive and market 
competition as a third-party motive, prior studies have almost ignored this area of 
research. To my knowledge, the study of Bushman et al. (2013) examines the influence 
of the voting rights as a corporate governance mechanism and market competition as an 
external motive on the loan loss provision in the banking sector of 46 countries. It 
documents that the role of weak governance in motivating earnings management can be 
mitigated by bank competition. Future studies should consider such related factors at 
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